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4IntroductIon: ratIonalIsatIon and convergIng 
HIgHer educatIon PolIcIes
As a sector of the economy, higher education has been the subject of sub-
stantial change in the last couple of decades, not least due to the exponen-
tial growth in the number of students and institutions, often seen as 
pertaining to the phenomena of massification (Trow and Burrage 2010). 
All over the world, organisational fields and their specific institutions, such 
as universities, have similarities in organisational design and activities. In 
many countries, universities have experienced a shift towards ‘academic 
capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie 1999) and are operating as ‘entrepre-
neurial universities’ (Clark 1998; Etzkowitz et al. 2008). Rationalisation 
of the universities as organisational actors has been done via the introduc-
tion of a more formal structure in terms of a stronger emphasis on quality 
assurance, evaluation, accountability measures and incentive systems. 
These can be considered a transnational process linked to the New Public 
Management (NPM) type of governance reforms (Ramirez and 
Christensen 2013; Seeber et al. 2015).
The social mechanisms of spreading ideas of rationalisation can be 
highlighted through the perspective of institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Literature on isomorphism concentrates on 
the increasing similarity of organisational and institutional structures and 
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5cultures. Studies on policy convergence instead focus on changes in 
national policy characteristics. Policy convergence, that is, the develop-
ment of similar or identical policies across countries over time (Knill 
2005), seems to be particularly evident in Nordic countries. They show 
similar types of policy development in many significant areas of higher 
education policy, particularly those related to governance.
One of the most important reasons behind policy convergence is inter-
national policy promotion, where an actor with expertise in a policy field 
promotes certain policies. International (or supranational) organisations 
specialising in certain policy fields are the main actors for inducing the 
convergence of policies. This happens when they actively promote certain 
policies and define objectives and standards, as well as arguments, to sup-
port their case in an international setting. Countries diverging from pro-
moted policy models may feel pressure to comply with the policies 
(Holzinger and Knill 2005; Knill 2005).
There are two overarching international political processes relating to 
higher education in Europe which presumably have a significant impact on 
the policy convergence: the higher education ‘Modernisation Agenda’ 
(European Commission 2006, 2011), promoted under the auspices of the 
EU institutions (European Commission, in particular), and the intergov-
ernmental Bologna process (Moisio 2014). Many of the NPM ideals 
implemented in Nordic universities, such as promoting the accountability 
and autonomy of higher education institutions and improving the gover-
nance, funding, quality and relevance of higher education, are directly 
aligned with the Commission’s Modernisation Agenda. Interestingly, the 
Modernisation Agenda presents the American higher education system 
and universities in particular as one of the important points of comparison 
in developing European higher education (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012; 
Slaughter and Taylor 2016).
Similarly, the Bologna process seems to increase policy convergence at 
the European level, even though research evidence for this is not yet 
entirely clear (Witte 2008). However, Voegtle et  al. (2011) found that 
higher education policies of Bologna participants converge more strongly 
and that the Bologna process has made a crucial difference in increasing 
the similarity of higher education policies. Particularly in the area of qual-
ity assurance, the majority of Bologna signatories implemented most of 
the measures. They also included all the required actors into their quality 
assurance measures according to Bologna standards by 2008 (Voegtle 
et al. 2011).
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the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) are highly influential actors in higher 
education policy convergence (e.g. see Shahjahan and Madden 2015). At 
the European and Nordic level, the OECD has the most notably high 
level of impact on policy convergence. Nation states, including Nordic 
countries, often rely on the OECD to provide them with the latest data on 
trends, current issues and policy options. The OECD uses conferences, 
trend and review reports and the mediation of policy language to influ-
ence the thinking of national-level policymakers within and outside of its 
member countries (Shahjahan and Madden 2015). For instance, the 
OECD’s thematic reviews can provide strong legitimisation or justifica-
tion to national governments for initiating policy reforms, as has happened 
in Finland (Kallo 2009).
In addition to the influence of international organisations, cross- 
national policy convergence might simply be the result of similar but inde-
pendent responses caused by the countries reacting to the same types of 
policy problems (Knill 2005; Bennett 1991). At the same time, conver-
gence in policies is more likely in countries that are characterised by high 
institutional similarity. Policies tend to be implemented insofar as they fit 
with existing cultures, socio-economic structures and institutional arrange-
ments. In their search for relevant policy models, states are expected to 
look to the experiences of those countries with which they share an espe-
cially close set of cultural similarities and ties (Knill 2005).
However, although policy convergence is clearly observable across the 
Nordic countries, it is important to note that similar policies are intro-
duced at different points in time and with important variations in the 
details. For instance, all the Nordic countries have introduced performance- 
based funding systems linked to the distribution of resources for basic 
research. Yet, performance is measured using different indicators and 
redistribution potentials. The effects are also somewhat different. There 
seems to be more convergence in policy ideas and policy rhetoric than in 
actual policy implementation. Other examples of these dynamics are found 
in relation to the overall governance and management structures, as well 
as to the national quality assurance systems linked to education.
Reforms inspired by the NPM have had a profound effect on the inter-
nal structures and governance arrangements of public higher education 
institutions in the Nordic countries. The impact has been further 
 K. PULKKINEN ET AL.
7 strengthened by parallel calls for increasing accountability and efficiency 
(Pinheiro et  al. 2014). Yet, few studies to date have systematically and 
comparatively investigated what types of effects the so-called modernisa-
tion efforts have had on teaching and research performance in publicly 
run and funded universities. This book responds to this gap in knowledge 
and brings forth new data and comparative analysis of universities in the 
Nordic countries.
The environmental conditions under which Nordic higher education 
institutions operate have changed dramatically in the last two decades. 
Policy efforts aimed at modernising the sector have paid considerable 
attention to the way in which public universities operate. A strong focus 
has been given to managerially inspired aspects, such as efficiency, effec-
tiveness and accountability (de Boer and Enders 2017). In addition to 
managing their internal operations in more cost-efficient manners, public 
universities are increasingly expected to respond to the needs of various, 
rather different, external stakeholder groups. In light of the social contract 
that exists between the universities and society that, in essence, funds 
them, interacting with the surrounding society has become a task to be 
tackled actively (Fumasoli et al. 2014; de Jong et al. 2016). One of the 
many mechanisms being used to achieve these goals relies on enhancing 
the rationalisation of internal structures and activities by promoting pro-
fessional management. As a result, most Nordic universities have devel-
oped extended administrative structures, ranging from central to unit 
levels. These structures have been designed to be capable of strategically 
supporting the primary activities of universities, that is, teaching and 
research (Amaral et al. 2003). Some have introduced changes in the nomi-
nation of formal leaders, that is, they are appointed rather than elected.
Reform efforts are both costly and demanding for the personnel. 
Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the extent to which they generate the 
expected results. Consideration should be given to the cost-efficient man-
agement of the universities as well as to the situations of the personnel 
whose task is to perform their duties according to the academic quality 
criteria in the midst of extensive reforms. As a key sector of the economy, 
it is necessary to take stock of the ways in which the higher education sec-
tor has changed performance-wise as a result of government-led and/or 
initiated reform efforts.
This is, in many ways, the case with Nordic countries, which are 
characterised by a welfare state ideology and development of the public 
sector within this framework. Moreover, they are relatively similar in 
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same type of political systems and political values. In terms of policy 
challenges, all Nordic countries have to deal with the financial, social 
and political sustainability of the Nordic welfare model which, in turn, 
as has been mentioned before, has triggered government-led reform 
efforts under the label of NPM, particularly in the higher education 
sector. In all countries, universities are expected to play an increasingly 
important role in  local and national economic development and to 
spur innovation. Such expectations have further intensified govern-
ment-led efforts to modernise the higher education sector in all Nordic 
countries but have also led to calls from the higher education sector to 
balance governmental funding and leeway regarding, for example, 
autonomy to better match with the growing demands for more diverse 
activities.
Before moving forward, we provide a brief note on the Nordic region, 
which is the geographical focus of this book. The Nordic region is situ-
ated in Northern Europe, and the Nordic countries are generally consid-
ered to include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 
including their associated territories (Greenland, the Faroe Islands and 
the Åland Islands) (Fig. 1.1). The region shares a strong cultural history 
and is known for its commitment to social-democratic values, equal 
opportunity and a generous but financially sustainable welfare state 
model (Hilson 2008). The Nordic region ranks rather high internation-
ally across a multiplicity of comparative dimensions, ranging from inno-
vation to trust in government to educational quality to quality of life. 
One of its great successes has been its ability to combine a strong safety 
net for its citizens, together with the adoption of market-based mecha-
nisms (open economy) aimed at increasing its global competitiveness. 
When compared to other countries, and as a whole, the Nordics were 
able to withstand the pressures emanating from the 2008 financial crisis, 
despite being affected differently as a result of their economic profile and 
vulnerability to global export markets. That being said, as is the case 
elsewhere, the region faces a series of challenges, including but not lim-
ited to an ageing population, an over-reliance on particular industries 
(economic specialisation) and the need to reform the pension system 
(Norden 2014).
The next section provides information on the research project that pro-
vided the framework for the current volume.
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Aim and Research Problem
This volume reports on the results emanating from a three-year (fall 
2014–summer 2017) comparative, international research project entitled 
“Does It Really Matter? Assessing the Performance Effects of Changes in 
Leadership and Management Structures in Nordic Higher Education”, 
funded by the Norwegian Research Council in the context of its FINNUT 
Fig. 1.1 The Nordic countries as the geographical focus of the book (excluding 
Iceland). Source: Mapswire.com. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License
 DOES IT REALLY MATTER? ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE EFFECTS… 
10
programme (Research and Innovation in the Educational Sector). The 
study’s focus was on the relationship between changes in formal leadership 
structures and performance shifts and was substantiated around the fol-
lowing research problem:
• To what extent are changes in leadership and management structures 
related to shifts in teaching and research performance in public univer-
sities across the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland) in the last decade?
In doing so, it illuminated three key dimensions:
 1. the key drivers promoting the rationalisation of academic activities in 
general and, specifically, the rise of managerialism within public 
universities,
 2. the roles played by both internal (academics and administrators alike) 
and external actors in strengthening the managerial structures (cen-
tral and unit levels) of universities and
 3. the effects of changes in leadership/managerial structures in the 
(teaching and research) performance of individual subunits, as well 
as in the behaviours of internal actors.
In a nutshell, the study provided both a quantitative assessment of 
formal structures and a qualitative interpretation of the meanings held by 
social agents (central and unit levels) associated with those same struc-
tures, for example, on being ‘modern’, ‘responsive’, ‘accountable’, ‘entre-
preneurial’ and so on. Rather than simply focusing on generating new sets 
of empirical data, the study aimed to advance new perspectives for theoris-
ing ongoing rationalisation processes on the basis of the various disciplin-
ary traditions and competencies brought together in the multidisciplinary 
research team, the core of which was composed of the authors of the cur-
rent volume.
Theoretical Foundation
Organisations have traditionally been conceived as either instruments, or 
tools to reach certain ends (goals), or as institutions, that is, having lives of 
their own (Scott 2008). Both views have merits and provide important 
insights on the dynamics facing modern organisations across the public 
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and private sectors. The rational view of organisations (c.f. Scott 2003: 
33–55) views internal behaviour as resulting from the purposeful actions 
of a set of coordinated social agents within a given local setting (Battilana 
2006; Hay and Wincott 1998). Key elements like goal specificity and the 
formalisation of structures and procedures are seen as critical to the ‘ratio-
nality of organizational action’ (Scott 2003: 34), therefore ranking high 
on the managerial agenda. The general assumption in the literature is that, 
as a process, rationalisation is, first and foremost, substantiated around the 
formal structure of organisations (Thompson 2008; Pfeffer 1997):
[…] in rules that assure participants will behave in ways calculated to achieve 
desired objectives, in cognitive decision-premises that guide individual deci-
sion making, in control arrangements that evaluate performance and detect 
deviance, in reward systems that motivate participants to carry out prescribed 
tasks, and in the set of criteria by which participants are selected, replaced, 
and promoted. (Scott 2003: 54; emphasis added)
The rational systems’ view of organisations, vividly contested by many 
(March and Olsen 2006a), puts a preferential emphasis on the role of for-
malised rules (plans, strategies, programmes, etc.) and normative struc-
tures (roles, sanctions, regulations, etc.). In doing so, this view disregards 
more tacit dimensions, such as the effects of macro-level scripts (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) and the preferences and behavioural patterns of organ-
isational participants (Powell and Colyvas 2008). Proponents of rational 
systems argue that structural (often hierarchical) arrangements play a criti-
cal role in the ways in which organisations interact with, and respond to, 
environmental demands (Selznick 1984). Leadership structures are cele-
brated, with the lower levels of the organisations primarily involved in the 
implementation, rather than problem assessment, of the key decisions 
undertaken at higher levels (Blau and Scott 2003).
In (continental) Europe, the basic structural features of academic 
organisations, that is, decentralisation of authority, loose-coupling of 
structures, multiplicity of tasks, unclear goals, complex technologies and 
so on (Pinheiro 2012; Clark 1983), have not traditionally been conducive 
to the implementation of centralised models of decision-making (Amaral 
et al. 2003). This is particularly the case when it comes to both the speed 
and scope of university responses to external demands (Hölttä and 
Karjalainen 1997). For example, Musselin (2007) contended that:
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[…] in universities, formal structures and procedures, even if numerous, 
rarely favor cooperation and coordination. They hardly define what to do 
and how to do it because of the specific characteristics of teaching and 
research […] As a result, changing the formal structures most of the time 
has no effect […] formal rules and structures weakly support hierarchical 
power. (Musselin 2007: 75)
Over the years and in many countries, including those within the 
Nordic region, the conception of traditional or classic research-intensive 
universities was that of ‘ivory towers’, that is, closed systems isolated from 
the dynamics of their surrounding environments (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). 
A key item in the policy agenda on national and supranational levels has 
been to institute a series of structural reforms in order to redesign univer-
sities. This is partly a result of the rise of a global knowledge-based soci-
ety/economy (Maassen and Stensaker 2011) and partly due to the 
strategic imperatives surrounding the modernisation of the Nordic welfare 
state (Castells and Himanen 2004). This is particularly the case with those 
with a long historical record. The aim has been to make them more adap-
tive and responsive to external events and stakeholder demands (Maassen 
2009; Etzkowitz 2001; Pinheiro and Stensaker 2013). In other words, 
ongoing reform processes aim at transforming public universities into 
organisational actors. There is a push towards becoming tightly integrated, 
goal-oriented and competitive entities which deliberately or strategically 
choose their own actions and are held accountable for their own behav-
iours (Krücken and Meier 2006; Ramirez 2010). In these circumstances, 
rationalisation measures such as the strengthening of managerial and lead-
ership structures play an increasingly important role (Teichler 2005; 
Krücken 2011).
The view of universities as rational(ised) tools or instruments for reach-
ing certain pre-determined goals or ends (Olsen 2007) pays considerable 
attention to the technical or material-resource features of the environment 
(c.f. Scott 2003: 133). These aspects are intrinsically related to the daily 
management and operations of universities, as well as their performance. 
In such circumstances, social agency is characterised by what March and 
Olsen (2006b) called the ‘logic of consequences’. According to this logic, 
university actors behave in ways that are congruent with the successful 
realisation of strategic objectives either set internally by the central admin-
istration or emanating from the outside (government/funding agencies). 
For example, this is clearly visible in the prominence given to contractual 
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arrangements (Gornitzka et al. 2004) and/or the rise of what Rip (2004) 
has termed ‘strategic science regimes’ in academia.
Yet, there are those who have convincingly argued that most organ-
isations, universities included, are not simply instruments or tools at the 
mercy of certain internal (managers) or external (governments) social 
agents (Selznick 1966; Olsen 2007). They contended that internal 
rules, both formal and informal, and standard operating procedures like 
the allocation of academic power or authority (Tapper and Palfreyman 
2011) cannot be changed arbitrarily (Maassen 2009; Maassen and 
Olsen 2007). Prior consent from academics at the unit level is similarly 
necessary for the definition of university strategic objectives (Zechlin 
2010). Such limitations are seen to safeguard what Clark (1998) referred 
to as the academic heartland. This is the view held by most institutional 
scholars who, amongst other aspects, have argued against the limita-
tions of ‘means-ends rationality’ while assessing change dynamics within 
organisations (Greenwood et  al. 2008; Powell and DiMaggio 1991), 
universities included (Maassen and Olsen 2007; Pinheiro et al. 2012; 
Gornitzka 1999).
Regarding the rationalisation processes, it is worth bearing in mind that 
this is far from unique for the higher education sector. It follows the ratio-
nalisation of administrative structures across the entire public sector and 
even across the entire organisational landscape (Brunsson and Sahlin- 
Andersson 2000). Thus, studies shedding light on ongoing attempts at 
transforming public organisations along the lines of New Public 
Management reform regimes (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Hood 
1991, 1995) provided important insights for our study. We paid particular 
attention to the nature and degree of response to such transformative 
processes by social agents at the local (micro) level (Oliver 1991; Powell 
and Colyvas 2008) within the broad context of mimetic isomorphic pro-
cesses/collective rationality (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and the need 
for securing (internal and external) legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman 
2008). This includes, but is not limited to, the role played by such critical 
aspects as the de-coupling of structural arrangements (Bastedo 2007) and/
or their contextualisation or local translation (Czarniawska-Joerges and 
Sevón 2005).
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Conceptual Backdrop
 Visions of the University
The study’s conceptual framework is built on the work of Johan P. Olsen 
(2007) on the visions of the (European) university. Olsen made a distinc-
tion between an instrumental and institutional view of universities. In the 
former, the focus is on universities as means to achieve certain pre- 
determined ends (e.g. policy goals or managerial aspirations); the latter 
sheds light on the university as a relatively independent fiduciary institu-
tion characterised by a life (norms, identity, inner dynamics) of its own. 
Following seminal work on formal organisations (Cohen and March 1974; 
March and Olsen 1979; Olsen 1988), Olsen advanced four stylised visions, 
or a typology (along two dimensions; autonomy vs. conflict), on the mod-
ern university. The typology was based on different assumptions about 
what the university is for as well as the circumstances under which it will 
operate appropriately. At the heart of Olsen’s inquiry was this question: 
what type of university for what type of society? (Table 1.1).
The four visions represent key features of universities as organisations 
and institutions. They are thought to be complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive, that is, key features associated with the four visions are 
present at any moment in time, shaping dynamics within a given 
organisation:
The four stylized visions are based on assumptions which make it unlikely 
that any of them alone can capture current university practices. As less than 
perfect approximations to the abstract visions, universities as practices show 
“a shocking diversity” (Neave 2003: 151), and the relations between uni-
versities, public authorities and society are characterized by a great variety of 
forms of interaction, intervention and control (Hood et al. 2004: Part III). 
(Olsen 2007: 33)
In the FINNUT-PERFACAD study, an issue of particular relevance 
was that of the interplay between different types of actors and their various 
roles in the broader higher education system. First, the interplay between 
internal and external dimensions of universities places pressure on the uni-
versity governance systems. This reflects the instrumental view in Olsen’s 
typology, as the interplay presumes that expectations exist between the 
external stakeholders and the internal university dynamics. It further 
implies that these expectations are mutual, that is, directed not only from 
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Table 1.1 Visions of the European university
Source: Olsen (2007: 30). Figure used with permission from Springer.
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the external inwards but also from the university towards the external 
players. The second interplay refers to the degree of internal conflict within 
the university institutions, which relates to the institutional view in Olsen’s 
typology. It presumes that there is a shared foundation in the core values 
of the university institution. However, it accounts less for the differences 
in which the multiple professions in universities adapt to changes in the 
operational and working environment. In short, the university institution 
is seen to function in a constantly changing context in which a multiplicity 
of adaptive measures are necessary. Next, we inspect the different dimen-
sions of interplay which formed a core qualifying factor for Olsen’s typol-
ogy and furthered the conceptual framework for our study.
 Adaptation of University Governance Between Multiple Pressures
Higher education institutions are public organisations and operate in a 
highly institutionalised environment (laden with rules, regulations and 
procedures). They are heavily dependent on public resources to finance 
their core activities. As such, higher education institutions are susceptible 
to shifts in governance arrangements. Yet, these internal changes do not 
occur in a linear manner, and universities are far from being passive recipi-
ents of reform agendas. As institutions, universities have both a history 
and lives of their own. They are also characterised by multiple internal 
constituencies (academics, administrators, students, managers). 
Universities have traditionally been bottom heavy and loosely coupled 
organisations which change only through minor local adjustments and 
where academics have had a lot of autonomy to act and direct their own 
activities (Bleiklie et al. 2017; Clark 1983; Fumasoli and Stensaker 2013; 
Weick 1976). Internal factors have traditionally been essential in the gov-
ernance of university dynamics, and a kind of vision of the university has 
been ‘a self-governing community of scholars’ (Olsen 2007).
Historically speaking, universities have proven to be rather resilient to 
shifts in political orientations and economic regimes. They are able to 
decouple themselves from short-term political imperatives (Bastedo 
2007). However, due to globalisation, knowledge society development, 
changes in political thinking and financial stringency, universities are 
increasingly embedded in competitive markets, wider material  resources 
and institutional environments. They have social connections, not only to 
internal academic constituencies and disciplines but also to policymakers 
and other external stakeholders (Bleiklie et al. 2017; Scott 2003; Williams 
and Kitaev 2005). This implies that universities are increasingly governed 
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with external environmental demands and factors (Olsen 2007). All these 
aspects (and others) play an important role in the ways in which universi-
ties respond to shifts in government policy.
In looking at the reforms of public institutions’ autonomy in general 
and university organisations in particular, assumptions regarding the ratio-
nale for autonomy appear. One key assumption is that reforms can be 
implemented only if administrative autonomy is strengthened. Such 
actions come tied to increased external result control, financial incentives 
and competitions (Fumasoli et al. 2014). This constitutes a double-edged 
sword: while input autonomy is granted to the public organisation, output 
control is kept tightly in the hands of the government (Verhoest et  al. 
2004). A second key assumption is the expectation that autonomy will 
semi-automatically strengthen competitiveness and specialisation, thus 
being beneficial to the public institution in comparison to other similar 
organisations acting in the same market (Fumasoli et  al. 2014). 
Effectiveness, economic efficiency and a better competitive edge with 
regard to quality through prioritisation are expected to follow as a result 
of increased autonomy.
The interaction between the state and universities can be viewed as an 
interdependent principle–agent relationship (de Jong et  al. 2016). 
Rational choice theory guides the thinking in which the institutional lead-
ership of the agent is seen to lean on self-interest, while the principal 
requires control mechanisms as well as incentives to guide the action 
(Fumasoli et al. 2014). A social contract exists between the two actors in 
which the state provides funds to universities to perform research and 
teaching of the highest level. Policymakers need the information produced 
by the universities, not only for society at large but also, and in particular, 
to provide guidance on how to tackle complex and often ambiguous pol-
icy problems. Knowledge regimes, such as universities, act as sense-mak-
ing apparatuses. In policy settings, sense-making includes power struggles 
as well as contestations and negotiation. Similarly, in universities, sense-
making processes vary depending on how they are organised (Campbell 
and Pedersen 2014).
The policy guidance and control provided by the state (funder) to the 
universities in return for services rendered constitute a form of a social 
contract. Relevance of science to society is a central aspect of the contract. 
However, the meaning of relevance is not a constant; rather, it evolves in 
time and reflects the general societal development. Relevance changes 
over time in line with the ideas of what benefits science can bring to  society 
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(Hessels et al. 2009). Knowledge regimes are fields of the policy research 
organisations and institutions that govern them. They are organisational 
and institutional machineries that generate data, research and policy rec-
ommendations, as well as other ideas that influence policy debate 
(Campbell and Pedersen 2014). The idea follows the same line of thought 
as Olsen’s typology (2007), where the universities may be seen as instru-
ments of national policies while also as leaning on a base of a community 
of scholars. In other words, universities are expertise-based institutions 
that simultaneously aim to influence policies proactively and respond to 
policy initiatives reactively.
The relationship between the state and the universities can be seen as 
based on highly different grounds. Universities have traditionally viewed 
themselves as communities of scholars where strong autonomy guarantees 
high quality and trustworthy research and teaching (Olsen 2007). As a 
result of this view, society is considered to benefit from a strong science 
basis without unnecessary middlemen. The state can be seen to sell the 
university free hands to manage its tasks in the way it sees fittest. In 
 contrast—and juxtaposing this view with another classification of Olsen’s 
typology—the university is an instrument of national policies. The state 
funds research and highest teaching with the condition that the university 
performs its duties in a transparent and cost-efficient manner (Olsen 
2007). As a result, tax funds are used to support the development of soci-
ety in ways that are deemed relevant. Activities are reported responsibly 
and in a way that demonstrates the accountability of the university institu-
tion towards the state funder and broader society. However, the autonomy 
of science is dependent on a non-autonomous economic and manage-
ment system.
The concept of universities as specific kinds of organisations with lim-
ited rationality and loosely coupled has begun to change. The institutional 
form of universities lives in the midst of a socio-political (and economic) 
struggle characterised by pressures to reconsider their role, regulatory 
practices and funding arrangements, as well as the processes that link uni-
versities to other societal actors. Now, universities are increasingly trans-
forming into penetrated hierarchies that are managed organisations with a 
central leadership and formalised rule systems (Bleiklie et  al. 2015). 
Strategic actorhood has become a key aspect in this. Penetrated hierarchies 
balance between multiple pressures from a broad range of external actors 
and stakeholders who hold power in the funding and prestige of the uni-
versities. As such, this creates a dependence that affects the internal power 
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structures, control mechanisms and working practices of universities. The 
academically focused pressures have been joined by managerial perfor-
mance demands, not only from the government but also from other exter-
nal actors who share an interest in how the university institution is 
managed. Yet, the ability of universities to respond to the external pres-
sures to, for example, innovate and develop organisational strategies is 
dependent on the availability of resources from a number of actors 
(Whitley 2008).
The development of universities as particular types of strategic actors 
relies heavily on the policies of governments, in particular, regarding their 
role in steering. National politics and the governance of universities are 
strongly coupled through the implementation of policies, despite the for-
mal autonomy of universities. The linkage has often been approached 
from a point of view of dichotomy, where the autonomy of universities 
and the external steering of them are seen as opposing poles (Stensaker 
2014). In an attempt to move beyond a top-down/bottom-up dichotomy 
and a duel-based view of the governance model, Sabatier (2005) applied a 
more general policy implementation toolset for the analysis of university–
state relationships. In this model, the study of policy implementation is 
approached with institutional learning as a central element. Though the 
top-down perspective allows the study of learning amongst proponents of 
a particular reform, it is ill-suited to similar studies amongst opponents of 
the reform. According to Sabatier, this lack can be rectified by looking at 
the strategies with which the bottom-uppers (the opponents) aim to 
strengthen the attainment of their goals. Sabatier called for the combina-
tion of the top-down and bottom-up approaches in the analysis to avoid a 
bias towards the proponents or opponents. In order to allow for the learn-
ing and systematic change (rather than ad hoc deviance from the norm), a 
period of at least a decade is necessary (Sabatier 2005).
Finally, the interplay between the university governance and political 
landscape can also be investigated based on the operational logics that are 
used. Universities work with a dynamic operational logic in their external 
relations and with an organic logic in the internal environments (Ståhle 
and Åberg 2012). The former outlines the conditions for the relationship 
between university actors and external stakeholders, while the latter defines 
the rationale for cooperation with actors outside academia. In a dynamic 
working environment, university actors network with other independent 
actors. The actors have a self-determined relationship with each other, and 
they can be seen to gain mutually from the interaction. Universities are 
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not considered to simply react to changes in their surrounding environ-
ment and/or act as instruments for national political agendas (Olsen 
2007), but are presumed to influence their working context themselves. 
Universities can, then, be seen as active elements of policy planning pro-
cesses, provided they have the will and skills to act.
The way universities interact with the policy planning actors is, how-
ever, also linked to the internal working environment. In the modern 
context, universities function as a type of representative democracy 
(Olsen 2007) in the midst of managerial pressures. This democracy con-
tinues to rest on the ideals of academic freedom, broad interest represen-
tation, an open discussion culture and respect for the self-correcting 
mechanism of science—in essence, the academic heartland (Clark 1998). 
In the Nordic context, the democratic aspect includes an active organisa-
tion of student representation and involvement in the formal structures 
of the university. The systems have been built to be responsive to the 
needs of the groups whose work and study conditions are affected by 
collective decisions regarding the running and structure of the university. 
In such an organic working environment, dialogue and exchange of 
experiences and feedback are central building blocks in developing func-
tions and academia (Ståhle and Åberg 2012). It can be argued that the 
core skills for dialogue exist in the conventional academic environment. 
Thus, the issue becomes whether these skills can be transferred and 
adapted for use in interaction with the university management and policy 
planning actors.
The interplay between shifts in governmental policy, university gover-
nance and internal university dynamics form a complex, continuously 
changing system. In the Nordic context the converging policies form a 
dimension that affects the way the national systems develop. These consti-
tute a moulding tool that can either support system development or act as 
a hindrance to organisational learning. 
 Operationalisation of the Conceptual Framework
In order to operationalise the study, six organisational/management 
mechanisms related to organisational performance were identified (see 
later). A shared understanding of what performance means in an academic 
university context was formed in order to ensure a coherent approach to 
the major issue at hand. An in-depth discussion on the meaning of perfor-
mance, as well as other central concepts such as accountability, are included 
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in Chap. 2 of this volume. Extant literature on organisations more gener-
ally, as well as on the nature of higher education systems and universities 
more specifically, was used to sketch these. These mechanisms are 
as follows:
• Strategy
• Decision-making structures
• Organisational structures
• Accountability measures
• Funding arrangements
• Cultural climate
The study acknowledged that modern universities are complex 
organisations, and that performance can be achieved in multiple ways. 
As such, ‘NPM/modern reforms’ is a messy concept; therefore, it was 
necessary to decompose what so-called new management structures 
imply for university performance. The six identified mechanisms were a 
way to acquire more knowledge about what the relationship is between 
management/governance structures and performance. The next step 
was to formulate the basic assumptions underpinning the study in light 
of the research problem following Olsen’s work,1 namely:
• there is a direct positive link between governance/management 
structures and performance (instrumental argument),
• there is a direct negative link between governance/management 
structures and performance (institutional argument) and
• there are a number of contingencies between governance/manage-
ment structures and performance (matching instrumental and insti-
tutional views).
A series of core hypotheses for each of the six mechanisms were then 
identified, driving the development of the survey questionnaire and 
1 Analytically, Olsen’s four stylised visions models can be reduced to two broad ideal types 
or archetypes, instrument and institutional or cultural views, with models being ‘variants’ of 
these archetypes. ‘Market’ models also assume a kind of rationality that build on the same 
mechanisms as the instrumental model. The ‘democracy’ model builds on a normative 
assumption about the legitimacy of participation, which connects back to the institutional or 
‘cultural’ model.
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 interview guide.2 These mechanisms are described in some detail later. It 
should be noted that while these hypotheses were not tested per se in the 
study, they were instrumental in developing the conceptual framework 
into a coherent structure. They played an important role as we designed 
the operationalisation for the gathering of quantitative and qualitative 
data. The hypotheses were used, for example, to ensure that the two sets 
of data corresponded with each other and could be utilised to study the 
same phenomena in a comparable and complementary manner. We return 
to these hypotheses in the concluding chapter of this book to reflect on 
their role and meaning in the empirical analysis of our data. The method-
ological considerations are discussed in more detail in the latter part of 
this chapter.
Strategy
• H0: an overarching and penetrating institutional strategy boosts 
performance
• H1: an overarching and penetrating institutional strategy alienates 
staff and negatively affects performance
• H2: strategies that are developed through participation boost 
performance
Decision-Making Structures
• H0: more hierarchical decision-making structures stimulate increased 
performance
• H1: more hierarchical decision-making structures negatively affect 
performance
• H2: participatory decision-making structures stimulate increased 
performance
2 In order to operationalise the study empirically, a series of key questions were devised 
around eight key themes associated with each of the six mechanisms described above (consult 
Table 1.5 and interview guide and survey template in Appendix). The empirical evidence 
provided in Part II of this volume sheds light on key findings along selected core themes, 
emanating from the survey questionnaire and the interview data.
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Organisational Structure
• H0: larger, more interdisciplinary structures boost performance
• H1: larger, more interdisciplinary structures negatively affect 
performance
• H2: diverse structures are best fitted to the diversity found in univer-
sities, and diversity boost performance
Accountability Measures
• H0: more systematic and regular (intense) reporting boost 
performance
• H1: more systematic and regular (intense) reporting negatively 
affects performance
• H2: it is the way and form of reporting that affect performance
Funding Arrangements
• H0: more incentive and result-oriented funding boosts performance
• H1: more incentive and result-oriented funding negatively affects 
performance
• H2: a mixed funding arrangement is the best way to boost 
performance
Cultural Climate
• H0: systematic training and competence building in the organisation 
boost performance
• H1: systematic training and competence building (takes time away 
from primary activities and) negatively affect performance
• H2: cultural change through participatory and trust-based processes 
drives performance
In addition to shedding light on the relationship between the identified 
mechanisms associated with new management structures and perfor-
mance, the study also aimed at exploring:
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• the linkages amongst the (six) mechanisms, for example, strategy is 
only effective if combined with hierarchical management and 
accountability measures;
• the possible tensions between the (six) mechanisms, for example, the 
existence of a strategy arguing for a particular profiling of the organ-
isation may collide with pressure to achieve results in a shorter time 
frame; and
• the relative importance of institutional governance/management 
structures in relation to national steering frameworks, for example, 
whether national models override what single universities try to do 
and how they are organised.
Finally, the study aimed to provide new theoretical explanations for 
how changes in university governance can be interpreted in light of the 
extant literature and major organisational and public administration theo-
ries. Our interest was in the linkages between formal change and perfor-
mance, although not in a strict causal sense.
researcH desIgn and MetHodologIcal 
consIderatIons
This FINNUT project adopted a comparative research design and applied 
a mixed methods approach (Bryman 2006) comprising a desk-top analy-
sis, surveys and interviews (see Appendix). While the time period 
2000–2013 was set as the focus of study, some of the thematic analysis 
included developments until 2016 in order to respond to recent changes 
brought up in the empirical data, in particular, in the interviews. The desk- 
top analysis consisted of major policy initiatives with national statistics and 
other official documentation on performance data related to education, 
research and management of the higher education sector. Such register- 
based and performance-related data can be compared across countries and 
institutions (Ragin and Rihoux 2009). The data provided background 
material for the further development of the study (in the form of a com-
prehensive database), and relevant information has been utilised in the 
individual chapters composing this volume. A large set of new empirical 
data was collected through surveys and interviews.
The target groups of the survey were full-time managerial staff and 
academics employed at the 54 publicly run universities in Denmark, 
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Finland, Norway and Sweden. The survey took place at the end of 2014 
and the beginning of 2015. The sampling and the definition of the popu-
lation was done differently in the four countries because of different 
national higher education systems, availability of sampling frames and also 
considering the different information needs of national research teams. 
Table 1.2 describes the study’s population, sampling and response rate.
The national samples were planned in a manner that allowed for Nordic 
comparisons. The comparative international subsamples included the 
respondents working in senior positions (European career levels III and 
IV) in official management positions or in ordinary academic positions. 
Table 1.2 Survey population, sampling and response rate
Population Sampling Response 
rate
N
Denmark Institutions: All Managers N/A 334
Staff categories: II, III, IV 
(assistant, associate and 
professor levels, including 
post docs and managers)
Academics
(census study)
17% 1989
Finland Institutions: All
Staff categories: III, IV
Managers: –
(census)
44% 199
Managers: (deans, vice- 
deans, heads of departments, 
vice-heads of departments)
Academics: Systematic 
random sample (every 
second)
24% 757
Academics: (University 
lecturers/researchers, 
associate professors, research 
directors, professors)
Total: 
1038a
Norway Institutions: All
Staff categories: All
–
(census study)
10% 1300
Sweden Institutions: 10 out of 16 
public universities
Managers: –
(census)
16% 700
Staff categories: II, III, IV 
(all academics, including 
managers, excluding PhD 
candidates)
Academics: Stratified
(Systematic random 
sampling (1/4). Small 
institutions (<800 
academics) simple random 
sampling of 200)
aOf the respondents, 73 did not report about their title, and 9 individuals worked primarily outside 
Finland
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The comparative samples are described in Table 1.3. Because the man-
agement positions differ from country to country, in comparative sam-
ples, the variable ‘are you holding an official management position?’ was 
used as a categorising variable. This means that the distinctions between 
academics and academic managers are based on the respondents’ own 
reporting. The Nordic comparisons were made by using subsamples 
that best fit for the purpose. For instance, in some cases, it was better to 
compare only heads of departments and deans, whereas, in other cases, 
it was more suitable to work with the self-reported official management 
positions.
The most inevitable limitations of the data pertain to the fact that it 
describes subjective performance, that is, the performance as experienced 
and reported by the informants. During the research project, a large 
amount of statistical data on actual (objective) performance was also col-
lected from each country. However, due to the long timescale of the 
academic performance, national differences in performance measure-
ment and intervening variables, the connection between survey data and 
statistical data was statistically difficult to establish. Therefore, the survey 
findings described and explained the subjective performance (Kivistö 
et al. 2017).
For the interviews, we selected two case universities in each of the four 
countries. We chose to perform the interviews at one of the flagship uni-
versities in each country and one regional university. The case universities 
were multidisciplinary, and the inclusion criteria were that the universities 
have both natural (including medicine) and social sciences. Within the 
institutions, we selected participants strategically based on their official 
positions in the system. These positions were senior academics from the 
social and the natural sciences, managers from different levels who mainly 
Table 1.3 Comparative samples of managers and senior academicsa
Seniors in official  
management positions
Seniors not holding official  
management positions
Denmark 319 1319
Finland 258 660
Norway 143 721
Sweden 215 289
Total 935 2989
aQuestion: ‘Do you hold an official management position?’
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had academic backgrounds and professionals in central administration 
dealing particularly with issues relating to research and teaching, as well as 
their development. Overall, a total of 93 interviews were conducted 
between the springs of 2015 and 2016 (Table 1.4).
A common interview guide was developed. As the selected participants 
were highly educated people and experts in their fields, we used the elite 
interviewing approach (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Goldstein 2002). 
Such an approach puts an emphasis on giving room to the interviewees to 
talk freely on the presented themes while ensuring that the different 
themes are covered so as to be able to compare findings across the cases. 
A semi-structured interview approach was selected, and the questions 
were adjusted to the knowledge of the participants.
Since quantitative methods are more suitable for providing an overview 
from a larger audience, and the ability to dig deeper into a theme follows 
qualitative methodologies, different questions were posed in the survey 
and interviews. The questions evolved around similar themes (see 
Table 1.5) per the conceptual and analytical framework adopted in the 
study, as sketched out earlier. The qualitative data generated by the inter-
views aimed at shedding light on the main drivers of and reactions to 
Table 1.4 Number of interviewees per country
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
Managers and administrators 17 14 18 9 58
Academics 11 10 8 6 35
Total 28 24 26 15 93
Table 1.5 Themes for primary data collection
Survey themes Interview themes
Perceived performance
Goal specificity and autonomy
Decision-making and strategy
Control and evaluation
Support structures
External stakeholders
Trust and accountability
Incentives
Goal specificity and degree of autonomy
Decision-making and strategy
Control and evaluation
Support structures
External stakeholders
Trust and accountability
Incentives/recognition
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rationalisation processes. The data also helped identify qualitative effects 
across teaching and research activities. This way of collecting data increased 
the study’s external validity (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). SPSS was used in 
the analysis of the statistical data. A systematic content analysis of the qual-
itative data was conducted using Nvivo.
Ethical guidelines were followed in the collection, publishing and the 
storing of data. We assured the anonymity of the participants in the data- 
collecting phase, and we referred to them in an anonymised manner 
related to the flagship/regional universities, positions and fields (consult 
Part II of the volume). The project was reported to and approved by the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data, which also stored the anonymised 
quantitative data.
There were certain limitations which had to be accounted for through 
the analysis phase of the project. Due to different access requirements in 
administering surveys in the case countries, four individual approaches 
were applied. Some country teams sent the survey to all the academic staff, 
while others sent it to selected groups, as described earlier. This bias had 
to be addressed while selecting groups for the analysis of statistical data so 
that the same type of data were included in the comparisons. Another 
issue was the different organising structures of higher education institu-
tions within the Nordic countries. This also had to be scrutinised, as we 
were comparing findings across cases and countries. A strategy to deal 
with these critical issues and to increase the reliability of the data was to 
include researchers with knowledge of the specific countries in each of the 
project’s publications.3 The semi-structured interview approach also made 
it more difficult to analyse the material when compared to fully structured 
interviews. This approach requires a more thorough reading and inductive 
approach to the data. The teams used a similar concept tree structure in 
the content analysis of the interview data to increase comparability between 
the countries.
3 In the case of the current volume, each chapter (with the exception of Chap. 6) has at 
least one co-author from each of the four countries, and all the individual chapters have been 
peer reviewed by an editorial board composed of senior authors from the region who were 
also directly involved with the study, as either team leaders and/or members.
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tHe voluMe’s organIsatIon and IndIvIdual 
contrIbutIons
As indicated in section “Introduction: Rationalisation and Converging 
Higher Education Policies” of this chapter, the volume reports on the 
results of a comparative project that assesses the interplay between changes 
in leadership and management structures in public universities across the 
Nordic countries and shifts in teaching and research performance in the 
last decade and a half. The chapters included in this book illuminate the 
key aspects associated with some of the thematic areas presented earlier 
from a comparative perspective. However, each chapter stands on its own, 
both conceptually and empirically, and can be read separately. The overall 
results should, however, be assessed against the backdrop of the larger 
project that was undertaken.
This book is structured into three distinct Parts. In Part I, the first chapter 
sets the context and presents the rationale for and the design of the FINNUT-
PERFACAD study and elaborates on the theoretical foundations and con-
ceptual landscape underpinning it. Chapter 2 by Kivistö et  al. provides 
clarification on the key terminology underpinning the study, including con-
textualisation within a Nordic setting. The book then moves on to Chap. 3 
where Pinheiro et  al. describe the system evolution, as well as the higher 
education systems of each of the four Nordic countries. Part II of the book is 
dedicated to thematically focused chapters. While all of them lean on the 
same conceptual backbone that encompasses the study as a whole, each of the 
chapters adopts its own theoretical approach to the question at hand. The 
chapters begin from the system level and move towards the institutional.
Part II begins with Chap. 4 by Söderlind, Berg, Lind and Pulkkinen on 
how research funding systems at the national level affect local perceptions 
of research as a core task. Chapter 5, by Lind, Hernes, Pulkkinen and 
Söderlind, elaborates on the role that increasing levels of external funding 
play on the experiences of autonomy and how the effects on academic 
freedom are felt in research work. In Chap. 6, Geschwind, Berg, Lind and 
Aarrevaara investigate the evolving roles of academic leaders and managers 
amidst reforms that emphasise performativity alongside academic virtues. 
Chapter 7, by Aarrevaara, Pinheiro and Söderlind, explore the various 
ways in which strategic processes play out within Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish universities. Chapter 8, by Hansen, Aarrevaara, Geschwind and 
Stensaker, undertakes a comprehensive approach to evaluation practices 
by bringing together some of the topics discussed in the other chapters 
composing Part II of the volume.
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In Part III, we return to look at the results of the FINNUT-PERFACAD 
study as a whole. Led by Geschwind, the volume editors take a step back 
to reflect on where we started and what we have learnt on the journey this 
comparative study has taken us on. In closing the volume, the editors 
contemplate on next steps and potential new avenues for future research 
endeavours.
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IntroductIon
Year after year, the higher education sector in Nordic countries continues 
to enjoy the highest level of public investments among all the OECD 
countries. Like in other European countries, these investments have put 
higher education institutions (HEIs) under increased scrutiny, with the 
obligation to explain their behaviour and performances. This trend is fur-
ther intensified by the fact that the higher education sector competes with 
other sectors for public funds, namely primary and secondary education, 
public health, social services and defence. At the same time, Nordic HEIs 
are facing increasing expectations to become more ‘entrepreneurial’ and 
increase their abilities to compete in a more globalised market. All these 
mean that there is an increasing focus on cost efficiency and productivity, 
as well as quality.
The need for greater efficiency, productivity and quality in the higher 
education sector has triggered increased governmental interest towards 
different mechanisms of accountability, especially evaluation and perfor-
mance measurement. This interest has developed over a relatively long 
period of time, but it has now reached its culmination point in many ways. 
For instance, advances in citation tracking, performance data collection 
and databases and the professionalisation of evaluative practices and meth-
ods have opened new avenues for verifying accountability.
This chapter offers definitions for the key concepts used throughout 
the book, which are as follows: accountability, evaluation and performance 
measurement and management. Each section is followed by a short con-
textualisation of the concept in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
The chapter ends with a short discussion about the policy convergence 
between Nordic countries and the reasons for it.
AccountAbIlIty
The concept of accountability has always been a topical question in higher 
education. Over time, academics and their institutions have had relation-
ships with various stakeholders (church, states and local communities) in 
which some sort of ‘answerability’ has continuously played an important 
role. In the modern world, such answerability relates to universities’ 
accounting for public money spent, as well as academics explaining their 
professional work and its outcomes (Huisman 2018). The concept of 
accountability, however, is multifaceted and ambiguous, allowing a range 
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of understandings and definitions (Christensen and Lægreid 2017). 
Often, the concept of accountability is used in a broad sense, making it 
difficult to maintain clear distinctions in terms of related concepts like 
transparency, responsiveness, responsibility, answerability and liability 
(Bovens 2007; Dubnick 2014). Essential questions for accountability are 
as  follows: who is to be held accountable, for what, to whom, and through 
what means? (Huisman and Currie 2004; Trow 1996). However, in gen-
eral, accountability can be considered a relational principle that attaches 
certain expectations of one party to the actions and performance of 
another, thereby making the performing party responsible for its actions. 
The concept can be studied according to a personal and a structural per-
spective (Sinclair 1995). The personal viewpoint relates to internal virtues 
that guide actors’ actions, independently of formal rules, while the struc-
tural perspective is linked to mechanisms between an actor and a forum to 
justify actions (Bovens 2007). According to this latter view, accountability 
is a relational concept providing a link between those held accountable 
and those who have a right to claim the accountability of others (Bovens 
et al. 2014). For our analytical purposes, in defining accountability, we 
find Bovens’ (2007, 450) definition especially useful, where accountabil-
ity is generically seen as a ‘relationship between an actor and a forum, in 
which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her con-
duct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor 
may face consequences’.
The main purposes behind the need for accountability vary. For 
instance, accountability is needed to discourage fraud and manipulation, 
strengthen the legitimacy of institutions and enhance the quality of per-
formance and work as a regulatory device through the criteria made 
explicit in the various reports requested by the reporting institutions 
(Huisman and Currie 2004). As such, it can be understood as ‘a constraint 
on arbitrary power, and on the corruptions of power, including fraud, 
manipulation, malfeasance and the like’ (Trow 1996, 311). Much of the 
discussion on accountability is geared towards economic or financial 
aspects. In addition, in the context of higher education, discussion on 
accountability is often paired with discussion on efficiency, effectiveness 
and performance evaluation. In this sense, the process of verifying account-
ability calls for proving, by effective means, that higher education has 
attained the predetermined results and performance. Correspondingly, 
accountability in higher education includes elements such as the rational 
use of resources, provision of evidence, evaluation of evidence, attaching 
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importance to costs and effectiveness and improving the education pro-
cess (Dressel 1980; Kai 2009).
Accountability regimes in higher education systems still tend to be the 
combinations of types of accountability principles and processes (King 
2015). Out of these perspectives, professional and political accountability 
are often considered, especially important in the context of higher educa-
tion (cf. Huisman and Currie 2004; see also Bovens et al. 2014; Romzek 
2000). The difference between these two factors is related to the source of 
standards for performance. Professional accountability involves a high 
degree of autonomy for individual academics, whose decisions are based 
on internalised norms of what is considered appropriate action and perfor-
mance. Especially on the side of research, the professional accountability 
standards are formulated in the academic community based on internal 
professional norms, which are enforced by academics. Due to the strong 
emphasis on professional authority, they are also more difficult to steer or 
manage in formal organisational settings.
Political accountability refers to political expectations for HEIs’ per-
formance. In this sense, demands for accountability are a safeguard to 
protect the interests of various stakeholders and interest groups, as well as 
the public. In the widest sense, political accountability also includes an 
element of social accountability, which means HEIs’ answerability to 
wider society, not just the constituencies and political actors involved in 
the governing of HEIs. In more narrow terms, political accountability 
illustrates the governance relationship between the state and state-funded 
universities. In this context, a further distinction can be made between 
legal and financial accountability on the one hand, and academic account-
ability on the other. Other equally important aspects of autonomy are 
legal and financial accountability (Trow 1996). Legal and financial 
accountability highlight the universities’ obligation to report how state 
public resources have been used and to what effect. This side of account-
ability clarifies whether the university is doing what is required of it by law 
and whether its resources are being consumed for the purposes for which 
they were provided.
Discussion on accountability is often accompanied with discussion 
about the limits of the self-regulative capacity of institutions (autonomy) 
and individuals (academic freedom); the emergence of various account-
ability mechanisms can be interpreted as a signal of a lack of trust in aca-
demic work and the functioning of universities (Gornitzka et  al. 2004; 
Kivistö 2007; Schmidtlein 2004). Institutions universally desire to uphold 
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their rights and capacities of self-governance, maintain substantial auton-
omy, and exempt themselves from excessive interference from the govern-
ment and other institution-external entities. However, accountability in its 
all forms implies outside interference, and intensification of accountability 
is often at odds, at least to some extent, with different aspects of  institutional 
autonomy. As the notion of accountability seems to be highlighted more 
explicit on stakeholders’ agendas than in the past, the balance between 
accountability and autonomy often tilts towards an overemphasis on 
accounting for performance (Huisman 2018; Kai 2009).
Contextualising Accountability in the Nordic Countries
 Denmark
Universities in Denmark are met with several accountability requests. 
Professional accountability is important in relation to the quality of educa-
tional programmes, and especially, the quality of research. However, to 
some extent, professional accountability has been challenged by political 
accountability, especially in the wake of the mergers of former governmen-
tal research institutes into universities.
Not surprisingly, political accountability regimes are well developed in 
welfare states where higher education is fully funded through taxation and 
to a certain extent, research is too. Over the last 15 years, reforms as part 
of higher educational policy have aimed at enhancing not only political 
but also social accountability. External stakeholders have become mem-
bers of advisory councils and university boards. A corporate-like gover-
nance structure, including boards with a majority of external members and 
a chairman who is politically approved, has been introduced. The former 
elected leaders have been replaced by top-down appointed leaders. All in 
all, political accountability has been enhanced through intensified mana-
gerial accountability, as well as through the introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM) instruments like contracts and performance-based 
funding. However, these instruments have come hand in hand with more 
traditional legal and bureaucratic forms of accountability in recent years, 
for example, the dimensioning of educational programmes not matching 
labour market demands.
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 Finland
Emphasising different aspects of accountability has played a substantial 
role in shaping the contents of the Finnish higher education policy over 
the past 25  years. After the introduction of block grants and the 
performance- based funding model in the mid-1990s, especially financial 
accountability has dominated the discussion about the accountability of 
universities. Currently, the Finnish university funding model is one of the 
most performance-oriented models in the world: over 70% of the core 
state funding is based on success in performance criteria (de Boer et al. 
2015). At the same time, the role of legal accountability in Finnish higher 
education policy has weakened after the new Universities Act that came 
into effect in 2010. This legislative reform changed the legal status of uni-
versities from being part of the state administration to being independent 
legal entities. Legislative regulation on central aspects like staffing policies 
(especially, regulation on staff qualifications, recruitment and remunera-
tion) and internal governance of universities was significantly changed; at 
present, Finnish universities enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy com-
pared with universities in many other European countries, including other 
Nordic countries (see Bennetot Pruvot and Estermann 2017).
In Finland, the role of universities in developing the economy has been 
supported and actively managed by successive governments since the 
1960s. This policy has continued to the present, when universities are seen 
as central actors in the Finnish knowledge-based economy and core parts 
of the Finnish innovation system expected to contribute to sustainable 
economic growth, employment and national competitiveness (Biggar 
Economics 2017). At the same time, Finnish higher education policy rec-
ognises the importance of higher education’s social and civic responsibili-
ties, for example, in reducing poverty, inequality and social exclusion. Year 
after year, among all the OECD countries, Finland is among the top three 
countries with the highest level of public expenditure (compared to the 
GDP) on HEIs (see, e.g. OECD 2017). This has kept political expecta-
tions, and therefore, political accountability, at a high level. Higher educa-
tion in general and universities specifically continue to be at the core of 
educational policies, and thus, political interests. At the concrete level, this 
has been evident in the ‘Government Programmes’ and ‘Action Plans’ of 
the past ruling cabinets (see, e.g. Prime Minister’s Office 2017). At the 
same time, important stakeholders, such as several trade unions, student 
unions and employer organisations (e.g. the Confederation of Finnish 
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Industries), have continued to keep universities and higher education high 
on their political agenda.
Professional accountability in Finland has remained strong alongside 
the other forms of accountability. For instance, various scientific associa-
tions operating under the Federation of Finnish Learned Societies are 
actively exercising their gatekeeping role, especially in publishing. Scientific 
associations are often responsible for publishing scientific journals and 
other publications, and they appoint the editorial boards and editors of 
these journals. In addition, the various trade unions, such as the Finnish 
Union of University Professors and Finnish Union of University 
Researchers and Teachers, continue to play a role in upholding and safe-
guarding professional norms and values of Finnish academic profession.
 Norway
Accountability aspects have been in the focus of Norwegian higher educa-
tion in the last three decades. The managerial structures have been changed 
through the ‘Quality Reform’ of 2003–2004, which involved an effort to 
enhance political and social accountability by including politically 
appointed stakeholders on the boards of the universities. The Ministry of 
Education introduced a model where the board appointed the chair, as 
well as the rector. This model replaced the traditional one where the rector 
was elected by the university and chaired the board (Gornitzka and Larsen 
2004). Still, the individual institution could choose which model to fol-
low, resulting in a hybrid version in many universities, with both appointed 
and elected leaders in the institutions. The aim in giving the universities 
the possibility of choosing the governance model was to increase auton-
omy (Stensaker 2014).
A performance-based funding system was introduced through the same 
reform, and this can be considered an important part of accountability 
programmes (Frølich 2011). Such a system offers a neutral framework for 
assigning funds between universities and scientific fields. The shares of 
funding related to performance-based indicators are much smaller than 
they are, for example, in the Finnish system. In Norway, 30% of the fund-
ing is assigned according to performance-based indicators from teaching 
and research, while the basic funding (70%) provides long-term and stable 
financing for the sector (Kvaal 2014). Most Norwegian HEIs are state 
owned, but private institutions are granted the same state funding as the 
public. As for professional autonomy, there has been an increased focus on 
quality of teaching and alignment in educational programmes, as well as 
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on research quality and quantity. This focus on both quality and quantity 
has challenged the professional autonomy via a bureaucratic and political 
form of accountability.
 Sweden
As in the other Nordic countries, Swedish universities are accountable to 
many stakeholders. The legal accountability in Sweden has changed in the 
last two decades. The country has a long tradition of central state steering 
based on planning. However, this changed during the 1980s and 1990s 
across many sectors, including higher education. During the 1990s, fol-
lowing a ground-breaking reform in 1993, the higher education sector 
was fundamentally deregulated, with a reduction in central laws and ordi-
nances and an increased formal autonomy for HEIs. Although most uni-
versities remained state agencies, with the autonomy (or freedom) reform, 
two HEIs, namely University College Jönköping and Chalmers University 
of Technology, became private foundations upon applications to the gov-
ernment. The main differences were regarding the internal organisation 
and regulations of hiring academic staff. Academic positions had thus far 
been centrally regulated, but from then on, professorships could be initi-
ated by each HEI.
An important aspect of the accountability context in Sweden is the 
funding system. The reform in 1993 also introduced performance-based 
funding in education. The system is based on the number of students 
starting education (input) and number of students graduating (output). 
The government also holds HEIs accountable in annual dialogues. Each 
year’s ‘production’ is presented in appropriations laid out by the govern-
ment. The main aspects of state accountability are within the realm of 
evaluation (details are given below). As in Denmark, external stakeholders 
are represented on university boards.
The professional accountability remains strong, both as a standalone 
aspect of academic work and as intertwined in political accountability. Like 
in Finland, university teachers’ and researchers’ unions are a strong voice 
for the academic profession. Peer review is an ever-growing activity, for 
example, in conferences, research proposals, academic publications and 
hiring and promotion of academic staff. Senior academics spend a signifi-
cant amount of time assessing colleagues.
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 Evaluation
Evaluation is closely related to accountability, as it is often considered an 
action that is used to verify accountability. For this and other reasons, 
evaluation has been a key theme in the public policy and higher education 
literature for at least three decades. It is obvious that evaluation can be 
used for control, aiming at contributing to holding individuals, groups, 
departments and organisations accountable. However, evaluation can also 
be used for many other purposes, including further learning and enhance-
ment and enlightenment purposes. Evaluation, therefore, is not limited to 
summative (retrospective) assessments, but it can be also formative  (during 
the process) or diagnostic (prior to the process). Moreover, evaluation can 
be used in strategic and tactical ways when actors try to pursue specific 
interests, as well as in symbolic ways when they wish to signal aspects like 
novelty. A more recent discussion related to use is the discussion on con-
stitutive effects of evaluation procedures and performance indicators 
(Dahler-Larsen 2014). The idea is that evaluation creates a new reality 
influencing and changing interpretations of the world, thereby enabling 
shifts in social relations and practices.
The literature is rich in defining the concept of ‘evaluation’. The North 
American literature is mostly concerned with aspects related to programme 
evaluation. Michael Quinn Patton, for example, defines (programme) 
evaluation as involving ‘the systematic collection of information about the 
activities, characteristics, and outcomes of programs to make judgements 
about the program, improve program effectiveness, and/or inform deci-
sions about future programming’ (Patton 1997, 23). In the Nordic con-
text, evaluation has been defined in a much broader way, including 
evaluative procedures for assessing the effectiveness of public organisa-
tions. An example can be found in the work of Evert Vedung, who defines 
evaluation as ‘careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth and 
value of administration, output and outcome of government interventions 
(in Swedish: offentlig verksamhet), which is intended to play a role in 
future, practical action situations’ (Vedung 1997, 3). This broader defini-
tion can be interpreted to resonate with the ideals of the Nordic institu-
tional welfare state.
As evaluative thinking has increasingly become integrated into regula-
tive and managerial practices, a distinction between evaluation on the one 
hand and other concepts, such as quality assurance, accreditation and per-
formance measurement on the other, has become increasingly blurred. In 
the higher education sector, we find an array of evaluative systems and 
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procedures performed at different levels and directed towards different 
activities, especially teaching and research (Geschwind 2016). At the 
national level, evaluative procedures are part and parcel of several account-
ability mechanisms by governments, such as performance-based funding 
and various external quality assurance instruments, most notably, accredi-
tation and auditing systems (e.g. Gover and Loukkola 2018; Santiago 
et al. 2008). In the Nordic countries, these evaluative procedures are per-
formed by national, autonomous organisations with their own boards, 
management and staff (Smeby and Stensaker 1999). Their various evalua-
tion practices are typically based on peer review panels including members 
of academic staff, students and stakeholders from working life and sup-
ported by project managers from the evaluation body. These national bod-
ies have an umbrella organisation called the European Association for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA). They have presented 
European standards and guidelines (ESG) to be followed by all national 
bodies. There is an ongoing and recurrent process of accreditation of 
quality assurance bodies (Stensaker et al. 2011).
Intra-institutional evaluative procedures play a critical role in shaping 
the teaching and research activities in universities. These procedures are 
built into educational programmes, for example, in monitoring student 
satisfaction, and at many universities, peer review–based evaluations of 
departments and programmes (‘audits’) are organised and carried through. 
Since the 1990s, HEIs in the Nordic countries have been expected to take 
responsibility for their own evaluation activities. Depending on the focus 
of the national systems, these institutional evaluations have either mir-
rored or complemented the national ones (Karlsson et  al. 2014). This 
development of intra-institutional evaluation has also implied that HEIs 
invest in the internal evaluation capacity in the form of designated evalua-
tion units and hiring professional staff with evaluation experience.
At the level of individual academics, peer review–based evaluative pro-
cedures are a standard precondition for scholars to be appointed and pro-
moted, as well as having their research projects funded and findings 
published. Increasingly, conferences have become based on peer review. 
As a whole, higher education sectors in most European countries are satu-
rated with aspects pertaining to evaluation to the extent that one can refer 
to ‘evaluation overload’. For instance, a recent study showed that senior 
academics can spend around a month per year evaluating other researchers’ 
work (Langfeldt and Kyvik 2010).
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Evaluation focuses on assessing quality, comprising both education 
quality and research quality. The concept of quality is ambiguous, and 
both education quality and research quality are multifaceted and multidi-
mensional phenomena. Quality can be judged, among other things, as 
exceptionality, consistency, fitness for purpose, value for money and trans-
formation (Harvey and Green 1993). Originally, this traditional categori-
sation was an attempt to deconstruct the rather abstract concept of quality 
in the context of higher education, focussing on its various dimensions to 
reconcile different ways of thinking about quality (Santiago et al. 2008; 
Stensaker 2004). Over the years, it has undoubtedly become the most 
influential framework for understanding and discussing quality in the 
 context of HEIs. Although almost 25  years old, its position remains 
unchallenged in the field of higher education research (Kivistö and 
Pekkola 2017).
In more concrete terms, quality in education can include aspects like 
preconditions (staff competence, talented student body and infrastruc-
ture), contents (relevant curriculum), process (pedagogical arrangements 
carried through by trained teachers) and the achievement of learning out-
comes, retention and student employability (see, e.g. Gibbs 2010). Quality 
education can even be further contextualised, including the views and 
expectations of relevant stakeholders (Jongbloed and Benneworth 2010). 
The emphasis on the different phases of education differs over time, and 
evaluation systems are usually readjusted slightly according to the require-
ments of the operating environment. For example, in some systems, a 
great emphasis can be placed on teacher competences, whereas other sys-
tems can rely heavily on an assessment of the final thesis (Lindberg- 
Sand 2011).
Although it differs slightly across the scientific fields and methodologies 
used, the characteristics of research quality often relate to aspects like 
objectivity, validity (internal and external), reliability, open-mindedness, 
honesty and thorough reporting (e.g. Miles and Huberman 1994; Steinke 
2004). As in education, not only has research output been under scrutiny, 
but so has the preconditions for undertaking research, that is, the research 
environments. Research quality evaluations have increasingly included 
assessments of the influence of the research, as shown both within aca-
demia and beyond, in the society at large. The latter could be evaluated by 
using patent and licensing data and counting the number of new compa-
nies, as well as by asking research environments to submit more qualitative 
‘impact cases’ (Karlsson 2017).
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The latest trend has been to evaluate the administrative operations at 
the institutional level as well. These ‘administrative assessment exercises’ 
have been undertaken with the same methodology as the evaluations of 
education and research, making use of panels of experts, both academics 
and professional support staff. The balance between central and local 
administrative support, digitalisation, efficiency and effectiveness and new 
roles and competency needs for administrative staff have been recurrent 
themes in these evaluations (Karlsson and Ryttberg 2016).
Contextualising Evaluation in the Nordic Countries
 Denmark
Evaluative procedures are widespread in Danish higher education. External 
evaluation of educational programmes was adopted in the late 1980s and 
institutionalised in the 1990s, at first as a soft national system supporting 
local quality development, but from 2007 onwards, as a hard control- 
oriented accreditation system where every bachelor’s and master’s pro-
gramme, new and established, had to be approved (Hansen 2011). 
Currently, the system is being changed into one based on approval of the 
internal quality systems at the institutions. If approval is refused, institu-
tions are not allowed to establish new educational programmes, and exist-
ing programmes must be accredited. At the institutional level, student 
satisfaction evaluation is a routine exercise. Evaluations of educational 
programmes in the light of stakeholder and labour market requirements 
are carried out on an ad hoc basis.
Compared with education, research evaluation is less standardised. 
There is no national system for evaluation of departments, disciplines or 
scientific fields. Some universities have developed institutional procedures 
aiming at taking all departments through research evaluations based on 
international peer review, while others do evaluations on an ad hoc basis 
or organise with advisory councils giving advice on how to improve 
research quality. However, in connection with basic funding of research in 
universities, a performance-based funding system works as an evaluation 
tool for research. While this metrics-based evaluation tool is meant to be 
an accountability and quality improvement tool on a national level, giving 
universities incentives to improve research, the system has been used inter-
nally at universities in budget models and for setting performance demands 
(see Chap. 4). In addition, evaluation is also linked to competitive research 
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funding. Funders of research, public and private, evaluate the quality of 
research proposals.
 Finland
Finnish universities, units and academics are subject to several types of 
evaluative procedures. The most important of these are institutional audits 
(complying fully with previously mentioned ESG), which form the core of 
the national quality assurance system. The Finnish Education Evaluation 
Centre (FINEEC) and its predecessor the Finnish Higher Education 
Evaluation Council (FINHEEC) have conducted audits of the  universities’ 
internal quality assurance systems since 2005. According to legislation, all 
HEIs must regularly (every six years on average) participate in external 
audits of their operations and internal quality assurance systems (Eurydice 
2018). The main emphasis of the audits is to secure that institutions have 
properly functioning internal quality assurance systems; however, they do 
not evaluate the quality of education, research, or other institutional activ-
ities per se. The nature of external audits is primarily enhancement and 
improvement rather than control; failing an audit does not result in any 
sanctions, but instead, only initiates a mandatory re-audit process. This 
development rather than control orientation in evaluation can partly be 
explained by the rather extensive use of performance-based funding in 
providing core funding to universities. Having an accreditation type of 
evaluation system could be considered to add another layer of control, 
thereby making quality improvement a process of mandatory compliment 
rather than actual development.
Compared with that of education, the evaluation of research in Finland 
is a more multifaceted process, and it is more driven by needs of securing 
accountability. The Academy of Finland, the national funding agency for 
research, is responsible for financing research, and therefore, evaluating 
the research quality (applications). In addition, most universities regularly 
conduct internal research assessment exercises based on international peer 
review. However, unlike in some other European countries, there is no 
national-level comprehensive and centralised evaluation procedure for 
research. The quality of research, however, is considered in the funding 
model based on the following: (1) a bibliometric indicator awarding uni-
versities for publications ‘points’ (13% weighting) based on their coeffi-
cient (‘JUFO’ levels 0–3), which is expected to reflect the quality of 
publication outlets, and (2) amount of competitive research funding (9% 
weighting).
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 Norway
According to legal rules, the individual Norwegian HEIs are responsible 
for maintaining the quality of the offered education through systematic 
evaluations of quality, but the institutions are allowed to choose how to 
organise this work. Such evaluations are supposed to cover quality aspects 
of education, learning processes for students and practical studies, as well 
as regarding relevance of the educations to society. In addition, the 
Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance (NOKUT) supervises the insti-
tutions and evaluates how the quality assurance work is performed. 
NOKUT’s mission is to supervise and provide information used to develop 
the quality of higher education in Norway, as well as evaluate and control 
the quality of study programmes and institutions. NOKUT performs peri-
odic control of the accredited higher education programmes and institu-
tions, but such controls are supposed to occur at least every eight years. 
The standards and guidelines recommended by NOKUT comply with 
ESG as far as possible.
The follow-up on research quality depends on several stakeholders act-
ing as funders of the research. The Norwegian Research Council is a main 
actor in providing funding for research in Norway, but smaller public and 
private agencies also play a role. For accountability and competitive rea-
sons, the quality of research applications is evaluated through peer-review 
processes. The Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and 
Education (NIFU) is an independent research institute that aims to deliver 
data on how Norwegian research and innovation is developing and the 
importance for society. Another central actor is the Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data (NSD), which evaluates the quality of research projects 
prior to their initiating to secure anonymity of the participants; the NSD 
also acts as a national agent for securing and storing collected data. The 
Statistics on Higher Education (DBH) database information is also dis-
tributed by the NSD.
Several databases have been established in Norway to secure usable data 
to follow up on evaluations as actions to verify accountability. Data related 
to teaching, as well as research-related activities, are collected and publicly 
available at the NSD, DBH, NIFU and Statistics Norway (SSB). As one of 
the few countries offering this, a national and non-commercial biblio-
graphical database named the ‘Current Research Information System in 
Norway’ (CRISTIN) is publicly available for recording scholarly and peer- 
reviewed literature. The individual researchers are supposed to report their 
publications, and data from CRISTIN are used as background material for 
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assigning performance-based funding to the universities. According to the 
Norwegian Publication Indicator, publication points are separated at level 
1 (lowest level) and level 2. The split of publication channels into two 
levels is due to peer reviews from academic associations, and the ratings of 
the different scientific journals and publishers are published on the web-
page from NSD.
 Sweden
Evaluation activities in Swedish higher education are performed at the 
national level, HEI level and by individuals. Starting with education, like 
in the other countries, a national system of evaluation has been in place 
since the 1990s, as part of the NPM-inspired reforms in the early 1990s. 
The first system can be described as a light-touch system, and it provided 
evaluations of each institution’s quality assurance system. These so-called 
institutional audits were undertaken during two rounds, with small adjust-
ments. The system that followed (2001–2006) included an emphasis on 
subject and programme reviews across the system. All subjects and pro-
grammes leading to a degree were included. Since the 1990s, accredita-
tion of programmes, scientific areas and HEIs has also been implemented, 
as well as thematic evaluations. The emphasis has shifted over the years; 
currently, there is again more focus on institutional audits.
Evaluation of research has been the responsibility of several actors. 
Through the Swedish Research Council, the state has initiated compre-
hensive subject evaluations. All the funding bodies evaluate the research 
that is being funded. There has been a development from only ex ante 
assessments of proposals to mid-term and final evaluations of funded proj-
ects and programmes. Many HEIs have also initiated independent evalua-
tions of research. They follow a similar basic model, including panels, 
bibliometrics, self-evaluations and site visits, with a slight variation regard-
ing scope and emphasis (Geschwind 2017).
PerformAnce meAsurement And mAnAgement
As is the case with evaluation, performance measurement and manage-
ment can be understood as instruments for exercising accountability. In 
the context of higher education, performance can refer to all actions, tasks 
and processes carried out in HEIs (teaching, research, and third mission 
activities), as well as outputs and outcomes resulting from these actions. 
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Given this high level of ambiguity, what is meant by performance is very 
much subject to different conceptions and definitions.
To determine its level (good vs. bad, low vs. high), performance needs 
to be measured somehow. As an activity, measurement requires objective 
‘measures’ that can be utilised in the process of measurement to determine 
the performance (cf. Neely et al. 1995). In this sense, the selection of mea-
sures and the way in which they are utilised (weighting, measurement 
methodology, etc.) defines what is, at any point in time, considered 
 performance. Thus, performance measurement is an evaluative act of quan-
tification (of performance). By nature, performance measurement is always 
instrumental, as it is done for a certain purpose, whether symbolic or real. 
These purposes are often related to management and manifested around a 
set of instruments, such as ‘management by objectives’, ‘total quality man-
agement’, ‘knowledge management’, or ‘strategic management’, aimed at 
achieving organisational goals. Thus, performance management in higher 
education can be defined as an activity where universities use the informa-
tion acquired through performance measurement to achieve and demon-
strate progress towards a predetermined set of goals (e.g. Wholey 1999).
Performance measurement, however, is not only a tool to verify 
accountability; it is also a means of directing organisational attention and 
focus. This is done by translating the institutional strategy into a set of 
goals reflected in performance measures that make success (and failure) 
more concrete for everyone (Melnyk et al. 2004; Vasikainen 2014). The 
goal of this approach to management is shifting focus from input and 
focussing on bureaucratic rules and procedures, to the output with goal 
setting and use of performance information, where public organisations 
also focus on economic performance (Christensen et al. 2007; Hvidman 
and Andersen 2013). These techniques tend to be cyclical, incorporating 
the formulation of objectives, performance, evaluations and adjustments, 
and this information is used to make managerial decisions.
There is a generic assumption that ‘management is management’ 
(Hvidman and Andersen 2013, 37) and the same managerial techniques 
can be applied in both the private and public sector. Considering this, 
three organisational characteristics that differ between public and private 
organisations may theoretically mitigate the effectiveness of performance 
management in the sectors as follows: incentives, capacity and clarity. For 
incentives, managers in the public sector are presumably motivated less by 
pay and other financial incentives than managers in the private sector are, 
and they are steered by a public service motivation, where the value of 
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doing something of importance for society is a personal incentive. 
Regarding capacity, public managers often have lower autonomy and 
higher levels of bureaucracy, and this affects their capacity to take advan-
tage of the collected information, which can be used for decision-making. 
The clarity of goals is also more problematic in public organisations, as 
there are many stakeholders, multiple goals and different expectations of 
political responsiveness and social equity (see Boyne 2002).
Often, performance management is utilised simultaneously with 
performance- based funding, where funds are allocated by a formula or 
algorithm for achieving certain predefined measures of performance. In 
a higher education context, most of the performance indicators measure 
progression or completion of final outputs related to teaching and 
research, such as study credits, number of degrees awarded, publica-
tions, competitive research funding awarded, citations, patents, level of 
competitive/external research funding, or student satisfaction (Kivistö 
and Kohtamäki 2016). Performance-based funding is believed to incen-
tivise institutions to improve or maintain their level of performance in 
exchange for higher revenue (Dougherty and Reddy 2011). By reformu-
lating incentives so that institutions are rewarded or punished primarily 
according to actual performance, performance-based funding mecha-
nisms stimulate a shift in institutional behaviour towards greater effi-
ciency. However, whether this is accomplished in real terms is another 
matter (Kivistö and Kohtamäki 2016; Kivistö et  al. 2017; Rutherford 
and Rabovsky 2014).
Performance management and performance-based funding are often 
associated with the use of performance contracts/agreements, both at the 
system level and in institution internal arrangements. Performance agree-
ments are contracts (see Gornitzka et al. 2004) between the government 
and individual HEIs, which set out specific goals that institutions will seek 
to achieve in a given period. They specify intentions to accomplish given 
targets, measured against pre-set known standards (Claeys-Kulik and 
Estermann 2015; de Boer et al. 2015). Furthermore, performance man-
agement increasingly takes place at the level of the individual academics 
(Andersen and Pallesen 2008; Kivistö et al. 2017). This is especially the 
case when it comes to research performance, where measurement by pub-
lication points has become common place in Nordic countries, especially 
Norway, Denmark and Finland (see, e.g. Aagaard et  al. 2015; Pölönen 
2015). In some institutional contexts, direct financial rewards could even 
be allocated to individual academics for research achievements, for 
 PERFORMANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AND ITS… 
54
instance, in the form of publications in high-status journals (Opstrup 
2014). These rewards can be paid as one-time bonuses, top ups of salaries 
and/or a maximum percentage of the individual’s total salary (Arnhold 
et al. 2018).
Contextualising Performance Measurement and Management 
in Nordic Countries
 Denmark
Performance measurement and performance management have been 
increasingly important principles in higher education governance in 
Denmark for more than 30 years. However, performance management has 
been criticised for encouraging production of quantity at the expense of 
quality. This criticism has recently been followed by a political request to 
incorporate quality criteria in the performance management approaches.
In the 1980s, performance management was introduced in educational 
funding. In today’s funding system, educational programmes are funded 
solely according to a performance principle. Funding is based on the num-
ber of students passing exams, as well as on bonuses given if students 
accomplish their studies in due time. The system is based on a real-time 
principle implying that the universities do not know the exact amount of 
resources available for education in a given year until the autumn of the 
same year. The real-time principle can be said to have been an advantage 
for the universities in a period with considerable growth in student num-
bers, but uncertainty about budgets due to variations in student practice 
have posed challenges for the institutions. Recently, it has been decided to 
further develop the funding system, including employability criteria and 
quality aspects that are probably linked to student assessments. Over the 
years, the performance-based funding formula has thus become increas-
ingly complex and still more tightly politically governed. Since 2009, an 
increasing part of the funding for basic research, currently amounting to 
20%, has been performance based. The formula includes the number of 
graduates from master’s and PhD programmes, the ability to attract exter-
nal funding and the counting of publications. A quality aspect is included 
in counting publications, as publication channels are divided into two 
groups, one releasing more points and resources than the other.
Funding from the Ministry of Higher Education and Science is given to 
the institutions as a lump sum, meaning that the universities decide how 
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to distribute the resources between faculties and departments. In relation 
to education, the performance-based principle is typically implemented all 
the way down in the hierarchy, whereas there are only a few examples of 
this in relation to funding for basic research. Universities also negotiate 
performance contracts with their parent Ministry. Hitherto, contracts 
have not been related to funding allocations, but the institutions must 
document goal attainment. Recently, it was decided to link goal attain-
ment to funding from 2019. In Denmark, salaries are only marginally 
linked to performance, although this aspect is increasingly gaining 
importance.
 Finland
In Finland, performance measurement and performance management 
have been guiding principles in higher education governance, both at the 
system and institutional levels, for over 20 years. Originally, performance 
management and measurement landed in the university sector within the 
general reform of state administration, which, to a large extent, was imple-
mented following the ideals derived from NPM. Today, even after the 
reform of 2010, which made universities legally independent from the 
state hierarchy, the university sector can be considered one of the admin-
istrative sectors governed/financed by the state where the ideals of NPM 
are most comprehensively applied (see e.g. Kauko and Diogo 2011; 
Salminen 2003). Some of the recent empirical studies have also proven the 
effectiveness of using performance-based funding in the increasing perfor-
mance of Finnish universities (see Seuri and Vartiainen 2018).
Although the execution of performance management on behalf of the 
Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture has been highly structured, its 
further application in individual universities in their internal management 
and strategies is not controlled by the Ministry. In fact, individual universi-
ties, and in many cases their subunits, like faculties, have developed their 
own internal variations of performance management (Kallio and Kallio 
2014). The extensiveness of performance-based funding is mostly visible 
in allocation practices in providing resources to universities, in profession-
alisation of academic and administrative management positions, in the use 
of contractual arrangements (performance agreements), and in outsourc-
ing and centralisation of support and administrative services in universi-
ties. Furthermore, as in many other European countries, old and new 
trends related to management, such as strategic management, quality 
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management and knowledge management, have also been applied in 
universities.
One important aspect of performance measurement is the salary system 
for university personnel. Since 2008, the salary system of universities, 
comprising both academic and administrative staff, has been based on per-
formance measurement, where a maximum of around one-third of the 
salary is performance based. Although the salary or other  performance- based 
financial incentives have not proven to be the main motivation for Finnish 
academics to work harder (see Kivistö et  al. 2017), they are applied as 
means of translating system- and institutional-level incentives to the indi-
vidual level, thereby drawing attention to what is considered valuable (and 
what is not).
 Norway
The funding system for HEI in Norway provides a more stable budget 
than that in the Danish system, as 70% of the funding is allocated as block 
grants. Still, the 30% of performance-based indicators increasingly func-
tion as a policy tool used to stimulate improvement in both teaching and 
research, as well as managerial tools in the institutions. Teaching indica-
tors constitute the largest share (24%), focussing on throughput of stu-
dents and internalisation. As for research indicators (the remaining 6%), 
these are related to the throughput of PhD students, external funding of 
research (e.g. from the EU and the Norwegian Research Council), and 
finally from the metrics related to publications. The Norwegian Publication 
Indicator as a measurement system was introduced in 2004. As a policy 
and performance management tool, such indicators from research are 
meant to stimulate excellence and productivity, as well as to increase the 
accountability of public research. Another important aspect is aligning 
research to societal and economic needs (Aagaard et al. 2015). Despite the 
broad objectives, the financial role of the indicator is marginal, as it only 
distributes 2% of the funding to the sector (Aagaard et al. 2015).
This funding system based on metrics and a market model has, on the 
one hand, increased the autonomy in the universities, as the boards are 
responsible for prioritising within the allocated financial frames and align-
ing their activities to meet the goals for the sector. On the other hand, ex 
post control has increased, and the contractual relationship between uni-
versities and the state based on performance metrics is replacing the trust- 
based foundational pact (Stensaker 2014). The increased autonomy is 
counteracted by controlling instruments, reporting systems and the 
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 financial incentive systems following students and research activities 
(Christensen 2011). The individual academics are still autonomous 
regarding teaching and research, but the autonomy is limited or steered by 
incentive and reporting systems; this can feel like a decrease in professional 
autonomy (Christensen 2011).
 Sweden
Generally, performance and performance measurement have become ever 
more important over time in Sweden as well. These phenomena have also 
increasingly ‘trickled down’ and been reflected across organisational levels. 
The developments of education and research described below have 
affected HEIs significantly, and various responses have emerged.
As mentioned above, one of the most dramatic changes in Swedish 
higher education was the introduction of performance-based funding in 
education, based on the inflow of students and throughput. The previous 
system was criticised for being too rigid, based on central planning, and 
not driving quality enough. The latter argument has also been used against 
the current system. Since funding is so closely related to student success, 
there have been discussions about decreased demands for passing stu-
dents. The system is based on the idea that different educational areas bear 
different costs. A student in the Humanities is supposed to cost far less 
than an Engineering student, for instance. Another effect of this system 
has been an increased marketing activity by HEIs. An important aspect of 
the system is the use of a ‘ceiling’ for the number of students recruited. 
Allocation of funds has a limit and it is linked to a maximum number of 
students. Throughput of students has been a controversial quality indica-
tor. Whereas there have been occasional discussions on the risk of lower-
ing demands on students, there are also examples where student 
throughput has been linked to incentives. Overall, this has not affected the 
individual academics but rather organisational units and HEIs.
In research, the traditional model was block funding based on historical 
principles rather than performance. Direct state funding was the bulk of 
the total funding for research. Lately, there has been a development 
towards more competitive external funding than direct state funding, and 
as of 2018, the external funding made up slightly more than half of the 
total funding. A milestone in Swedish research policy was the introduction 
of performance-based funding as part of the direct state funding. Since the 
introduction in 2009, 10–20% of the total funding has been allocated to 
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HEIs based on performance as shown in publications and external  
funding.
convergIng HIgHer educAtIon PolIcIes
Organisational fields with their specific institutions, such as universities, 
have similarities in organisational design and activities all over the world. 
In many countries, universities have experienced a shift towards ‘academic 
capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie 1999) and operate as ‘entrepreneurial 
universities’ (Clark 1998; Etzkowitz et al. 2008). Rationalisation of the 
universities as organisational actors by the introduction of more formal 
structure, in terms of introducing a stronger emphasis on quality assur-
ance, evaluation, accountability measures and incentive systems, can be 
considered a transnational process linked to the NPM type of governance 
reforms (Ramirez and Christensen 2013; Seeber et al. 2015). The social 
mechanisms of spreading the ideas of rationalisation can be highlighted 
from the perspective of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). The literature on isomorphism concentrates on the increasing sim-
ilarity of organisational and institutional structures and cultures, whereas 
studies on policy convergence focus on changes in national policy charac-
teristics. Policy convergence, that is, the development of similar or identi-
cal policies across countries over time (Knill 2005), seems to be especially 
evident in Nordic countries, which show similar types of policy develop-
ment in many significant areas of higher education policy, predominantly 
those related to governance.
One of the most important reasons behind policy convergence, 
although not the only one, is international policy promotion, where an 
actor with expertise in a policy field promotes certain policies. International 
(or supranational) organisations specialised in a certain policy field are the 
main actors for inducing the convergence of policies by actively promot-
ing certain policies and defining objectives and standards in an interna-
tional setting. Countries diverging from the promoted policy models may 
feel pressure to comply with the policies (Holzinger and Knill 2005; 
Knill 2005).
There are two overarching international political processes relating to 
higher education in Europe, which presumably have a significant effect on 
policy convergence, as follows: the higher education ‘Modernisation 
Agenda’ (European Commission 2006, 2011) promoted under the aus-
pices of the EU institutions (especially the European Commission) and 
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the intergovernmental Bologna Process (Moisio 2014). Many NPM ideals 
implemented in Nordic universities, such as promoting the accountability 
and autonomy of higher education institutions and improving the gover-
nance, funding, quality and relevance of higher education, are directly in 
line with the Commission’s Modernisation Agenda. Interestingly, the 
Modernisation Agenda presents chiefly the American higher education 
system and universities as one of the important points of comparison in 
developing European higher education (see also Slaughter and Cantwell 
2012; Slaughter and Taylor 2016).
The Bologna Process seems to increase policy convergence at the 
European level, although the research evidence for this is not yet entirely 
clear (see, e.g. Witte 2008). However, Voegtle et al. (2011) have found 
that the higher education policies of the Bologna participants converge 
more strongly and that the Bologna Process has made a crucial difference 
in increasing the similarity of higher education policies. Especially in the 
area of quality assurance, most Bologna countries implemented most of 
the measures and included all the required actors for quality assurance 
measures according to Bologna standards by 2008 (Voegtle et al. 2011).
International/intergovernmental organisations, such as the OECD, 
World Bank and UNESCO, are highly influential actors in higher educa-
tion policy convergence (see, e.g. Shahjahan 2012; Shahjahan and Madden 
2015). At the European and Nordic level, most notably, the OECD has 
had a high level of influence on policy convergence. Nation states, includ-
ing Nordic countries, often rely on the OECD to provide them with the 
latest data on trends, current issues and policy options. The OECD uses 
conferences, trend and review reports and the mediation of policy lan-
guage to influence the thinking of national-level policymakers within and 
outside of its member countries (Shahjahan and Madden 2015). For 
instance, the OECD’s thematic reviews can provide a strong legitimisation 
or justification to national governments for initiating policy reforms, as has 
happened in Finland (Kallo 2009).
In addition to the influence of international organisations, cross- 
national policy convergence may simply be the result of similar but inde-
pendent responses caused by the same type of policy problems to which 
countries are reacting (Bennett 1991; Knill 2005). At the same time, con-
vergence in policies is more likely for countries that are characterised by 
high institutional similarity, as policies tend to be implemented insofar as 
they fit with the existing culture, socioeconomic structures and institu-
tional arrangements. In the search for relevant policy models, states are 
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expected to look to the experiences of those countries with which they 
share an especially close set of cultural similarities and ties (Knill 2005). In 
many ways, this is the case with Nordic countries, which are characterised 
by a welfare-state ideology and public-sector development in this frame-
work. Moreover, they are relatively similar in population size and geo-
graphically proximate, and they share the same types of political systems 
and values. In terms of policy challenges, all Nordic countries have to deal 
with the financial, social and political sustainability of the Nordic welfare 
model, which in turn, as has been mentioned before, has triggered 
government- led reform efforts under the label of NPM, especially in the 
higher education sector. In all countries, universities are expected to play 
an increasingly important role in  local and national economic develop-
ment and innovation, which has further intensified government-led efforts 
to modernise the higher education sector in all Nordic countries.
Although policy convergence clearly is observable across the Nordic 
countries, however, it is important to observe that similar policies are 
introduced at different points in time and with important variations in the 
details. For instance, all the Nordic countries have introduced performance- 
based funding systems linked to the distribution of resources for basic 
research. However, performance in Nordic countries is measured using 
different indicators and redistribution potentials, and therefore, also the 
effects of the measurement are quite likely different. Other examples of 
divergence are found in relation to overall governance and management 
structures, as well as the national quality assurance systems linked to edu-
cation. Overall, there seems to be more convergence in policy ideas and 
policy rhetoric than in actual policy implementation.
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IntroductIon
Higher education (HE) in the Nordic countries has experienced continu-
ous change in the last three decades. This has partially been a result of the 
increased number of enrolled students, but it is also a result of the influ-
ence of larger societal trends, such as urbanisation, digitalisation, and the 
importance attributed to innovation and global competition. Governmental 
reforms have placed an emphasis on quality, excellence, efficiency, and 
accountability, and have led to significant changes in the internal fabric of 
publicly funded universities. At the system level, the traditional binary 
divide characterising higher education throughout the Nordic region has 
also been affected. In some countries, such as Norway, the general trend 
has been convergence towards a unitary model based on comprehensive 
research-intensive universities, whereas other countries (e.g., Finland) still 
exhibit policy commitments towards maintaining horizontal diversity, 
with different providers undertaking specific functions.
Given their geographical features, regional dimensions also play an 
important role; however, these have also been adapting to the new realities 
facing localities and regions beyond the largest urban areas. As is the case 
with other countries’ higher education systems, the influence of market- 
based models has been felt in the Nordics, and new public management 
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(NPM)-inspired reforms have resulted in the rise of managerialism 
 focusing on efficiency, performance, and outcome-based assessments. The 
traditional social contract, which is based on trust between higher educa-
tion institutions (HEI) and society and is brokered via the state, has grad-
ually yet steadily been replaced by a contractual relationship in which 
providers are expected to deliver certain pre-determined outcomes in light 
of agreed- upon input factors (such as people and funding) and perfor-
mance metrics (such as outputs).
Given their cultural similarities and their shared commitment 
towards public investments in the realm of welfare and education, the 
Nordic countries have often been grouped together to encompass the 
“Nordic model.” Yet, beyond the surface, each Nordic country is 
unique in its own right, and this is reflected in the governance and 
organisation of their respective national higher education systems. 
Despite a considerable degree of policy convergence among the Nordic 
countries, important variations in terms of timing, content, and degree 
of change can be detected. These national specificities, described in 
some detail later in this chapter, provide the backdrop for assessing the 
results of the comparative study that comprise the bulk of this 
edited volume.
We start by describing how the four national systems included in this 
study—Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—are currently organ-
ised and structured, illuminating several specific features such as the 
types and sizes of the institutions, enrolment patterns, performance 
measures, and funding. The chapter then moves on by providing a snap-
shot of how higher education systems have evolved historically by shed-
ding light on policy dynamics from the late 1990s to 2013, the baseline 
period for the comparative study. That being said, and when appropriate, 
the chapter reflects briefly on key policy developments in the last five 
years or so (2013–2018 period).
natIonal HIgHer educatIon SyStemS and recent 
PolIcy dynamIcS
Denmark
 Landscape
Higher education in Denmark is organised into three types of programmes 
offered by different types of institutions. Short-length programmes are 
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offered by business colleges (erhvervsakademier) responsible for voca-
tional training, medium-length bachelor’s programmes that train teachers, 
pedagogues, and social workers are offered by university colleges 
 (professionshøjskoler), and long-length programmes (master’s and PhD 
programmes) are, in addition to bachelor’s programmes, offered by uni-
versities. Universities are also responsible for most of the sector’s research 
activity. As indicated above, the empirical focus of this edited volume is 
solely on the university sector. In 2013, the Danish university landscape 
consisted of eight universities that enrolled 156,815 students and 
employed 33,446 staff, as shown in Table 3.1.
As the table shows, the higher education landscape is diverse. Denmark 
has very large institutions, such as the University of Copenhagen, 
small  institutions, such as RUC, and even tiny institutions, such as 
ITU. The table also reveals that some institutions, such as CBS, have many 
students in  comparison to the number of staff while other institutions, 
such as  DTU  and Aarhus University, have the opposite. Diversity has 
increased as a result of the merger reform in 2007 (described later) during 
Table 3.1 The Danish higher education university landscape, 2013
Institution Type Number of enrolled 
students
Total number of staff 
(FTEa)
University of Copenhagen Multi- 
faculty
40,866 9652
Aarhus University Multi- 
faculty
38,169 8216
University of Southern 
Denmark (SDU)
Multi- 
faculty
22,224 3626
Roskilde University (RUC) Multi- 
faculty
7588 1020
Aalborg University Multi- 
faculty
19,064 3379
Technical University of 
Denmark (DTU)
Mono- 
faculty
10,196 5721
Copenhagen Business School 
(CBS)
Mono- 
faculty
16,659 1526
IT University of Copenhagen 
(ITU)
Mono- 
faculty
1894 306
Total 156,660 33,446
Source: Statistics from Universities Denmark
aFull-time equivalent (FTE)
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 which most governmental research institutes were merged into the univer-
sities. Due to this reform, there are huge differences in the research inten-
siveness of these universities today.
 System Governance
The main elements in the governance system of Denmark’s university sec-
tor are legislation, development contracts (recently re-termed as strategic 
framework contracts), performance-based funding, accreditation, and dia-
logue. Universities are so-called self-owing institutions under the auspices 
of Denmark’s Ministry of Higher Education and Science. Boards with 
external majorities have the overall responsibility of strategically managing 
the institutions and are accountable to the minister when it comes to the 
administration of economic resources. Furthermore, these boards appoint 
the vice-chancellors responsible for the daily management of the 
universities.
In the Danish university sector, reforms have become part of daily life. 
Looking back at the last 15 years, the most important policy developments 
and reforms related to governance have been: the introduction of contract 
steering in 2000, the governance reform in 2003, the merger reform in 
2007, and the changes in output-based mechanisms for resource alloca-
tions in universities. Many of these developments can be traced back to a 
2001 report that established a research policy reform agenda. This agenda 
was, first and foremost, geared towards the need to increase resources for 
public sector research, reform universities’ management structures, 
strengthen evaluation and quality assurance, and boost PhD education. In 
addition, these changes were aimed towards securing critical mass through 
collaboration and mergers and developing the resource allocation system 
in a more results-based direction (Aagaard 2012; Hansen 2001; Research 
Commission 2001).
Since the year 2000, development contracts between Denmark’s line 
ministry and the country’s individual universities have been an important 
element in the governance of the sector. Contracts have lined up impor-
tant goals and measurable results, but they have not been linked to 
resource allocations per se. Instead, they have been followed up by the 
documentation of results in the form of institutional annual reports. In 
2015, “binding goals” were introduced, which line up political goals for 
the sector as such. The binding goals from 2015 to 2017 were to improve 
quality of education, increase relevance and collaboration, strengthen 
internationalisation, and increase social mobility. All Danish universities 
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have been committed to helping achieve these goals. The aim of the con-
tract regime is to ensure the responsiveness of the universities to societal 
political goals.
In 2003, a new university act was introduced. University leaders (vice- 
chancellors, deans, and heads of departments) who in the past had been 
elected from below (by their peers) were now being appointed from above. 
Boards with external majorities and elected chairmen among their external 
members were introduced. According to the law, nominated external 
board members require experience in the realms of education, research, 
leadership, organisation, and economics. Academic councils and study 
boards, in which the majority of members are elected by staff and stu-
dents, remain important organisational elements. However, under the 
new governance regime, academic councils have become, primarily, advi-
sory bodies for the deans. The overall intention behind the law was to turn 
universities into dynamic, strategic actors. In the wake of the reform, an 
intensive debate arose regarding the consequences of the reduced influ-
ence of staff on important decisions. An international evaluation in 2010 
argued that the boards had to start taking responsibility to involve staff 
and students in decision-making processes (Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation 2009). As a result, the law was changed in 
2011, demanding public universities to adopt internal rules for enhancing 
staff and also demanding that students be directly involved in governance 
issues. The universities reacted accordingly by establishing more advisory 
bodies. With the 2003 act, public universities became self-owned institu-
tions. The meaning of this, however, is unclear. Only a few universities 
own their buildings. Universities interested in becoming owners of their 
buildings have hitherto not been allowed to do so. This is one example of 
a significant restriction of Danish universities’ autonomy. Universities 
were also made responsible for third mission activities. Tasks related to 
research communications were not new to universities, but the new law 
stressed the responsibilities of universities in this area.
In 2007, a merger reform was implemented in the university sector. 
This reform included both inter-university mergers as well as mergers 
between universities and governmental research institutes (GRIs). A total 
of 12 universities were reduced to eight, and nine GRIs were merged into 
the universities. An important overall argument for the mergers was econ-
omies of scale, namely, the pooling of finances, knowledge, technical facili-
ties, and buildings to create increased competitiveness. In addition, 
economies of scale cover the possibilities of saving administrative and per-
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haps even teaching resources (Aagaard et al. 2016). A more specific argu-
ment was to strengthen the use of the GRI staff ’s competencies in the 
educational programmes of the universities. The merger reform process 
was politically initiated and coercive, but at the same time, it included a 
voluntary element. Universities and GRIs could choose with whom they 
would merge. In retrospect, governance reform can be interpreted as a 
precondition for merger reform. The new governance structure seemed to 
be more responsive than the old one. In addition, the new leaders were 
tempted by the promise of increased resources for research due to the 
globalisation agreement (as described later in the chapter). At the time of 
the mergers, the new universities were organised as federal structures, 
meaning that specific responsibilities remained within the participating 
institutions. In several Danish universities, post-merger reorganisation 
processes have been initiated with the aim to develop more unitary struc-
tures, whereas former participating institutions ceased to exist due to the 
adoption of new governance structures.
 Funding Structures
Public resources for Danish universities are allocated through four chan-
nels: resources for education, basic resources for research, resources for 
carrying out tasks for ministries, and resources for research allocated 
through open competition via research councils and foundations. Over 
time, the system has become increasingly results-oriented. Resources for 
education have, since the 1980s, been linked to the number of students 
who pass their exams. Since 2009, this “taximeter system” has been sup-
plemented by bonuses. Universities receive extra resources if students 
complete their studies in due time (Regeringen 2010). Among these uni-
versities, the allocation of most basic resources for research has been his-
torically determined. Since 2010, however, the allocation of new basic 
resources for research has been results-based. New resources, which, in 
most years, have been generated through both cutting back 2% of the 
existing resources and using genuine, new, and politically prioritised 
resources, are allocated to universities according to each university’s ability 
to generate educational resources. These abilities include the number of 
PhDs awarded by the university, the ability of the university to attract 
competitive research funds, and the bibliometric indicator measuring the 
total amount of research production in the university. The latter indicator, 
based on two quality levels, was developed upon inspiration from Norway. 
However, the Danish model only re-allocates resources across universities 
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within certain scientific fields, not across the main scientific fields as in 
Norway’s model. Very different opinions exist regarding the bibliometric 
indicator (Dahler-Larsen 2012). Due to its limited re-allocation abilities, 
this indicator has been characterised as “a lot of fuss about nothing” 
(Schneider and Aagard 2012). Despite this fact, there is no doubt that the 
system influences researchers’ behaviour, especially within fields where the 
introduction of the model is followed up by management demands about 
publication volume or wage bonuses.
Resources for education and basic resources for research are allocated 
to Danish universities as a lump sum, which gives these institutions strate-
gic manoeuvring room. Danish universities have indeed taken a series of 
strategic initiatives; however, these are implemented in a context in which 
departments and faculties fight with one another to obtain their historically- 
gained resources. Since the merger reform, Danish universities have 
received additional resources for carrying out certain national tasks. These 
are allocated based on four-year contracts between specific universities and 
ministries. If a university does not fulfil its obligations, a ministry may 
enter into a contract with another actor, such as another university. There 
are several institutions responsible for allocating competitive resources for 
research. The most important are the Danish Council for Independent 
Research (recently renamed the Independent Research Fund Denmark), 
the Innovation Fund Denmark, which offers resources for strategic 
research, technology, and innovation, and the Danish National Research 
Foundation, which funds centres of excellence (for a comparative analysis 
of Nordic centres of excellence as a research policy initiative, consult 
Langfeldt et  al. 2013). Apart from these main actors, there are several 
additional programmes within the ministries as well as private founda-
tions, especially within the health sciences field. International research 
programmes, particularly within the EU (in the context of the European 
Research Council), are also highly important. In 2012, external research 
funding in Denmark totalled 28% of the total revenue for the university 
sector as a whole (Danske Universiteter 2013, 4). Table 3.2 breaks down 
the types of funding in the period 2007–2013.
The data shows considerable growth across the main categories. 
Funding allocations for education increased by 30%, and funding for both 
core research and external funding rose by 50% from 2007 to 2013. That 
being said, when it comes to the sharing of competitive funding emanat-
ing from the ministry (official tasks), the figures have been rather stable 
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over time. Overall, university funding allocations across all categories 
increased by 25% during the seven-year period.
As is the case with the introduction of governance through contracts, 
several key policy developments, including the merger reform and the 
development of an increasingly results-based resource allocation system, 
are very much in line with the more general trends in public sector reforms. 
Other development initiatives include more specific higher education pol-
icy initiatives. This can be seen particularly in the case of the governance 
of reform that has been discussed since the 1970s, during which time a 
very democratic governance structure was introduced. However, it also 
applies to some of the adjustments of the resource allocation system; for 
example, the introduction of bonuses for students who complete their 
studies in due time. The key policy developments reflect an ongoing dis-
cussion and a dilemma between, on the one hand, leveraging university 
autonomy (the idea of turning universities into dynamic strategic actors), 
and on the other, fostering universities’ political (societal) responsiveness 
and state control. In a nutshell, the merger reform reduced the number of 
institutions, thus turning governance through contracts into a more man-
ageable process, whereas the governance reform introduced hierarchical 
structures into universities, turning (some) leaders into very responsive 
actors in the eyes of the government.
Table 3.2 University funding from 2007 to 2013, Thousand Danish Kroner- 
fixed pricesa
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Core: 
education
6170.6 6269.3 6583.1 6944.1 7286.5 7621.1 8065.7
Core: 
research
6056.2 7374.7 8070.2 8330.8 8834.2 8868.9 9007.8
External 5385.5 5945.2 6282.7 6929.5 7188.7 7585.2 7950.6
Ministry 
tasks
536.9 508.8 541.1 505.9 517.3 489.2 488.7
Other 3738.4 2610.2 2759.6 2511.7 2339.4 2059.9 1917.8
Total 21,887.7 22,708.2 24,236.7 25,222.1 26,166.2 26,624.2 27,430.5
Source: Statistics from Universities Denmark
aFinal figures have been rounded for simplicity. The year 2006 is not included, as its figures are not com-
parable due to the merger of GRIs into the universities. “Other” includes example revenues for other 
purposes, as well as financial revenues
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 Recent Policy Initiatives
In recent years, several policy initiatives have been developed that are 
aimed at boosting effectiveness and efficiency. On the teaching front, 
these initiatives have been geared towards increasing students’  throughput, 
and on the research side, the bibliometric indicator may be interpreted as 
an initiative meant to increase research productivity as well as, to some 
extent, research quality. During the period between 2003 and 2014, the 
Danish government was concerned with both education and research- 
related issues; however, different governments attempted to balance the 
two sides of the system differently. For instance, the liberal government 
from 2001 to 2011 exhibited a very active research policy reform agenda, 
whereas the left-leaning government, which has been in power since 2011, 
has been more occupied with driving educational reforms. Towards the 
end of 2014, the political agenda shifted somewhat towards cutting back 
on educational programmes with high levels of graduate unemployment. 
Dimensioning initiatives have hit programmes within the humanities espe-
cially, but other areas have also been affected, for example, biology pro-
grammes. Below, we provide an overview of the key 2003–2014 policy 
initiatives aimed towards boosting performance in teaching, research, and 
doctoral education.
 Historical Overview
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 outline a number of government-led initiatives in 
Denmark geared towards boosting the number of students in the higher 
education university system as well as initiatives for ensuring effective-
ness and efficiency. The globalisation agreement increased the volume 
of the system in relation to research, especially with respect to PhD 
education. The increase in the number of youth applying to study at 
Danish universities (in 2011, marked by the political 25% goal for 
2020), combined with the taximeter resource allocation system, has 
boosted the volume of the system in relation to teaching. System growth 
and the potentially problematic incentives of allowing students to pass 
their exams (due to the taximeter system) have raised concerns about 
whether quality problems exist in the sector. This has led to policy ini-
tiatives aimed at ensuring quality by further developing the accredita-
tion system and, more recently, including a quality indicator in the 
funding system.
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Table 3.3 Key policy initiatives within teaching
Year Measures taken Rationale Reactions of higher 
education 
institutions
2007 Programme accreditation; all 
new and established 
programmes have to go through 
accreditation
Ensure quality and relevance of 
programmes
Negative; very 
resource- and 
time-consuming
2009 Bonus for students who 
complete their studies in due 
time
Improve throughput rates Negative; 
universities did not 
find that they were 
able to influence 
student behaviour
2011 New government agreed that 
25% of all youngsters in 2020 
must obtain a master’s degree
2013 Fremdriftsreformen Ensure that students study full 
time; improve throughput rates
Negative; see above
Accreditation system changed to 
institutional accreditation, 
combined with administrative 
approval of new programmes
Ensure that universities have 
optimal procedures for 
ensuring the quality and 
relevance of their programmes
Rather positive; was 
seen as an 
improvement from 
the former system
2014 Reducing the number of 
students in programmes with 
graduate unemployment 
(dimensionering)
Enhance graduates’ 
employability; cutting back on 
certain programmes
Overall positive, 
but sceptical 
towards the 
technical design of 
the system
Table 3.4 Key policy initiatives within research
Timeline Measures taken Rationale Reactions of 
higher education 
institutions
2003–2005 Reform of the research 
council system
Separating strategic research 
initiatives from responsive 
mode funding and 
establishing a foundation for 
technology development
2006 Globalisation 
agreement
Increased resources for 
research (2007–2012)
Positive
2010 Bibliometric indicator Increased resources for PhD 
programmes (2007–2012)
Positive
The Danish National 
Research Foundation 
evaluation increased 
resources and, some 
years later, cutbacks
Varied; some used 
it actively, and 
others mostly 
ignored it
2014 Innovation Fund 
Denmark
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Finland
 Landscape
The Finnish higher education system consists of two complementary sec-
tors: universities and universities of applied sciences. Both sectors have 
their own distinct profiles and missions. As specified in Finnish legislation, 
the mission of universities is to conduct scientific research and provide 
undergraduate and postgraduate education based on this research. 
Universities must promote free research and scientific and artistic educa-
tion, provide higher education based on research, and educate students so 
that they can serve their country and humanity. While carrying out this 
mission, universities must interact with the surrounding society and 
strengthen the influence of research findings and artistic activities on soci-
ety (Universities Act 558/2009). In contrast, the mission of universities of 
applied sciences is to train professionals in response to labour market needs 
and to conduct applied research, development and innovation activities 
which supports instruction and promotes regional development in par-
ticular (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture n.d.).
In 2013, there were altogether 14 universities operating under the aus-
pices of Finland’s Ministry of Education and Culture (see Table 3.5). All 
these universities offer bachelor’s, master’s, licentiate, and doctoral 
degrees. The standard degree obtained by students at Finnish universities 
is the master’s degree. The bachelor’s/master’s distinction is more or less 
a formality introduced to align with the two-cycle Bologna system, as the 
bachelor’s degree is not widely regarded as a degree with which one can 
enter the labour market.
 System Governance
Finland’s university sector is steered through legislation, performance- 
based funding, performance agreements, and quality assurance measures, 
as well as through national mid-term (five years) development plans before 
their abolishment in 2015. National legislation (acts and decrees) has a 
particularly strong influence on the structure of the Finnish university sec-
tor. Legislation determines the number of universities, the missions and 
tasks of the universities, the governance and administrative structures and 
bodies of the universities, the regulations related to studies and studying, 
the number of academic staff, and so on.
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Finland’s university admissions system has been highly decentralised 
in contrast to other European countries. Finnish universities are free to 
establish their own criteria for the admission of students. Entrance 
 examinations, in the majority of cases, differ from one university to 
another. Unlike many other countries, all fields of study in Finnish uni-
versities apply numerous clauses to their admission policies. Universities 
are not allowed to initiate degree-based training in new disciplinary 
fields (e.g., engineering, medical science, or law) without the approval of 
the Ministry of Education and Culture. The purpose of this restriction is 
Table 3.5 Universities in Finland, 2013 (all figures are FTE)
University Type Number of 
students
Number of 
academic 
staff
Number of 
non-academic 
staff
Aalto University Multidisciplinary 12,772 2845 1886
Hanken School of 
Economics
Business 
(Swedish-speaking)
1696 130 109
Lappeenranta 
University of 
Technology
Technical 3270 588 351
Tampere University 
of Technology
Technical 6147 1175 664
University of 
Eastern Finland
Multidisciplinary 10,798 1497 979
University of 
Helsinki
Multidisciplinary 23,505 4186 3493
University of 
Jyväskylä
Multidisciplinary 9718 1512 917
University of 
Lapland
Multidisciplinary 3193 304 273
University of Oulu Multidisciplinary 10,374 1645 989
University of the 
Arts Helsinki
Art 1577 386 298
University of 
Tampere
Multidisciplinary 10,045 1055 842
University of Turku Multidisciplinary 12,716 1758 1350
University of Vaasa Multidisciplinary 3622 285 196
Åbo Akademi 
University
Multidisciplinary 
(Swedish-speaking)
4187 729 464
Total 113,620 18,095 12,811
Source: Vipunen database
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to ensure national coordination and the quality of the programmes 
within the scope of the higher education institutions’ educational 
responsibilities, as well as the (public) resources available to them 
(Kivistö and Pekkola 2013). Otherwise universities have high levels of 
autonomy in developing their programme portfolios. This policy choice 
is based on the welfare state ideology in which forecasting labour (mar-
ket) demands plays an important role due to the qualification require-
ments for many (public) professions, whereas university degrees have 
traditionally functioned as screening devices. Admission and degree tar-
gets for each field of education are agreed upon between them and 
contained in each higher education institution’s performance agree-
ment with the Ministry of Education and Culture. In 2015, the govern-
ment decided to bring an end to all mid- term policy planning and 
concentrate more on strategic planning. Thus, the development plans 
are part of administrative history—for the time being (Kivistö and 
Pekkola 2013).
The national authorities that are primarily responsible for science and 
technology policy in Finland are the Ministry of Education and Culture 
and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The former is in 
charge of matters related to researcher training and science policy, as well 
as the Academy of Finland. The latter deals with matters related to 
industrial and technology policies, the National Technology Agency 
(TEKES) (renamed Business Finland as of 2018), and the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The bulk of public R&D funding is 
channelled through these two ministries (cf. Ministry of Education 
2005). Finnish national science, technology, and innovation policies are 
formulated by the Science and Technology Policy Council (1987–2008) 
and the Research and Innovation Council (since 2009), which were and 
are chaired by the Finnish Prime Minister. The role of these councils was 
and is to advise the government on the strategic development and coor-
dination of Finnish science and technology policy as well as the national 
innovation system.
 Funding Structures
From 2003 to 2013, state funding allocated through the funding model 
(core funding) was relatively stable and covered approximately 72–75% of 
total university funding, depending on the year (consult Fig. 3.1). The 
differences between the years, therefore, were no greater than 3%.
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Throughout the period between 2003 and 2013, the greatest share of 
external research funding was allocated by the Academy of Finland, in 
which the proportion of all research funding ranged between 31% and 
39%. Notably, during this decade, the share of the Academy of Finland’s 
funding increased from 33% to 39%. TEKES’ share of total external 
research funding has been more stable; it ranged from 20% to 22%, 
depending on the year. Similarly, the share of funding from the EU 
 fluctuated between only 8% and 11%, depending on the year. However, 
the relative share of domestic companies steadily decreased from 2008 
(13%) to 2013 (8%), in both relative and absolute terms.
 Recent Policy Developments
In 2010, the Finnish university system witnessed a profound reform that 
encompassed the implementation of a totally new legislation (Universities 
Act 558/2009) accompanied by a series of reform acts and policies known 
as the “structural development” of the entire higher education system. 
Consequently, universities became independent legal and economic enti-
ties, separate from state financial administration. Universities became 
either foundations under private law (Aalto University and the Tampere 
University of Technology) or corporations under public law (all the other 
universities). This meant that these universities assumed full financial lia-
bility for both their operations and their properties.
The change in legal status also meant a change in the status of the uni-
versity staff, who were no longer employees of the state. Thus, civil service 
employment relationships were changed to contractual employment rela-
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Fig. 3.1 University core funding and external research funding, 2003–2013. 
Source: Statistics Finland
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tionships. This change permitted the universities to exercise more inde-
pendent human resource policies, including staffing and the transfer of all 
related employer responsibilities (e.g., insurance and collective bargain-
ing) to universities (Pekkola and Kivistö 2012). The New Universities Act 
pushed the universities towards a more professional model of manage-
ment, with the board as the supreme decision-making body. One of the 
new responsibilities of the board was to appoint a rector. Previously, rec-
tors had been elected by an election collegium. Moreover, in contrast to 
the previous situation in which the rector acted as the chairperson of the 
board, under the new act, the chairperson was to be elected among exter-
nal board members. Universities were allowed to charge tuition fees for 
international master’s programmes from non-EU/EEC students on a trial 
basis (2010–2014).
In 2008, as part of the reform of Finland’s salary system, the salary 
system in the state’s universities was also changed. The new salary system 
replaced the old system with salary categories and experience (age) 
bonuses. The new system was composed of two components: the task’s 
requirement level (fixed) and individual performance level (0–46, 3%). 
The reform of the salary system introduced a biannual evaluation of indi-
vidual performance (including teaching, research, and other tasks) and an 
institutional two-partite mechanism to define the requirement levels in all 
departments and disciplines. In addition to the performance component 
in the salary, many universities introduced performance bonus systems.
From 2003 to 2013, the core funding for Finnish universities was allo-
cated as a lump sum, primarily through a performance-based funding for-
mula that covered approximately 70–90% of the total core state funding. 
The performance agreements between the Ministry of Education and 
Culture and each university set operational and qualitative goals and deter-
mined the resources required to reach these targets over a three- to four- 
year period. However, the actual influence of these agreements has 
somewhat diminished due to the indicator-driven, performance-based 
funding system.
Thematic system-based evaluations form the basis of Finland’s national 
evaluation and quality assurance system. The main actor pertaining to 
these evaluations has been the semi-autonomous Finnish Higher Education 
Evaluation Council (FINHEEC), which is responsible for conducting 
external quality assurance activities (though as of 2014, it is now the 
Finnish Education Evaluation Centre [FINEEC]). Finland does not have 
a higher education accreditation system per se; however, each institution 
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is mandated by the Universities Act (in both the 1997 and the 2009 ver-
sions) to take part in external evaluation of their activities and quality 
assurance systems on a regular basis. In line with this requirement, Finnish 
universities were first audited by FINHEEC/FINEEC during the period 
between 2005 and 2012. The second round of audits, with a slightly 
revised auditing scheme, began in 2013. Contrary to the systems that 
evaluate all degree programmes in the same disciplinary field, each univer-
sity established its own quality assurance system. Universities also became 
responsible for the quality and continuous development of their educa-
tional programmes and other operations. The evaluations are develop-
mental in nature and are aimed towards helping institutions improve their 
operations (cf. Melin et al. 2015).
The Ministry of Education and Culture’s policy of upgrading its uni-
versity funding model every three years has been aligned with standard 
period of performance agreements between the Ministry and the univer-
sities from 2003 to 2013. In the period between 2013 and 2015, the 
allocation (funding) model with regard to universities was completely 
restructured. The number of indicators incorporated into the new model 
was significantly lower compared to the model in the period 2010–2012. 
The rationale behind the restructuring was to further increase the clarity 
and transparency of the model and, at the same time, offer fewer but 
stronger incentives for universities to reach their expected outputs and 
outcomes. In addition to reducing the number of indicators, the 
2013–2015 model introduced some new ones. The new teaching-related 
indicators included: the number of students who gained more than 55 
study credits European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) within one aca-
demic year, the number of students who gained study credits in open 
university and non-degree programmes, the number of employed gradu-
ates, and the number of master’s degrees awarded to foreign nationals. 
In the research component of the model, the new indicators included a 
revised way of calculating scientific publications, which were now linked 
to national classification scheme (“publication forum”) levels based on 
impact assessment, “international teaching and research personnel,” and 
“PhD degrees awarded to foreign nationals.” As in the 2010–2012 
model, the teaching and research components together comprised 75% 
of the core funding allocated through the model.
In terms of politics, the goal of increasing the share of private reve-
nue (from sources other than tuition fees) has, in most cases, been con-
sidered favourably throughout the period 2003–2009. Finland’s 
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constitution guarantees tuition-free education for all students (apart 
from student union membership fees), based on the idea of higher edu-
cation as a right rather than a privilege and a generous student support 
system supported by a progressive tax structure (Melin et  al. 2015). 
Private contributions to higher education are limited to industry and 
foundation funding. Before passing the new Universities Act 
(558/2009), changes in comprehensive government policies that 
encouraged the generation of private revenue have been minor or non-
existent. In terms of the development of new approaches to cost-shar-
ing, the 2009 Universities Act encouraged universities to compete for 
international research funding and donations and to increase revenues 
from business ventures to diversify their funding bases. Due to its 
strong welfare state ideology, the practice of giving and donating in 
Finland is weak.
The most pressing policy concerns with respect to university education 
have been the policies’ delayed entry into higher education, the long 
study durations, and problems associated with completion rates (cf. Melin 
et al. 2015). Between 2003 and 2013, several policy measures have been 
taken to tackle these challenges, namely, the introduction in 2005 of an 
ECTS system as part of the implementation of Bologna’s policy in Finland 
and a transition period between 2005 and 2008 to the two-cycle degree 
system in all university degree programmes. In September 2008, all the 
degrees (with a few exceptions) granted by Finnish universities were 
Bologna- compatible, and the normative study durations for lower and 
higher level university degrees were set according to the Universities Act 
(1997, 2009).
 Historical Overview
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 shed some light on the importance of Bologna’s pro-
cess in promoting efficiency and harmonisation within teaching (from 
2005) as well as the mixed receptions such measures entail. On the research 
front, the  policies pointed towards the effort to integrate policy streams 
across governmental portfolios. They also pointed towards a series of 
structural reforms aimed at enhancing the global competitiveness of higher 
education institutions as well as the social influence by promoting inter-
disciplinary collaborations across the board.
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Table 3.6 Key policy initiatives related to education
Timeline Measures taken Rationale Reactions of higher education 
institutions
2005–the 
present
ECTS European 
harmonisation/
efficiency
Mixed; more administrative 
work, but promotes the 
accomplishment of European 
higher education
2005–2008 Two-cycle degrees European 
harmonisation/
efficiency
Mixed; more administrative 
work, but promotes the 
accomplishment of European 
higher education
2005 Restrictions for the 
duration of study
Efficiency Mainly positive due to the 
performance-based funding 
model
2005 Changes in 
study-related 
benefits; better 
conditions for loans
Efficiency Mainly positive due to the 
performance-based funding 
model
Table 3.7 Key policy initiatives related to research
Timeline Measures taken Rationale Reactions of higher 
education institutions
2005–
present
Strengthened the 
role of the Science 
and Technology 
Council
To integrate science, 
technology, higher 
education, and 
innovation policy
Mixed to positive; more 
emphasis placed on 
competitive research 
funding and additional 
funding
2007–2013 Strategic Centres for 
Science, Technology 
and Innovation 
(SHOKS)
To create globally 
competitive innovation 
clusters
Mixed; no major impact 
on universities or their 
funding
post- 2013 Research institute 
and funding reform
To promote mergers for 
larger and stronger 
entities, multidisciplinary 
research, and social 
significance
Mixed to positive; new 
funding instruments and 
more competition in the 
research sector as a 
whole
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Norway
 Landscape
The Norwegian higher education system consists of universities, special-
ised university institutions, and university colleges. All three of these insti-
tution types are regulated in the framework of the 2005 Act relating to 
universities and university colleges. The mission of higher education insti-
tutions is articulated around teaching, international high-quality research, 
and the dissemination of knowledge for public administration, cultural 
life, businesses, and industries (Act 2005, 1–1). Norwegian public higher 
education institutions are owned by the state and belong to the public 
sector and administration. However, they are granted academic and artis-
tic freedom with respect to the academic content of their teaching and 
research activities, individual appointments, and organisational structures 
within the limits of the framework regulations (Act 2005, 1–5). Higher 
education and research in Norway are the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education and Research. In 2013, a total of eight universities operated in 
Norway offering bachelor’s (three years), master’s (two years), and com-
bined five-year programmes (e.g., teacher training), professional pro-
grammes, and doctoral degrees (three to four years). Our analyses also 
include the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), which belongs to 
the category of specialised university institutions owned by the Norwegian 
state. Overall, close to 110,000 students enrolled in Norwegian universi-
ties in 2013, as shown in Table 3.8.
The Ministry of Education and Research determines the admission cri-
teria for the education sector and carries the ultimate responsibility for 
state educational institutions, student welfare, and student financial sup-
port. There are no student fees in public universities. Universities and 
university colleges are also responsible for the student learning environ-
ment; they are usually connected to a student union that takes care of 
student welfare needs. The student unions are established by the Ministry 
of Education and Research but are not administered by a central govern-
ment. The student welfare organisations are independent organisations, as 
stipulated in relevant legislation and regulations, and receive state fund-
ing, tuition fees, and access to office space and basic equipment (provided 
through educational institutions at no cost) in order to offer high-quality, 
reasonably priced services to students. The Norwegian Universities and 
Colleges Admission Service (NUCAS) is responsible for determining 
admission to most programmes at Norwegian universities; that said, some 
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institutions have their own admission systems. This applies to several pri-
vate university colleges as well as university colleges that have entrance 
examinations or auditions.
The national government plays an important role in the Norwegian 
Research and Development (R&D) system. At the political level, the 
responsibility for research is organised according to the “sector principle.” 
Several ministries allocate sizable resources to research projects that are 
related to sectors within their respective domains. Research appropriations 
are widely distributed among several ministries. The Ministry of Education 
and Research is the largest source of governmental research funding and is 
responsible for the inter-ministerial coordination of national research poli-
Table 3.8 Universities in Norway, 2013 (all figures are FTE)
Type Number of 
enrolled 
students
Number of 
academic 
staff
Total 
number of 
staff
Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH)
Specialised, business 3370 260 398
Norwegian University 
of Science and 
Technology (NTNU)
Technical, 
comprehensive 
(research-intensive)
22,935 2965 5029
University of Agder Comprehensive, 
vocationala
10,470 571 960
University of Bergen Comprehensive, 
research-based
14,895 2082 3463
University of Nordland Comprehensive, 
vocational
6015 319 558
University of Stavanger Comprehensive, 
vocational
9680 684 1144
University of Oslo Comprehensive, 
research-based
27,360 3394 6067
University of 
Tromsø—The 
Norwegian Arctic 
University
Comprehensive, 
research-based
10,400 1445 2613
Norwegian University 
of Life Sciences
Specialised, natural 
sciences
4595 582 1045
Total 109,720 12,302 21,277
Source: NSD, database for statistics in higher education
a“Comprehensive-vocational,” refers to its origin as former university-college and stronger vocational 
profile (professional training)
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cies and the government’s overall research funding. At the operational 
level, three agencies are largely accountable for implementing the govern-
ment’s research and innovation policies. The Research Council of Norway 
(RCN), acts as the only operational research policy agency in Norway. In 
addition to funding research, the RCN has a mandate to advise the gov-
ernment on research policy and to create communication and coordina-
tion arenas for actors in research, industry, and government. The Ministry 
of Research and Education and the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and 
Fisheries are the most important contributors to the RCN’s budget, which 
was approximately NOK 7.67 billion in 2013. The other two, Innovation 
Norway and the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA), 
are the primary public institutions which support innovation. Innovation 
Norway offers programmes and services to promote innovation at the 
regional and national levels, giving a particular focus to small- and 
medium-sized companies. SIVA is involved in the provision of science 
parks, incubators, and services (mainly to start-up firms).
The Norwegian higher education system was traditionally divided into 
a university sector and a college sector (Kyvik 2009), the latter established 
as part of an expansion of the educational system in the late 1960s and 
1970s. Traditionally, university degree programmes were inspired by the 
continental university model, with a four-year first degree and a two-year 
second degree. Some professional degrees have differed from this struc-
ture (e.g., teaching programmes, medicine programmes, etc.). The system 
has changed dramatically in the last two decades, mainly as a result of the 
so-called Quality Reform (St. Meld. 27, 2000–2001). This reform, initi-
ated by a conservative government in the late 1990s and further devel-
oped by a social–democratic government in a 2001 white paper and 
implemented within higher education institutions starting in 2003 (a 
regulation established by yet another conservative government), was an 
attempt to address several challenges in higher education. These issues 
involved the following needs:
• The need for improved efficiency in higher education and research 
(by the early 2000s Norwegian higher education experienced a high 
level of student dropout and delayed graduation).
• The need to enhance the quality of higher education (it was seen as 
problematic that students had little contact with teachers, old- 
fashioned teaching methods emphasised traditional lectures, and lit-
tle emphasis was given to student learning).
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• The need to adjust Norwegian higher education to the ongoing 
Bologna Process and Norway’s related obligations.
• The need to find a system of governing the higher education sector 
that would enable it to respond to the challenges listed above 
(Ministry of Education 2005).
As part of the Quality Reform, governance structures at the institu-
tional level allowed universities full autonomy in relation to organisational 
and management issues below the board/rector level. In essence, this 
autonomy implied that individual institutions were to decide their own 
internal organisation and governance systems. However, at the institu-
tional level, only two main models of institutional leadership could be 
chosen by the universities’ boards. The standard model—seen as a con-
tinuation of existing governance arrangements—saw a rector elected by 
the staff of the individual institution. This model implied that the rector 
also became the board chairperson. However, if this model was chosen, 
the institution also had to establish dual leadership at the institutional level 
and had to appoint a director responsible for all administrative matters 
(Stensaker 2014). The alternative governance model was one where the 
rector was appointed by the board for a limited time. An external member 
of the board then had to become the chairperson. If the rector was 
appointed, he/she had full academic and administrative responsibility, and 
the law did not demand the appointment of a director. A two-thirds 
majority among board members was required for an institution to opt for 
this alternative model. Following the standard rule, a board consisted of 
11 members.
Following the Quality Reform, a new funding scheme for higher edu-
cation was also introduced in 2004. The development of this scheme can 
be said to represent a continuation of earlier changes in funding, empha-
sising an output and performance system orientation. The most impor-
tant change in the system was that a greater part of the budget became 
dependent on results, and several new “performance indicators” were 
therefore introduced. In 2017, the funding system was adjusted to 
include a performance indicator that incentivises universities to become 
more entrepreneurial in the acquisition of external funds, further incen-
tives to improve students’ throughput rates, and adjustments to the 
publishing indicator to ensure that all subject areas counted equally and 
that both national and international research cooperation are stimulated.
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As part of the budgeting process, the Ministry requires an annual report 
from every higher education institution on its results, achievements, and 
future plans. This report is also used as the foundation for consultative 
annual meetings between representatives of the Ministry and of the indi-
vidual institution. The reports and meetings are important for monitoring 
and for setting targets and objectives for the coming years. This form of 
dialogue-based approach between the Ministry and public higher educa-
tion institutions has a long tradition in Norwegian higher education 
(Bleiklie et al. 2000), and in recent years, it has been formalised as the 
standard procedure. As part of the Quality Reform, a new scheme for stu-
dent financial support, aimed at providing more incentives for students to 
graduate on time, was also introduced.
In the 2003 quality reform, accreditation of all institutions within the 
Norwegian higher education system was introduced alongside systematic 
evaluations of institutional quality assurance systems. This accreditation 
system can be said to represent a new way to categorise the institutions 
within the Norwegian higher education landscape, where institutional 
autonomy is conditioned by an institution’s status within the accreditation 
system. For example, if an institution is accredited as a university, it is 
given full rights regarding the establishment and cessation of degree pro-
grammes at all levels.
The establishment of a national database for higher education (called 
the DBH-NSB) has also been an important step towards improving both 
the system’s accountability and information about its performance. The 
DBH-NSB was established prior to the Quality Reform but has received 
much more attention in the last decade. This database, which is accessible 
to everyone and is frequently used by newspapers and other media, con-
tains information on staff, students, and student mobility, as well as finan-
cial data; it is mainly used by the Ministry of Education and Research for 
planning, monitoring, and budgetary purposes.
As a result of participating in the Bologna Process, a new degree 
structure was also launched through the 2003 Quality Reform. 
Restructured bachelor’s, master’s, and doctorate degrees (according to 
the three-year bachelor, two-year master, and three-year doctorate 
degree model) and a new grading system based on the ECTS were intro-
duced. The new degree structure could be considered a rather dramatic 
change to the system, as it involved the establishment of a series of 
shorter modules with examinations for each within a given study pro-
gramme (Michelsen and Aamodt 2006). In addition to the structural 
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change at the programme level, new forms of student guidance were also 
introduced, with evaluation and assessment systems aimed at improving 
student feedback, reducing dropout and study interruption, and encour-
aging students to complete their programmes on time.
 Funding Structures
Approximately 80% of governmental funding for R&D in higher educa-
tion institutions is channelled directly from the Ministry of Education and 
Research, mainly as institutional funding. Most of these funds are given 
through block funding as a lump sum. The rest is distributed based on 
reported student performance, research performance, and strategic 
research considerations. Since 2003, resulting from the Quality Reform, a 
new institutional funding structure has been in place. It consists of three 
core components:
• Basic funds, which are block funds without detailed use specifica-
tions. This component originally accounted for about 60% of 
institutional funding (on average for all universities) but has 
decreased somewhat.
• A teaching component, by which funds are distributed on the basis 
of reported student performance; this component initially 
amounted to approximately 25% of institutional funding and has 
increased somewhat.
• A research component, which amounts to approximately 15% of insti-
tutional funding. This component is subdivided into two parts, a 
performance-based part and a strategic part, within which earmarked 
funds are allocated to specific institutions for hiring PhD students 
and for acquiring/maintenance of scientific equipment.
From 2008 to 2013, state subsidies allocated to universities increased 
by 79%, while total revenues in the decade 2003–2013 more than doubled 
after a 129% increase (Table 3.9). The ratio of core funding to competitive 
funding has remained largely constant in recent years. However, the 
changes in the structure of core funds indicate a greater recent emphasis 
on performance- and strategy-based core research funding. Competitive 
funding is mainly channelled through the RCN. Central RCN funding 
schemes involve a competitive national arena for researcher-initiated basic 
research projects (FRIPRO) and so-called large-scale programmes cover-
ing strategic areas of national research policies. The FRIPRO scheme is 
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funded by appropriations from the Ministry of Research and Education 
and corresponds to about 15% of the RCN’s annual budget. Over the 
years, state funding allocated through core funding has regularly increased 
by an average of 5% per year, as shown in Table 3.10. The greatest share of 
external research funding has been allocated by the RCN at around 4–5%. 
EU framework programmes have accounted for, on average, around 1%.
 Recent Policy Developments
In 2014, the then new centre-right government put forward a reform 
agenda for the entire higher education sector, aiming to build strong aca-
demic environments capable of carrying out research and addressing 
important social challenges. This occurred despite the presence of strong 
research environments in select areas (most notably, within the life sci-
ences and biomedical research) and improvements in international research 
aspects (Gornitzka and Langfeldt 2008). In comparison with other Nordic 
countries, Norwegian research lags somewhat. Among other concerns, 
the government worries that universities do not assert themselves com-
Table 3.10 University research funding per source, 2003–2013 (in billion 
NOK, rounded figures)
Lump sum  
(state grant)
Total 
external
Industry Public 
sector
RCN Overseas 
total
EU
2003 48.8 26.1 3.7 17.2 13.8 2.2 NA
2005 58.3 32.3 4.3 21.8 16.7 2.8 NA
2007 75.8 41.5 4.7 29.6 19.8 2.9 1.5
2009 89.6 44.9 5.1 31.9 23.7 3.3 1.8
2011 94.4 48.2 5.7 34.8 25.2 2.7 2.4
2013 108.2 51.2 6.6 35.2 20.2 3.3 2.6
Source: DBH-NSD and NIFU database
Table 3.9 Universities’ core funding, selected years for the period 2003–2013 
(in billion Norwegian Kroner or NOK, rounded figures)
2003 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
State subsidies NA NA 108.4 167.8 182.8 185.9 193.8
Revenue 110.9 122.5 103.7 220.3 239.7 242.7 253.8
Source: DBH-NSB
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petitively for EU funding, despite Norway’s generous contributions to the 
EU’s financial mechanism, most notably within the programmes run by 
the European Research Council (ERC).
A series of evaluations conducted in recent years point to academic 
environments without critical mass, lacking sufficient stability, and facing 
efficiency issues. As a result, a new wave of mergers and restructuring has 
been taking place as part of a reorganisation process, initiated in 2014, 
that focuses on a structural reform of the entire sector (Kyvik and Stensaker 
2013). The current policy moves away from the traditional binary of uni-
versities and non-university institutions and instead focuses on smaller, but 
more robust and competitive, universities with distinctive teaching and 
research profiles. That said, there are serious concerns with respect to the 
growing homogenisation (in the convergence of structures, strategies, and 
programmes) that has resulted from these mergers (Pinheiro et al. 2016) 
and the resulting erosion of diversity that has historically characterised the 
domestic higher education system (Pinheiro and Stensaker 2018; Skodvin 
and Lid 2018).
Quality development and specialisation have become cornerstones of 
recent policy initiatives, resulting in a 2016–2017 white paper on higher 
education quality (St. Meld. 16 2016–2017). In addition to the use of 
merging, quality and specialisation is to be achieved in the following ways:
• Channelling a considerable amount of result-based public funding 
via student graduation or throughput rates;
• Developing fit-for-purpose performance indicators for qual-
ity measures;
• Enacting new incentives, for institutions and academics alike, to pri-
oritise high-quality education, as has been the case regarding research 
excellence (Skodvin and Lid 2018, 408).
Other key priorities of the ongoing reform process include an update of 
the long-term strategy for higher education and research (for the period 
2015–2024), a revamping of teaching education (as the foundation for a 
“knowledge society”), and a revision of the working conditions of aca-
demic staff, including recruitment, employment, and career structure. A 
process is currently underway to improve the attractiveness of the aca-
demic profession, with a focus on the recruitment and retention of tal-
ented individuals. This includes a future revamping of the tenure-based 
career track that has traditionally been composed of only two stages: 
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associate and full professorships. A new third category of “senior profes-
sors,” focussing on top achievers, is being considered.
 Historical Overview
Table 3.11 below demonstrate the major changes from 2002 to 2013 
relating to the implementation of the Quality Reform and the policy 
efforts put towards European compatibility, efficiency, and accountability 
(within the teaching realm). Measures to promote scientific excellence and 
the global competitiveness of the domestic research environment within 
universities are also considered (Table 3.12).
Table 3.11 Key policy initiatives related to education
Measures taken Rationale Reactions by higher education 
institutions
2002/2003 New degree 
structure
Efficiency European 
harmonisation 
(Bologna Process)
Implemented without major 
resistance
2002/2003 New funding 
system
Performance- 
orientation; student 
graduation and credit 
production
Implemented without major 
resistance despite critics of the 
“market” (including student 
groups)
2002/2003 Quality assurance 
agency 
(“NOKUT”)
Provide oversight and 
international 
comparison
Relatively uncontroversial, 
given that universities were 
given more autonomy
2002/2003 Strengthening 
managerial 
autonomy
Improve accountability 
and efficiency
Positively, despite some 
academic criticism of 
managerialism
Table 3.12 Key policy initiatives related to research
Specific measures taken Rationale Reactions by higher education 
institutions
2003 Establishment of the 
Centres of Excellence 
scheme
Excellence and global 
competitiveness
Positively
2003 Bibliometric system 
(based on two levels)
Incentive to research 
productivity
Positively for the most part, 
despite some criticisms on the 
process for determining the 
publication levels (levels 1 and 
2/highest) in certain fields.
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Sweden
 Landscape
All higher education is offered by public institutions or independent edu-
cation providers granted degree-awarding powers by the government. 
Third-cycle courses and programmes are offered by universities or univer-
sity colleges that have been granted the entitlement to award third-cycle 
qualifications. There are 14 public universities and 17 public university 
colleges in Sweden. In addition, there are three independent institutions 
that are entitled to award either all or some third-cycle qualifications: 
Chalmers University of Technology, the Stockholm School of Economics, 
and Jönköping University. In addition, there are nine independent educa-
tion providers entitled to award first-cycle and, in some cases, second-cycle 
qualifications; four independent course providers are also entitled to award 
qualifications in psychotherapy (Table 3.13).
To be able to award a specific qualification, each institution offering a 
programme—whether it is accountable to the state or is independent—is 
required to have degree-awarding powers (i.e., special permission to award 
particular qualifications). Universities are entitled to award first-, second-, 
and third-cycle general qualifications. Public university colleges have a 
general entitlement to award diplomas, bachelor’s degrees, and 60-credit 
master’s degrees. Those granted the ability to award third-cycle qualifica-
tions within one or more specified fields, according to new regulations 
from 2010, are also entitled to award 120-credit master’s degrees in speci-
fied fields. The Higher Education Act stipulates, however, that each higher 
education institution has the right to apply to the Swedish Higher 
Education Authority for the entitlement to award 120-credit master’s 
degrees in one or more fields of study. In other cases, the government or 
SHEA determine institutional entitlement to award general qualifications. 
In the case of first- and second-cycle professional qualifications and all 
cycle qualifications in the fine, applied, and performing arts, both universi-
ties and university colleges must apply to SHEA for degree-awarding pow-
ers. In addition, university colleges must apply to SHEA for the entitlement 
to award third-cycle qualifications. Independent education providers must 
apply to the government for degree-awarding powers. This is also the case 
for the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and the National 
Defence College.
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 System Governance
In Sweden, the overall responsibility for higher education and research 
rests with the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) and the government, 
which decide on the regulations that apply to higher education. The 
Riksdag decides which public higher education institutions may be estab-
lished. The government determines whether an institution has university 
status and outlines the objectives, guidelines, and the allocation of resources 
for higher education and research. The Ministry of Education and 
Research handles issues relating to schooling, higher education institutions, 
research, adult education, public education, and student finance. Public 
Table 3.13 The Swedish university landscape, 2013 (all figures as FTE)
University type Total number 
of students
Total number of 
academic staff
Total 
number of 
staff
Uppsala University Comprehensive 24,621 3017 6237
Lund University Comprehensive 27,702 2997 7166
University of 
Gothenburg
Comprehensive 24,781 2491 5192
Stockholm University Comprehensive 29,555 2227 4578
Umeå University Comprehensive 16,015 1935 3897
Linköping University Comprehensive 17,716 1633 3432
Karolinska Institute Specialised, 
medical
6027 2097 4791
KTH Royal Institute 
of Technology
Specialised, 
technical
12,000 1533 3875
Luleå University of 
Technology
Specialised, 
technical
7823 632 1510
Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences
Specialised, 
agricultural
3835 1381 3015
Karlstad University Comprehensive 7994 593 1047
Linnaeus University Comprehensive 13,817 952 1704
Mid Sweden 
University
Comprehensive 6840 467 864
Örebro University Comprehensive 8615 542 1048
Chalmers University 
of Technology
Specialised, 
technical
8926 1173 2863
Stockholm School of 
Economics
Specialised, 
business
1804 105 224
Total 218,071 23,775 51,443
Source: UKÄ (Annual report 2014)
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higher education institutions are accountable to the Ministry of Education 
and Research. One exception is Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet (the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences), which is accountable to the Ministry 
for Rural Affairs.
In Sweden, public higher education institutions are agencies in their 
own right that report directly to the government. The operations of higher 
education institutions are regulated by laws and statutes. Higher educa-
tion institutions are also subject to administrative and labour-market leg-
islation and the provisions of the Instrument of Government. Operations 
are also governed by the parameters and funding determined by the 
Riksdag and the government. The mission of the higher education institu-
tions is to offer education based on an academic or artistic foundation and 
proven experience. They must also undertake developmental work, includ-
ing research and artistic development. In addition, higher education insti-
tutions must co-operate with their surrounding communities, provide 
information about their operations, and act to ensure that benefits are 
derived from the findings of their research.
Higher education in Sweden is governed by the Higher Education Act 
and the Higher Education Ordinance. The Higher Education Act was 
enacted by the Riksdag and contains regulation on the operations of 
higher education institutions, which are often supplemented by the provi-
sions laid down in the Higher Education Ordinance. The Higher 
Education Act’s regulations focus on the courses and programmes offered 
by higher education institutions. For instance, the Act characterises courses 
and programmes at different levels and stipulates the freedom of research. 
It also provides a framework for the organisation and governance of higher 
education institutions and states that every institution must have a board 
of governors and a vice-chancellor. Additionally, the Act regulates the 
duties of teachers and contains provisions on student influence. It requires 
that higher education institutions foster equal opportunity and broaden 
their recruitment.
The Higher Education Ordinance was enacted by the government and 
is linked to the provisions of the Higher Education Act; for instance, the 
Ordinance states that students must be able to influence their courses and 
programmes. It also contains regulations on entrance qualifications, the 
selection of courses and programmes, and the appointment of teachers 
and doctoral students. In addition, it regulates course and programme syl-
labi, grades, and qualifications.
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Annex 2 to the Higher Education Ordinance and the annexes to the 
Ordinance on the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and the 
Ordinance on the Swedish National Defence College are qualifications 
ordinances that contain the descriptors for all institutions. Within these 
parameters, higher education institutions are relatively free to decide their 
own organisation, allocation of resources, and course offerings. The sys-
tem is based on the principle of management by objectives. The govern-
ment lays down the directives for operations of higher education 
institutions in annual public service agreements. The Swedish Higher 
Education Authority, a government agency responsible for quality assur-
ance, legal supervision and for monitoring efficiency, supervises these 
institutions to ensure their compliance with the relevant statutes and regu-
lations and also reviews the quality of higher education and the efficiency 
and effectiveness of resources and public funding within it.
 Funding Structures
The Riksdag determines the funding for higher education institutions. 
Resources are allocated to institutions for first- and second-cycle courses 
and programmes according to the number of students enrolled in each 
cycle, expressed in terms of full-time equivalents (FTEs) and the number 
of credits attained (which are annual performance equivalents). Every 
year, the government determines an institutional funding cap—the max-
imum amount that can be given to each institution. In June 2010, the 
Riksdag decided that resources for first- and second-cycle programmes 
are also to be allocated according to the results of the Higher Education 
Authority’s quality evaluations. This meant that institutions with the 
highest ratings are incentivised with additional funding (a measure called 
“quality funding”). Quality-based resource allocation applies to public 
higher education institutions as well as the Chalmers University of 
Technology and the Jönköping University Foundation; this type of allo-
cation was effective as of 2013. Direct funding for research and third-
cycle courses and programmes is based mainly on past allocations, but 
since 2009, about 10% of funding and new resources have been allocated 
on the basis of two quality indicators: reported publications and citations 
and the amount of research funding from external sources. The Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences has a special budgeting and reporting 
system by which funding for research, courses, and programmes is allo-
cated for three-year periods alongside educational targets for the same 
periods (Table 3.14).
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 Recent Policy Developments
Turning now to the evolution of the system, an important reform in 
Swedish higher education was launched in the early 1990s when the cur-
rent funding and governance system was introduced (Geschwind 2017). 
In June 2005, the Swedish government presented proposals to reform its 
higher education system according to the Bologna Process (Swedish Govt. 
Bill 2004/2005, 162). The bill was adopted by the parliament in February 
2006; changes to the Higher Education Act and the Higher Education 
Ordinance commenced on 1 July 2007. In 2009, the bill for greater 
autonomy in higher education institutions (Swedish Govt. Bill 2009/2010, 
149) created additional opportunities to transform domestic providers. 
Faculty boards were no longer mandatory or regulated by the Higher 
Education Ordinance, as was the case before. In brief, the bill stated the 
following:
Table 3.14 University education and research funding per source, 2003–2013 
(in million SEK)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 
research 
income
3175 3106 3282 3240 3448 3717 3975 4130 4306 4672 4874
Research 
income
(external)
1781 1662 1799 1717 1862 2029 2274 2094 2239 2481 2666
Research 
income
(other)
1394 1444 1483 1523 1586 1688 1701 2036 2067 2191 2208
Income for 
first and 
second cycle 
education
1698 1705 1713 1919 1875 1962 2216 2271 2247 2281 2357
Direct state 
funding as a 
share of 
income (%)
65.2 64.6 65.7 62.8 64.8 65.5 64.2 64.5 65.7 67.2 67.4
Share of 
external 
research 
funding (%)
56.1 53.5 54.8 53.0 54.0 54.6 57.2 50.7 52.0 53.1 54.7
Source: Högskoleverket and UKÄ (annual reports from 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014)
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• Higher education institutions shall have a board and a president, but 
are otherwise free to develop their own organisation.
• Decisions requiring a particular, qualified assessment must be made 
by people with scientific or artistic qualifications.
• Students have the right to representation when decisions are taken or 
preparations are made that significantly affect their education or 
situations.
• Staff in the categories of “Professor” and “Senior Lecturer” will con-
tinuously be regulated by the Higher Education Ordinance. 
Otherwise, higher education institutions can choose their own career 
structures and staff categories. They can also recruit staff to profes-
sorships without the need for the traditional open competition.
• Education will be less governmentally regulated, and some state- 
regulated examination goals shall be abolished.
The bill “A Reformed Constitution” (Swedish Govt. Bill 2009/2010, 
80) also included two amendments to increase the freedom of higher edu-
cation institutions. The amendments came into effect on 1 January 2011 
and introduced new provisions to protect the freedom of research. 
Furthermore, the stipulation that heads of government agencies and 
members of government agency boards must be Swedish citizens was 
removed from the instrument of government but can instead be included 
in an act of primary legislation. The bill also emphasised the continued 
importance of collegial bodies at colleges and universities and increased 
their freedom in organising their internal affairs. In particular, it abolished 
the regulation requiring there be a faculty board at every institution, 
resulting in a debate on whether collegiality is at risk of elimination at 
Swedish universities.
According to a 2000–2001 bill (Swedish Govt. Bill 2000/2001), 
strong research environments were to be established through funding 
from the then new Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet). Its belief 
is that “…to sustain the position as a leading research nation, a mobilisa-
tion is needed in Swedish research” (Swedish Govt. Bill 2000/2001, 12). 
From its foundation, the Research Council has funded “basic research of 
highest quality,” initially by primarily funding individuals or small teams of 
researchers. As a response to competition from the initiatives of private 
foundations and pressure from the Swedish government, which pushed 
for such schemes, Centre of Excellence schemes were eventually intro-
duced despite some hesitation from the Council.
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In the following research bill (Swedish Govt. Bill 2004/2005), a new 
type of large-scale funding programme was launched, inspired by interna-
tional developments. Consequently, a number of schemes were established 
from 2005 onwards, including one with scientific excellence as the overall 
objective (the Linnaeus Environments), another focussed on economic 
rationales and innovation (the VINN Excellence Centres), and several 
other schemes with multiple objectives. These other schemes included the 
FAS Centers (aiming at scientific excellence, social challenges, and strate-
gic objectives), the Berzelii Centres (aiming at scientific excellence, eco-
nomic rationales, and innovation), and the Strategic Research Centres 
(aiming at social challenges, strategic objectives, economic rationales, and 
innovation). The latter scheme was funded by a private foundation. The 
total number of centres funded by the schemes mentioned above is nearly 
100, of which 20 were hosted by the dominating institution, Lund 
University.
The implementation of these excellence centres was delegated to the 
funding bodies (i.e., the research councils and the innovation agency 
VINNOVA). In the following 2008 bill (Swedish Govt. Bill 2008/2009), 
the further concentration and prioritisation of resources was at the pol-
icy forefront. In line with previous bills, the government criticised earlier 
allocation models based on historical criteria (i.e., head counts) rather 
than excellence, per se. Instead of allocating direct state funding as block 
grants, more high-profile institutions and prioritisation were now 
desired. The policy solution to this was termed “Strategic Research 
Areas” (SROs) and involved long-term funding for designated areas 
based on an institution’s publications, citations, and ability to attract 
external funding (Benner 2008).
In the 2012–2013 research and innovation bill (Swedish Govt. Bill 
2012/2013), the quality target was further developed. Compared to 
earlier bills, a stronger emphasis was put on the role of direct state fund-
ing as a precondition for breakthrough research: “…it is the govern-
ment’s opinion that it is natural to let a bigger share of the funding than 
before be allocated according the quality measures introduced in the 
previous research and innovation bill” (Swedish Govt. Bill 2012/2013, 
17). Notably, the earlier focus on “big environments” had shifted to one 
on “excellent individuals,” including both researchers early in their 
careers and internationally recognised scholars. Additionally, a new sys-
tem for resource allocation based on peer review (inspired by the British 
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Research Excellence Framework, among other models) was investigated 
and a proposal was submitted to the government. Currently, a govern-
ment inquiry is investigating the governance and funding structures of 
the Swedish higher education system (Strut 2019).
Regarding education quality and accreditation, Sweden introduced a 
national quality assurance system in the early 1990s. Initially, its focus 
was on accreditation and institutional audits. From 2001 to 2006, a 
comprehensive evaluation of all programmes and subjects culminating in 
a degree was undertaken by peer review teams. After the round of reviews 
completed in 2014, excellence could be rewarded financially. The cur-
rent system has changed its focus again, now evaluating quality assurance 
systems at the institutional level and, by doing so, returning to the con-
cept of higher education institutions being responsible for their own 
quality assurance. Furthermore, the Swedish Higher Education Authority 
(UKÄ) has been entrusted with the task of evaluating research (again at 
the quality system level).
Additionally, according to the Higher Education Ordinance, higher 
education institutions since 2010 have had the right to summon and 
appoint a staff member as a full professor if he/she is of significant impor-
tance to the academic environment. This procedure (known as 
Kallelseförfarandet) should be used restrictively and per the decisions of 
the vice-chancellor. Since its launch, 40 people (as of the autumn of 2013) 
have been summoned, of which 30 were men and 10 were women.
 Historical Development
The tables below demonstrate that policy efforts focussing on revamping 
the governance and funding systems and on teaching quality span more 
than two decades. In the last decade, policy focus has shifted to deregula-
tion and efficiency imperatives—measures that received little resistance at 
the system level. When it comes to research, as seen in the other three 
countries (policy convergence), the policy focus has been on incentive 
systems and structural changes aimed at promoting excellence and global 
competitiveness (Tables 3.15 and 3.16).
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IntroductIon
In this chapter, we explore how the introduction of performance-based 
research funding systems (PRFSs) in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and 
Finland is influencing the perception of research within universities. Here, 
performance-based resource allocation constitutes a new way of distribut-
ing institutional research funding, and its establishment is related to the 
general development of the increasing quantification of the higher educa-
tion sector (Hicks 2012). Various performance measures are currently 
used to inform internal and external actors about organisational activities 
and to govern and control higher education institutions (HEIs) (see Chap. 2; 
de Rijcke et  al. 2016). On the one hand, this has been propelled by 
demands from within the education sector. Academics have always been 
keen on evaluating and comparing the work of colleagues, and the devel-
opment of quantitative tools to describe academic work has a long history 
(Garfield 1955; Nelhans 2013). With advances in information technology, 
quantification and performance indicators have become more refined, pre-
cise and complex but also more accessible to, and used by, professionals 
and amateurs alike (Gläser and Laudel 2007; Leydesdorff et al. 2016; van 
Raan 2005).
On the other hand, there are also a number of external pressures that 
have been suggested as ways to induce the increasing quantification of 
academic work. According to Portnoi, Rust and Bagley (2010), there is a 
clear trend towards global competition in the higher education sector. 
This is related to the advent of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 
1997) but also to a global knowledge economy and a neoliberal paradigm 
in higher education governance (Olssen and Peters 2005). The increasing 
size and costs of the sector during the twentieth century have also created 
demands for increasing efficiency, transparency and accountability. 
Responses have often comprised the introduction of new public manage-
ment reforms, including marketisation, a strengthening of management 
structures and a focus on performance measurement (Paradeise et  al. 
2009). Thus, performance measures are used in various ways to assess 
institutional activities but also to incentivise universities and academics to 
increase their performance.
Although similar in many ways, the Nordic countries display consider-
able differences in university governance policies (Gornitzka and Maassen 
2012, 124; Pinheiro et al. 2014). This also includes how metrics are used 
to assess, evaluate and award academic work. Although all the Nordic 
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countries have implemented PRFSs in recent years, the design of these 
systems varies. The systems have furthermore come to influence institu-
tional resource allocation practices because local PRFSs often are estab-
lished at institutional or subinstitutional levels. However, recent research 
has found that local implementations of PRFSs vary greatly and rarely 
reflect the configuration of national systems (Aagaard 2015; Hammarfelt 
et al. 2016). Aagaard (2015, 736) suggests that these findings ‘only can be 
explained by including local conditions and personal perceptions at lower 
levels of the institutions’. Therefore, it is imperative to study not only the 
local resource allocation systems but also the nonsystematic and informal 
use of metrics in the organisation and execution of research activities.
This is the aim of the present chapter; we study how the varying use of 
performance indicators in the national PRFSs of four Nordic countries is 
reflected within universities. Our intention is to explore how national per-
formance metrics affect local perceptions of research as organisational 
actors make sense of these novel forms of resource allocation. As sug-
gested by Weick (1995), an organisation is not only a formal structure, but 
it also includes the way people interpret and categorise their daily experi-
ences to make sense of a more or less disorderly reality. How the metrics 
that are used in national PRFSs are understood and acted upon within 
universities is thus likely to be of major importance for the local organisa-
tion of research. An investigation of these issues allows for a deeper com-
parative analysis of the qualitative aspects of the ways in which indicators 
influence research practices. It also contributes to the ongoing debate of 
the design, use and effects of performance-based funding of university 
research (e.g., European Commission 2018). Thus, taking a closer look at 
the perceptions and uses of research metrics within universities may pro-
vide important insights into how external performance measures structure 
everyday thought and action.
Because national PRFSs vary regarding their design, we expect the 
influence of research metrics at the institutional level to vary as well. 
Therefore, we compare the national PRFSs in four Nordic countries and 
ask how they affect the way university actors perceive and make sense of 
research activities at the institutional level. To study this, we conduct a 
comparative study between the four countries to explore how the link 
between national macro-states affects organisational behaviour within the 
universities. We identify three factors highlighted in previous research on 
performance metrics that have been suggested as being instrumental in 
influencing organisational action. Through interviews with academics and 
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managers at eight universities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, 
we explore how these factors inform the perception of research in Nordic 
universities.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, we review previous studies 
that analysed the effects of performance measures. Based on this, we 
develop our analytical framework. The framework identifies three major 
ways in which research metrics influence HEIs; their ability to enable 
action, to enhance legitimacy and to solidify taken-for-granted representa-
tions of reality. Second, we describe the methods used for the analysis in 
the present study. We then turn to the design of the national PRFSs in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Next, we present the empirical 
analysis of our interview data. The final section contains a comparative 
discussion of the results.
the roles and effects of Performance-Based 
fundIng systems
Performance measures are tools that describe organisational activity and 
are constructed and applied with the intention to direct organisational 
attention (see Chap. 2). When introduced to incentivise actors, to support 
and facilitate decision-making and to enhance accountability, they per-
form these functions in new ways, thus complementing or replacing previ-
ous practices (Dahler-Larsen 2014; Espeland and Stevens 1998). As 
incentives, they measure and monitor everyday work in very precise and 
compartmentalised ways, neglecting undefined aspects and introducing 
the risk of displacing holistic assessments. As support for decision-making, 
they may constitute a transparent basis for decisions, counteracting per-
sonal biases and fraudulent behaviour, but they may also substitute for 
qualitative assessments, peer review and professional judgement. To 
account for organisational activities, indicators easily replace trust between 
people and may cause a myopic concern for numerical comparisons (Porter 
1995). In some respects, metrics are superior to alternative ways of describ-
ing organisational activity, but in other ways, they are inadequate. The 
most immediate benefit of metrics is their ability to enable clear compari-
sons and induce action, but some notable side effects are that they decon-
textualise the measured phenomenon and structure reality in ways that 
may not always be desirable (Dahler-Larsen 2014; Espeland and Stevens 
1998; Rottenburg et al. 2015). Thus, research on the role and effect of 
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performance measures points out several ways in which metrics may influ-
ence organisational action. Drawing on these insights, we identify three 
factors that cause metrics to affect organisations: actionability, legitimacy 
and institutionalisation.
Actionability
Actionability refers to the ability of indicators to induce an action. This 
may occur either in decision-making processes, where indicators arbitrate 
between alternative routes of action or in the case where incentives are tied 
to the indicators, making the subjects of measurement motivated to act in 
certain ways. Regarding decision-making, actionability is a reason behind 
the popularity of rankings because they transform the differences in raw 
scores that may be negligible to clearly ordered alternatives that range 
from less to more or best to worse, thus facilitating decision-making 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007). Actionability is a factor that has been identi-
fied in several studies as being important when it comes to the influence of 
indicators. Aagaard (2015, 735), for example, shows how a publication 
indicator ‘functions as a potent instrument of managerial decision- 
making’. Even when the accuracy of indicators is questioned, they may be 
seen as useful. For instance, this has been shown to be the case for citation 
metrics (Aksnes and Rip 2009), the journal impact factor (Rushforth and 
de Rijcke 2015), journal lists (Mingers and Willmott 2013) and business 
school rankings (Wedlin 2007).
As noted by Espeland and Sauder (2007), measurement also alters the 
behaviour of the individuals being measured. Incentives combined with 
performance indicators are powerful tools to structure action because 
measurement causes reactivity from the subjects being measured. 
Incentives may be remunerative or normative, they may be positive or 
negative and they may be more or less formalised. Remunerative incen-
tives imply the conditioning of material resources in relation to some indi-
cator. Here, PRFSs are instructive because funding is allocated based on 
performance, which is often measured using quantitative indicators. 
Normative incentives, however, include the symbolic gains and losses that 
are related to an indicator. Institutional reputation is an example because 
it is a critical resource for universities that often is thought to be related to 
various indicators, such as university rankings. Also, PRFSs have been sug-
gested as contributing heavily to the gains and losses of institutional repu-
tation (Hicks 2012).
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Legitimacy
Legitimacy is another factor that has been suggested to be important for 
the ability of performance measures to exert influence over organisations. 
Because metrics highlight the various aspects of organisations and their 
activities, they also can impart legitimacy to the organisation because its 
performances are demonstrated to internal and external actors. Whether 
metrics can perform this function depends on the legitimacy of the indica-
tors because they must be accepted as valid. Here, we can distinguish 
between technical and normative legitimacy, where the former is conferred 
because of a perceived correspondence between the indicator and object, 
while the latter occurs as an indicator and is seen as appropriate to use. 
Regarding technical legitimacy, Bowker and Star (2000, 245) demonstrate 
the importance of designing indicators that resonate with people’s idea of 
the described phenomenon. Without a reasonable correspondence 
between the indicator and object, there is a risk that people will reject the 
indicator as a valid representation of reality, making the indicator unable 
to affect the organisation. This has been a major concern for research met-
rics, and the debate has continued about the validity of research metrics 
(Donovan 2007; Gläser and Laudel 2007; van Raan 2005).
However, normative legitimacy may be conferred to an indicator even 
though it has low technical legitimacy. Here, it is instead a matter of the 
perceived appropriateness to measure at all, even though accurate metrics 
may be missing. Power (2004, 769) notes that ‘specific measurement sys-
tems may be defective and fail, but they also constantly reproduce and 
reinvent an institutional demand for numbers’. The desire to measure, 
hence, trumps the ability to accurately do so. A prominent example may 
be university rankings, which have been criticised for being invalid mea-
sures of scientific excellence (Harvey 2008; van Raan 2005; van Vught 
and Westerheijden 2010). External actors may, however, consider the lim-
ited information provided by rankings better than the alternative, which 
often is overwhelming and impervious. The rankings thus gain normative 
legitimacy and provide an ostensible transparency of university excellence. 
In a similar way, Rushforth and de Rijcke (2015) show that researchers see 
the journal impact factor as useful for various purposes, despite having 
knowledge of its limitations. Aksnes and Rip (2009) also note that 
researchers doubt the ability of citation metrics to indicate scientific qual-
ity, but the metrics are seen as useful because they convey academic pres-
tige. The normative legitimacy of these metrics thus makes them influential, 
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even though they may represent reality in a unidimensional or inaccu-
rate manner.
Institutionalisation
While actionability and legitimacy are effects that organisational actors are 
more or less conscious of, institutionalisation refers to the process where 
metrics are taken for granted (Scott 1987; Zucker 1987). When indicators 
solidify and become firmly established, people come to accept the general 
agreement of the indicator as representative of reality. Being accepted as 
real, the metrics’ limitations and flaws are easily forgotten, and they 
become more likely to influence decision-making and organisational activ-
ity. The institutionalisation of indicators may occur through a number of 
processes, including habituation, reification and reconstitution. 
Habituation implies that an indicator may gain increasing acceptance over 
time as people get used to it. Sauder and Espeland (2009) note how the 
novelty of rankings initially made universities dismiss them, but, in due 
time, these rankings came to be very influential. Reification implies the 
solidification of an indicator as it is built into the practical organisation of 
labour and resources. This may take place as offices are established to 
handle issues relating to the indicator, where an example includes biblio-
metric offices dealing with rankings (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Finally, 
reconstitution occurs as indicators alter the notion of the indicated objects. 
Dahler-Larsen (2014) describes this as the constitutive effects of indica-
tors, and Woolgar (1991, 319) notes how ‘the very system of measuring 
and manipulating citations redefines the phenomenon it is supposed to 
measure’. Because bibliometrics emphasise publication in international 
peer-reviewed journals, this may alter the perception of publication quality 
to the detriment of publications in alternative outlets. How quality in 
research is understood may thus change to align with the indicator. The 
constitutive effects of the indicator cause institutional lock-in as the indi-
cator and object converge.
The Analytical Framework
Summarising these insights, performance measures have been noted as 
influencing organisational action in three ways. First, metrics induce action 
because numerical indicators are able to rank and clearly order alternatives 
for decision-makers; this also occurs because the subjects of measurement 
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adapt their behaviour as they are being measured. Second, performance 
measures can impart organisational legitimacy. This is contingent on the 
technical and the normative legitimacy of the metrics, which reflects the 
accuracy of the measures and the perceived usefulness of measuring per-
formances. Third, performance measures can influence the organisation 
as they become institutionalised and are taken for granted as valid 
descriptions of reality. This occurs over time when people grow accus-
tomed to indicators, when indicators are built into the practical organisa-
tion of activities and when people alter their idea of the measured object 
to better fit with the indicator. These three ways in which performance 
measures can influence universities are summarised in Table 4.1. They 
compose the analytical framework applied in the current study as we 
explore how the metrics used in national PRFSs influence Nordic univer-
sities and how this in turn affects the way academics make sense of 
research activities.
A caveat to note is that performance measures are not seen as unam-
biguously imposing actionability, legitimacy or institutionalisation. 
Instead, these effects may emerge as academics interpret performance 
measures in relation to the measured activities. Therefore, the influence of 
indicators depends on the perception and understanding of organisational 
actors. As academics experience performance measures as novel tools to 
describe research, they may then use these tools to reconstruct the mean-
ing of research. It is the perception and interpretation of performance mea-
sures made by university actors that enables the metrics to be actionable, 
enhance legitimacy or become institutionalised.
Table 4.1 Analytical framework: the influence of metrics
Actionability
 Decision making
 Incentives
Legitimacy
 Technical legitimacy
 Normative legitimacy
Institutionalisation
 Habituation
 Reification
 Reconstitution
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methods
In this chapter, we address how university actors perceive research activi-
ties in light of the performance measures used in national PRFSs. Because 
the purpose of the chapter is to reach a deeper understanding of these 
processes, we adopt a qualitative approach and apply a comparative case 
study method (Yin 2009). The study may furthermore be described as a 
mix of a congruence analysis and causal process tracing (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012). In our efforts to explore the influence of PRFSs on local 
perceptions of research, we utilise previous theoretical insights into our 
theoretical framework. Some of these insights are likely to be more influ-
ential than others and hence may provide more explanatory power. The 
current study will perform a congruence analysis, where the applicability 
of earlier theoretical accounts is tested. With the analytical focus on the 
influence of performance measures on university actors, however, there is 
also a large interest in the causal configurations of these processes. Thus, 
the analysis will contain a significant portion of causal process tracing 
because we want to analyse the way national PRFSs influence local percep-
tions of research.
A desktop study was conducted to map the national PRFSs. The sources 
include earlier research, as well as official reports from governments and 
government agencies. To study how research metrics implemented in 
national PRFSs affect perceptions of research at the institutional level, we 
conducted 93 semi-structured interviews with academics, managers and 
administrators at eight Nordic universities. The universities chosen include 
one flagship and one regional university per country. The interviews 
sought to illuminate organisational reactions as numerical indicators are 
used to describe and incentivise organisational action through national 
PRFSs. Although the perspectives varied among the respondents, they 
were all interviewed regarding their role as academic professionals and 
considered to represent their respective organisation and culture in which 
they were situated.
To perform the analysis, the interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim with the approval of the respondents. The transcriptions were 
systematically analysed with the aid of computer software to code the data 
and structure the findings. Initially, the analysis was inductive and atten-
tive to the material, exploring how performance measures influence per-
ceptions of academic work. In later stages of the analysis, a refined coding 
was made to categorise the findings according to the analytical framework, 
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where we explored whether national PRFSs create actionability, legitimacy 
and institutionalisation that in turn affects how the informants understand 
research activities. The results have subsequently been analysed and com-
pared across the countries.
Before moving on, some terminology will be discussed to enable an 
informed comparison between the countries. The funding system termi-
nology used has been adopted from the EU report ‘Performance-Based 
Funding of University Research’ (European Commission 2018, 27–29). 
The term institutional funding is used to denote government resources 
provided to universities, which they may spend more or less as they wish. 
However, a notable exception is that institutional funding in some coun-
tries is provided separately for teaching and research. In these cases, the 
term institutional research funding will be used to specifically indicate 
the institutional funding allocated for research activities. Institutional 
funding is furthermore separated into block grants and performance-
based funding. Performance-based funding is allocated depending on 
the outcome of various performance measures, which may be related to 
teaching, research, societal interaction or other activities. A block grant 
denotes the rest of the institutional funding and is often contingent on 
historical allocations. External funding denotes revenue from public and 
private organisations that normally is designated for particular purposes 
and won by individual researchers in a competition with others. Some 
countries use performance contracts between HEIs and the govern-
ment’s ministry. As long as these do not contain a funding formula, such 
as those found in a PRFS, these contracts are considered to inform the 
allocation of the block grant.
the nordIc Performance-Based research 
fundIng systems
Although the four Nordic countries in the current study have imple-
mented PRFSs in recent years, the systems differ in their configurations. 
The PRFSs are designed in different ways and include different indicators. 
In the following, the four PRFSs are presented and compared.
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Denmark
In Denmark, a PRFS has been in place since the end of the 1990s, and it 
has distributed a small part of the institutional research funding based on 
student throughput, external research funding and PhD production, while 
the larger part has been constituted by block grants. Because of dissatisfac-
tion with the absence of output measures of research quality, a fourth 
indicator was added to the Danish PRFS in 2010: the Bibliometric 
Research Indicator (BRI). The BRI took its inspiration from the 
Norwegian bibliometric indicator, measuring the publication activity in 
peer-reviewed journals and books, and awarding points to universities 
depending on their relative performance in a zero-sum game. Hence, the 
BRI covers the breadth of publishing patterns across scientific areas, 
including monographs, conference proceedings and so forth, to be rele-
vant for all the disciplines.
Panels in each scientific discipline evaluate the journals and book pub-
lishers in their field and place them on either level 1 or level 2 (Schneider 
and Aagaard 2012). The evaluation of journals is done according to a 
quality criterion (originality and novelty) and a relevance criterion (that 
the journals are of interest to, and accessible to, Danish researchers). 
However, other than these very basic guidelines, it is very much up to the 
panels to decide how the assessment is conducted. All Danish researchers 
can suggest changes to the list that the panels will have to consider. Every 
year, the results of the panels’ work on placing journals on the authorised 
list are made publicly available.
The total funding distributed from the PRFS depends on how much 
new money is put into the system from year to year. In 2010, the PRFS 
distributed 4 per cent of the institutional research funding of Danish 
HEIs, but this amount increased to 19 per cent in 2017 (Aagaard 2016).
Finland
The Finnish funding system changed in the early 1990s when the first 
performance-based elements were introduced in the form of performance 
agreement negotiations. The new system was intended to offer incentives 
for increased efficiency and effectiveness, but it remained very input ori-
ented. It was not until 2010 that performance-based funding was intro-
duced, which is now used to allocate resources to universities in a zero-sum 
game. Currently, roughly 70 per cent of the institutional funding of 
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 universities is performance based. The current PRFS consists of a model 
where education performance accounts for 39 per cent, research perfor-
mance for 33 per cent and other education and science policy consider-
ations for 28 per cent. The research indicators used include doctoral 
degrees, scientific publications and external funding, which are about 
equally weighted. In addition, universities have strategy-based funding 
that is agreed upon between the university and the government as part of 
their negotiations. The funding scheme aims at strengthening the quality, 
impact and performance of universities. The institutional funding is thus 
largely performance based because the funding is allocated according to 
the performance results of the previous four years (for a current analysis, 
see Seuri and Vartiainen 2018).
For the bibliometric indicator, scientific outlets are given a rating by 
the publication forum, a classification system created by the Federation 
of Finnish Learned Societies. The evaluation of publication outlets is 
conducted by expert panels that consider the typical publication practices 
of the specific research fields, the existing appreciation of the particular 
publication channel within the scientific community and the balance 
presence of various disciplines at higher quality levels. In this system, 
each scientific outlet is placed on a level between 1 and 3. Also, nonref-
ereed journals are included at level 0, and publication in these outlets 
provide very low rewards.
Norway
In Norway, a PRFS was introduced in 2005, allocating institutional fund-
ing based on both teaching and research indicators. The purpose of the 
PRFS has been to provide a neutral framework for assigning funds between 
universities and scientific fields but also to stimulate better performance 
and reward successful research environments. In 2014, 24 per cent of the 
funds were distributed based on teaching indicators and 6 per cent based 
on research indicators (Kvaal 2014).
There are four research indicators: number of PhDs awarded, allocation 
of EU funding for research, allocation of funding from the Norwegian 
Research Council and bibliometrics. Regarding the bibliometric indicator, 
a national, non-commercial bibliographical database has been established 
to classify different types of scholarly and peer-reviewed literature from the 
whole sector, including journal articles, book chapters and monographs. 
Scientific outlets are classified at two levels, and publications in these 
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 outlets are rewarded with publication points fractionalised according to 
the number of authors. The data are used to allocate funding but also 
enhance transparency across institutions. This transparency is also sup-
posed to increase the quality of research in the sector. The database is 
available online and is open to the public.
Sweden
In 2009, a performance-based dimension was introduced to the institu-
tional research funding of Swedish HEIs, sending a clear signal from 
decision- makers of their desire to increase the quality of research per-
formed at Swedish HEIs (Swedish Government Bill 2008/09:50). By 
conditioning part of the institutional research funding on performance 
indicators, incentives were created for the HEIs to increase their 
research output, but this system has changed several times in its 
short lifespan.
The system reallocates 20 per cent of the institutional research funds 
based on the outcome of two indicators: bibliometrics, which is com-
posed of publication counts and citation counts, and the amount of exter-
nal funding acquired. The resources are allocated based on the relative 
performance of each HEI compared with the others in a zero-sum game. 
Any new research funds granted by the government from one year to 
another are also allocated according to the model. The bibliometric data 
are collected from Thomson Reuters and are field normalised and frac-
tionalised according to the number of authors. External funding is mea-
sured as a running three-year average and is weighted by discipline. The 
effects of the model have been moderated by various decisions through-
out its existence. The continuous increase of the total institutional 
research funds has also left the worst performers with at least as much 
institutional research funding as the previous year. In a few cases, special 
allocations have been made to guarantee that no HEI experiences decreas-
ing institutional research funding, with the result being that the redis-
tributive effects of the model are modest (Universitetskanslersämbetet 
2015, 2017, 19f.).
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sImIlarItIes and dIfferences In the nordIc 
Performance-Based research fundIng systems
Table 4.2 summarises the main components of the PRFSs in the four 
countries, showing a number of similarities but also some notable differ-
ences. The introduction of the systems all occurred at the same time, with 
the exception of Norway as a forerunner and acting as an inspiration for 
the Danish BRI and the Finnish bibliometric model. The Swedish system, 
however, utilises data from an already existing infrastructure, while the 
other three countries established completely new databases. Furthermore, 
the reasons behind implementing the PRFSs have been similar across the 
four countries. Allocating research funds through a PRFS in a zero-sum 
game is intended to provide universities with incentives to increase their 
performance. Higher competition is supposed to enhance both research 
quality and productivity. In Norway, the PRFS is also noted to improve 
the equity of the resource allocation system.
The amount of funds allocated through the PRFSs is similar in Denmark 
and Sweden, where about 20 per cent of the institutional research funds are 
performance based. Because HEIs in Denmark and Sweden receive sepa-
rate institutional funding for teaching and research, the percentages of the 
amount of resources allocated by the PRFSs are not directly comparable 
Table 4.2 Main components of the PRFSs in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Introduced 2010 2010 2005 2009
Size 19% of institutional 
research funding 
and increasing 
every year
33% of total 
institutional 
funding
6% of total 
institutional 
funding
20% of institutional 
research funding 
and annual 
additions
Indicators – Publications 
(fractionalised)
– External research 
funding
– PhD production
– Student 
throughput
– Publications
– External 
research 
funding
– PhD 
production
– Publications 
(fractionalised)
– External 
research funding
– EU research 
funding
– PhD 
production
– Publications 
(fractionalised)
– Citations
– External research 
funding
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with those in Norway (6 per cent) and Finland (33 per cent), where insti-
tutional funding also includes teaching funds. However, as noted in the 
EU report ‘Performance-Based Funding of University Research’ 
(European Commission 2018, 37), the use of PRFSs and external fund-
ing from the state affects whether research funding is more or less con-
tested. The report notes that Norway and Sweden are restrained in their 
use of performance-based funding and rely heavier on external funding. 
Finland, on the other hand, has high competition for funds, where the 
PRFS is an integral component, thus creating strong incentives for uni-
versities to perform.
The indicators used differ somewhat between the countries. All coun-
tries use publication counts, but Finland differs somewhat because the 
PRFS do not fractionalise the publication counts. This makes it beneficial 
for researchers to coauthor their publications because the number of 
authors does not dilute the publication points awarded. This also imply a 
bias towards fields such as the natural and health sciences, where the 
tradition of copublication is strong, and the number of coauthors is high 
compared with the social sciences (Muhonen and Pölönen 2016). 
Sweden also includes a measure of citation counts that enables an assess-
ment of the impact of individual publications. In the other three coun-
tries, publication outlets are given different weightings, giving all 
publications in the same outlet the same value in the PRFS. Denmark, 
Finland and Norway are not using citation counts because they have 
opted for systems with their own bibliometric databases, while Sweden 
relies on the already existing database of Thomson Reuters. The latter 
bibliometric database includes citations but does not have the same cov-
erage of publication outlets as the databases created in Denmark, Finland 
and Norway.
Furthermore, all countries have indicators for external research fund-
ing, though what is counted differs somewhat. Although Norway also has 
a specific indicator for EU funding, this is accounted for in the measures 
of external funding in the other countries. Additionally, it can be noted 
that in Norway and Denmark, non-competitive funding is included as well 
(European Commission 2018, 50). All countries except Sweden have 
indicators for the number of PhDs awarded. In Denmark, there is also a 
connection to teaching performance because the use of student through-
put informs the institutional research funding. Teaching metrics are, how-
ever, also used in Norway and Finland, though the connection to research 
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is hard to assess because universities receive their institutional funding 
together for both teaching and research activities.
the Influence of metrIcs on the PercePtIons 
of research
Actionability
For all four countries, the research metrics utilised in the national PRFSs 
are clearly actionable. Primarily, they facilitate managerial decision-making 
at different levels of the universities, but the formalisation in the use of 
metrics for this purpose differs. The perceived incentives provided by the 
PRFSs also differ. In some cases, the PRFSs provide clear and substantial 
incentives for universities and individual researchers, while the incentives 
in other cases are perceived as weaker or not directly related to the PRFSs.
In Denmark, the BRI has affected both the organisation of academic 
practices and the academic practices themselves. The most prominent 
example of changes in the organisation of academic practices is how the 
BRI has been used locally by universities in their budget models for allo-
cating resources to lower organisational levels. It does, however, depend 
greatly on the context in what way, if at all, the BRI has been used. At the 
flagship university, the BRI has not been used in the budget model at the 
university level because international publishing was already seen as the 
norm. This was different at the regional university where they interpreted 
the BRI as very actionable because it could be used as a management tool 
for boosting performance. Thus, the regional university implemented the 
national PRFS locally for allocating funding to the faculty members and 
even made it apply to all the funding for research, in contrast to the 
approximately 20 per cent at the national level. Therefore, the PRFS, and 
especially the BRI, is seen as an extremely disciplining remunerative incen-
tive at the lower-levels, affecting  such things as publication practices. 
A manager stated, ‘What has pushed the publication activities mostly is the 
BRI system’ (Flagship, manager, DK).
The inclusion of the BRI in the budget models has also spurred changes 
in academic practices. Hence, it is mostly at the regional university that we 
see researchers reacting to the BRI. In the sociology department, the bud-
get model was experienced as extremely disciplining: ‘There was money 
on each BRI point earned, and you could see it directly on the budget of 
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the department’ (Regional, manager, DK). Therefore, management 
started to demand that in a period of two years, researchers produce BRI 
points. The researchers reacted by putting much more emphasis on mak-
ing sure their outlets were on the sanctioned BRI list. Some reported that 
this led to less Danish language research outputs, less broad dissemination 
and more stress among faculty.
Also, in Finland, we note how the PRFS affects decision-making and 
provides incentives for the universities and individual researchers. At an 
institutional level, the PRFS has provided an action-induced and predict-
able way of improving the chances of receiving the required resources. 
The PRFS has pushed universities to make strategic choices regarding how 
they allocate funding internally and prioritise scientific fields. Seen from a 
manager’s point of view, the PRFS is also a way to provide support to the 
academic work and to the development of science within the university 
more broadly. The incentives of the PRFS also clearly affect research prac-
tices: ‘The publication forum classification has steered our publication 
activities in social sciences and the humanities towards more international 
fora’ (Regional, manager, FI). The PRFS is thus seen as enhancing the 
pressure on academics to strive for high-quality and impactful science. 
Many academics have seen this resulting in positive career developments at 
personal levels and hence have come to accept these changes as something 
that drives science forward.
In the previous Finnish system, where performance was tracked to a 
much lesser degree, problems of academic units and departments could, 
according to the interviewees, also be overlooked. In the current PRFS, 
this is no longer the case because universities now have the ability to see 
problems before they become too large to manage. Issues behind low 
performance are becoming visible, which encourages managers to provide 
the necessary academic leadership to overcome the situation; this provides 
managers with the support they need to bring out the best in their staff: 
‘Once a year we have a performance discussion with the rector and go 
through the main indicators of how well the faculty has done. We look at 
the state of the faculty and its development prospects’ (Regional, manager, 
FI). As such, the PRFS aids managerial decision-making because it high-
lights underlying problems, such as poor human resources management, 
weak leadership and favouritism, which in a more transparent system will 
be a call for action.
In Norway, the PRFS is also seen as a potent instrument, providing 
actionability at both the organisational and individual level. Organisationally, 
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it facilitates decision-making, for instance, because universities have imple-
mented local variations of performance-based funding. These local sys-
tems also provide incentives for the researchers, though their influence 
often is considered to be limited. Examples of these incentives include 
how some departments have established systems to reward researchers 
with a type of bonus that is earmarked for attending international confer-
ences. These rewards are awarded for publications at levels 1 and 2 but 
also popular science publications in addition to the completion of a master 
thesis, PhD dissertation and external funding. Those who are working in 
units where metrics result in the allocation of bonuses find this to be an 
important part of the freedom to attend international conferences. Still, 
the amount of money is not large, so the influence on motivation is lim-
ited, as exemplified by a researcher: ‘It is clear, there are other things that 
drive what you are doing than money. It is … kind of not the reason why 
you are sitting down to write your articles, to get 5000 NOK’ (Regional, 
academic, NO). However, regardless of the connection to rewards or not, 
publication points and citations are highly valued by many academics. 
Also, other types of metrics are important to academics, such as citation 
indexes and journal impact factors, despite the fact that these metrics are 
unrelated to direct financial rewards. The metrics are instead regarded as 
symbols of success, and this is interpreted to be important for being invited 
to networks and research projects and obtaining new positions.
Performance metrics are also used to assign (and refuse) sabbaticals, a 
practice that is used at both case universities in Norway: ‘[Publication 
points] are presented as statistics to all of us … and this is used to assign 
sabbaticals, so this is a strong guiding principle for our institution’ 
(Regional, manager, NO). Metrics can also be used by managers to inspire 
and motivate academics and are often brought up in the annual appraisal 
meetings. Publication points are used to follow up on academics who are 
not publishing very much, not to punish, but rather to offer support and 
facilitation. A manager explains, ‘Actually, it is more like I am saying; “Is 
there anything we can do?” It is not like; “We are expecting you to publish 
five articles next year.” It is not on that level, we are not a factory’ (Flagship, 
manager, NO).
In Sweden, there is less emphasis on the actionability of performance 
measures compared with the other countries. There is broad agreement 
that performance measures are to some extent necessary to enable decision- 
making, but also that they are inevitable as others use them. Academics do, 
for instance, acknowledge the accountability relationship between the 
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 university and ministry and how this results in requirements to report 
organisational activities in standardised ways. Also, the dependence on 
external funders and other stakeholders is evident, and that they some-
times prefer simplified metrics to assess research. Thus, the actionability 
created by metrics is appreciated and accepted because it enables necessary 
accountability relations and resource allocation flows.
As incentives, the PRFS is most notable within the social sciences, 
where the increasing emphasis on bibliometrics has implied a shift in pub-
lication patterns. As explained by a manager, ‘Everyone is moving towards 
scientific articles. Not exclusively, but it is what people talk about and what 
we are supposed to aim for’ (Regional, Manager, SE). In the natural sci-
ences, publications and citation counts are instead described as traditional 
measures of research performance. For researchers, the incentives pro-
vided by research metrics are, however, rarely related to the national 
PRFS. Instead, these indicators are important for other reasons. External 
funding is essential because it provides resources for the individual 
researchers, and bibliometrics are vital because of the reputational gains 
for researchers being well published and well cited. Whether research met-
rics are effective motivational tools is an issue where opinions vary. Some 
express the notion that they make researchers increase their output: ‘If you 
measure things, if you look at things and take notice of things, more things 
happen’ (Regional, Manager, SE). However, others doubt the necessity of 
creating stronger incentives because academia already is rife with incen-
tives, emphasising that academics primarily are motivated by their own 
initiatives. The establishment of local PRFSs is thus challenged: ‘The ques-
tion is whether we need to make yet another assessment to distribute the 
government grant’ (Flagship, Manager, SE). This also emphasises the 
transparency that indicators create because metrics may provide clear and 
indisputable grounds for decision-making. Although neither of the two 
Swedish case universities uses a PRFS at the institutional level, these sys-
tems exist at both universities at the faculty level. However, the local 
PRFSs are rarely strict implementations of the national system but often 
include a variety of components, such as PhDs awarded and teaching per-
formance. The indicators of the national PRFS are thus applied in the local 
PRFS because they are seen as useful to allocate resources between organ-
isational units, but they are not the only metrics used here.
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Legitimacy
Research metrics are largely seen as important for legitimising organisa-
tions and their activities. It is generally acknowledged that metrics are 
important in demonstrating performance to external actors in simple and 
understandable ways. Also, equity issues are brought forward because 
metrics enhance transparency and thwart arbitrary decision-making. 
Although some critique may be noted against the necessity to measure 
research so closely, it is mostly seen as just and appropriate. Regarding the 
technical legitimacy of the PRFSs, there is more variation. In particular, 
we note how academics primarily from the natural sciences are sceptical of 
the PRFSs. They often perceive these systems as crude and unable to accu-
rately gauge the value of scientific publications.
In Denmark, the BRI is a new measure of publication performance; it 
has, to varying degrees, challenged the status quo of the existing methods 
for assessing the value of different kinds of scholarly publications and out-
lets. Within the social sciences, the BRI constitutes a new indicator that 
reflects the publication patterns of the social sciences. For the faculty 
members of natural sciences, it was a different case. Here, the impact fac-
tor of what journal the research was published in had for decades been the 
standard to measure the quality of a journal. Hence, the BRI was seen as 
a crude measure because it only differentiated between two levels. In the 
eyes of natural science scholars, the BRI had low technical legitimacy and 
was competing against a well-institutionalised and entrenched measure-
ment system. A similar logic differentiates the flagship university from the 
regional university. Although the BRI was understood as an appropriate 
tool to boost performances at the regional university, this was seen as 
unnecessary at the flagship university, where researchers were already pub-
lishing in international fora. Therefore, the BRI has never been fully 
accepted as a proper measurement tool by various groups and universities, 
thus suffering in both technical and normative legitimacy. This is especially 
the case in the natural sciences, where researchers simply do not know the 
BRI or reject it as faulty. As one researcher replied when asked if they take 
notice of the BRI, ‘No, I don’t think so. Because it is a bit wrong’ 
(Flagship, academic, DK).
In Finland, on the other hand, the PRFS generally enjoys high norma-
tive legitimacy but suffers from a somewhat lower technical legitimacy. 
Although there is some concern over how well the PRFS actually increases 
the quality of research, most academics and managers see it as a  constructive, 
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forward-looking system. Measuring academic performance is perceived to 
be an inseparable part of a modern university. However, the normative 
legitimacy is strongly coupled with the transparency of the indicators: 
‘The more there is fair competition where rules are open, the better we 
do. But if there is competition where the rules of the game are not known 
by those who compete, it is simply an arbitrary use of power’ (Flagship, 
manager, FI). From a managerial perspective, measuring performance is a 
tool used for the smooth running of a complex expert organisation but 
also for ensuring the fair treatment of personnel. For the academics, the 
situation is more complex. They value the openness and transparency of 
the PRFS but do not necessarily feel they can trust the administration in 
upholding these standards because university managers adopt and use 
these metrics. In the eyes of academics, the legitimacy of the system is, 
hence, coupled with a fair and open application of the performance mea-
sures throughout.
Regarding the technical legitimacy of the metrics included in the PRFS, 
they are largely seen as established indicators of research performance and 
hence as technically legitimate. The use of bibliometric indicators is 
 perceived to follow the logic of academia and is seen to align well with 
academic conventions. However, a concern is that the system is not seen 
as meeting or serving the interests of high-quality research: ‘Measuring 
performance can have a side effect that if the demands are too low or too 
quantitative we start to count how many publications to do, and so you 
start to produce lower quality publications because their quality is not 
measured, only quantity’ (Flagship, academic, FI). How much is pub-
lished is considered to be stressed at the expense of quality, posing a threat 
to scientific integrity. This is the main reason for the mistrust towards the 
use of metrics in the evaluation of academic performance.
In Norway, performance measures are used to increase transparency 
between and within universities. However, there are large variations within 
the universities on how this is practised. In some departments, they share 
the information on an individual level to all employees, while others use 
the data to compare at the department and faculty level. The practice of 
sharing data at the individual level raises critical voices among both aca-
demics and managers because of the shaming of academics with few pub-
lications: ‘I believe it feels personally more uncomfortable, because it is so 
visible now. It is more apparent’ (Regional, academic, NO).
Generally, research metrics may be said to hold normative legitimacy as 
tools to indicate success. However, there seems to be differences in the 
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legitimacy of the national PRFS among the academic fields. Within the 
natural sciences, the system of quantification was not questioned, but it 
was noted that it provided an increased focus. As illustrated by a researcher: 
‘There is a larger focus on symbols, for instance in relation to highly 
ranked journals. To get an article in Nature of Science or others has larger 
significance now. This is almost immediately reported to the rector and on 
the web site. The flagging and use of status symbols … have changed dra-
matically, I think’ (Regional, academic, NO). Research performance, as 
indicated by metrics, is thus used more often to demonstrate achievements 
and acquire legitimacy for the university as an organisation.
There are also critical voices, mainly within the social sciences, where 
academics emphasise the problem of turning values of research into mea-
surable points, problems related to quality versus quantity and highlight-
ing that not everything is countable. Furthermore, these voices question 
how the role of the university as an independent research institution would 
be affected by the close connection between funding and metrics. The 
social scientists were also highly critical towards what they perceived as the 
new public management influence in the sector, as one academic expressed: 
‘We are a kind of counter culture … many of the most prominent critics to 
the leadership of the university come from our department’ (Flagship, 
academic, NO).
In Sweden, the various components of the PRFS are fairly well estab-
lished as indicators of research performance and may be considered to 
have a high level of technical validity. External funding is ‘the accepted 
method of measurement when it comes to research performances’ 
(Flagship, administrator, SE). It aligns well with the idea that external 
research grants are awarded to the most prominent applicants after a rigor-
ous peer-review process; therefore, the acquisition of grants is an acknowl-
edgement of academic merit. This is also a notion that is well represented 
within Swedish universities: ‘If you are rewarded and get a lot of grants 
you will be perceived as successful’ (Flagship, administrator, SE). Also, the 
bibliometric indicators used in the PRFS align well with academic conven-
tions, though differences exist between the disciplines. Although some 
sections of academia are more familiar with bibliometrics and the publica-
tion practices it refers to, others have been less so. However, a shift is 
underway, making research metrics increasingly common within the 
social sciences.
Although generally accepted, the metrics of the PRFS are not exempt 
from critique. On the contrary, both researchers and managers emphasise 
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the difficulties of measuring research. The critique is, however, mostly 
levelled towards measurement in general rather than focusing on specific 
problems with the existing indicators. An example is provided by a man-
ager who states that fulfilling performance criteria ‘does not necessarily 
imply that the performance has high quality’ (Flagship, Manager, SE). 
There is a general awareness about the limitations of performance mea-
sures, and that academic work often produces benefits that are not easily 
captured by performance metrics. Also, the level where metrics are appli-
cable is noted. Here, a manager states that most metrics are unfit to assess 
individual performance: ‘Your performance is not a result of your own 
efforts alone, it is largely collective’ (Flagship, manager, SE).
The research metrics of the Swedish PRFS are generally seen as norma-
tively legitimate because they legitimise research activities. Still, this is con-
tingent on the relatively high technical legitimacy. It is, however, generally 
stressed that the research metrics will not benefit the universities if these 
metrics come to define and control academic work internally. As expressed 
by a manager, ‘We need to make room for the fact that research can occur 
in various ways’ (Regional, manager, SE). Swedish academics are thus 
holding a quite pragmatic view of these research metrics, one where their 
benefits and limitations are acknowledged.
Institutionalisation
The research metrics of the national PRFSs have been variously institu-
tionalised in the four studied countries. In some ways, they are now deeply 
institutionalised because they have been reified in organisational struc-
tures, and people are becoming increasingly habituated to them. On the 
other hand, there is variation regarding how much they are taken for 
granted. In some cases, they clearly affect how people make sense of the 
research activities. However, there are also findings indicating that these 
metrics are not internalised and taken for granted, yet people relate to 
them in attentive and deliberate ways.
In Denmark, the BRI is by far the element in the PRFS with the largest 
but also the most differentiated effects on the organisation and practice of 
academic work. Because the other elements of the PRFS (external fund-
ing, student throughput and PhD production) have been in use for almost 
two decades, they are already institutionalised in the organisation of aca-
demic work. Furthermore, they are also important measures in themselves 
outside of the PRFS. Hence, the importance of securing external funding 
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is not tied so much to its inclusion in the PRFS but rather stems from the 
necessity to acquire external funding to enable research activities. Although 
researchers emphasise that the acquisition of external funding has become 
increasingly important and that they experience pressure from manage-
ment, no one ties this specifically to external funding being included in the 
PRFS. However, it cannot be ruled out that the processes of reification 
and habituation have made external funding even more important because 
of its inclusion in the PRFS.
On the other hand, the BRI is clearly being institutionalised. We have 
already described how it is reified in the budget models at the regional 
university. Its effects on how research results are disseminated are also 
noted. As a manager states, ‘Another perverse effect is what we have felt 
strongly for, because we originally were created by the surrounding soci-
ety: To disseminate to the surrounding society […]. You stopped doing 
that’ (Regional, manager, DK). Introducing the BRI has thus led to a 
reconstitution of what ‘quality publication’ is. However, despite the BRI 
leaving its mark on various places, it has not been broadly institutionalised 
as a taken-for-granted measure of research performance. This is related to 
the low legitimacy of the BRI among some groups within Danish universi-
ties, preventing the full acceptance of metrics. Moreover, most actors at 
the university level act under the impression that the BRI is only distribut-
ing a small fraction of the total funding for research. As one top manager 
notes, ‘If you look at how much it [the PRFS] has redistributed, then I 
think you will see that it has redistributed next to nothing’ (Regional, 
manager, DK). Hence, it seems that some institutionalisation of the BRI 
has taken place, though a very general and taken-for-granted type of lock-
 in effect is lacking.
In contrast, in Finnish universities, the performance measurement is 
becoming well institutionalised. It is now perceived as a control mecha-
nism both for the purpose of keeping track and ensuring the accountabil-
ity of academic staff, as well as being a transparency instrument allowing 
those who perform well to be rewarded. The internal application of PRFSs 
to allocate funding also indicates an increasing institutionalisation of the 
national PRFS. With institutional funding being highly performance based 
and as the competition for external funding increases, it has become sen-
sible for universities to focus on strong and rising fields of research and to 
build incentive systems to reward high-achieving departments. Therefore, 
the logic of the PRFS has been internalised within Finnish universities. 
A manager exemplifies this when stating that ‘our revenue generation logic 
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leans clearly on performance […] and results have to be somehow measur-
able’ (Regional, manager, FI). Although there is criticism against perfor-
mance indicators and the way they are designed, the indicators have also 
influenced the way people understand research activities: ‘Also in research, 
people have started to speak that way, that research activities need to be 
effective and efficient, that they must be measurable and that the system is 
a kind of steering mechanism for how good research is’ (Regional, man-
ager, FI). This indicates that reconstitution has started to occur because 
research indicators have influenced how academics perceive the meaning 
of everyday activities.
Also, in Norway, there is general agreement on the influence metrics 
have over the organisation of research. In particular, it is noted that the 
performance measures of the PRFS are institutionalised in several ways. 
The local use of performance measures derived from the national PRFS 
constitutes an institutionalisation of these metrics, both as they are reified 
in organisational decision-making structures and as people become habit-
uated to an increasing measurement of academic performance. There are 
also signs of reconstitution: an increasing measurement of performance 
alters the notion of research activities among academics. There is now an 
increasingly widespread notion that research needs to be measurable so 
that academics can demonstrate their performance quantitatively. A man-
ager notes how this influences the notion of sabbaticals as a reward rather 
than preconditions for research achievements: ‘Of course, there is more 
focus on that people have to deserve sabbaticals’ (Flagship, manager, 
NO). Thus, the use of metrics is influential as an organisational principle, 
and it affects the way people think about research:
It [publication metrics] means a lot today, even… It is almost comical, right? 
I can see what it does to my head. I mean, there are far too many journals, 
too much focus on publication points, because it is not saying anything 
about the quality, either this is level 1 or 2. Still, it messes with your head as 
you are measured and weighed, so you are in a way searching for… It means 
a lot. Therefore, this is an incredibly strong organisational principle. 
(Regional, manager, NO)
In Sweden, the metrics of the PRFS are quite well institutionalised. 
Although academics within the natural sciences are more familiar with 
them, social scientists are now well acquainted with these measures, mak-
ing the habituation ubiquitous. The measures are, along with other 
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 measures of academic work, reified in the decision-making structures at 
various places in the two universities, albeit not at the highest level.
The reconstitution of the research metrics is relatively weak in Sweden. 
Although a general acceptance of the indicators of the PRFS has implica-
tions for the way university actors perceive research activities, this does not 
seem to stem from the PRFS. Mainly, the PRFS is not understood to be of 
particular importance to academics in organising their research activities 
when compared with other instances where research metrics appear. The 
way academics describe the relation between performance indicators and 
research activities instead alludes to a wider context where these metrics 
are seen as important. That the PRFS does not have a major influence on 
the way academics perceive research can be explained by the fact that the 
construction of the PRFS has proceeded from measures already institu-
tionalised as indicators of research performance. However, the specific 
measures included in the PRFS are often the ones that academics refer to 
when describing research and the ways in which it is measured. A manager 
states, ‘We measure performance in external funding, publication and cita-
tions; those are the tools we have’ (Flagship, manager, SE). This indicates 
that the metrics included in the PRFS are institutionalised and that the 
PRFS aligns well with established conventions of how to measure research. 
Although the PRFS is not the origin of these metrics, its implementation 
creates yet another source of pressure on universities, reinforcing the 
power of these research indicators. A reconstitution of research in line 
with prevailing performance measures does seem to be absent, something 
that can be explained by the relatively weak actionability and incentives of 
the PRFS when compared with the other three countries.
concludIng dIscussIon: What role do Performance 
metrIcs Play In research?
In the present study, we have sought to illuminate how the PRFSs of 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland affect the way university actors 
understand research activities at the institutional level. The PRFSs have all 
been introduced in recent years, but the ways in which they are configured 
differ somewhat. This is true for the indicators used, as well as for the 
amount of funds the systems are distributing. Our results indicate that the 
establishment of these PRFSs has had notable effects within Nordic uni-
versities. The performance measures of the PRFSs are implemented as 
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 formal structures for resource allocation and decision-making, but they 
are also used informally and in nonsystematic ways to organise and per-
form research activities. In particular, they contribute subtly to the institu-
tionalisation and consolidation of research metrics as the descriptions and 
organising principles of research and to the notion that all scientific con-
tributions can be compared with each other.
However, it is not only the metrics of the four PRFSs that are used 
within the universities. A number of performance measures are applied by 
university actors to make sense of research activities and to navigate in a 
context where there is evermore measurement, evaluation and competi-
tion. The PRFSs should therefore be seen in this wider context, where the 
PRFSs may be understood as expressions of government intentions to 
promote quantitative evaluation that allows for measurable evidence to be 
used to describe and compare a complex situation. Even though ques-
tions are raised within the universities against the various uses of perfor-
mance measures, the metrics are generally accepted and often appreciated 
as valuable tools for enhancing transparency. The introduction of the 
PRFSs can thus be seen as an important contribution to the quantification 
of research and as effective in establishing an all-encompassing research 
evaluation regime.
Analysing the empirical findings against our analytical framework, the 
different ways in which performance measures have been noted to influ-
ence organisations in previous studies all possess explanatory power in the 
present study. Regarding the actionability of the performance measures 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007), they are instrumental in supporting decision- 
making within the universities. This is emphasised in all the studied coun-
tries, though the ways in which metrics are used for this purpose differ 
somewhat. Although there are examples of local PRFSs in all countries at 
the institutional or subinstitutional level, our results indicate that the met-
rics in Norway are also used to allocate funding for conferences or sabbati-
cals. In Denmark, there is a large variation between universities depending 
on the presence of local PRFSs, which are used at regional universities to 
improve organisational performance. This is also the main use of the met-
rics, as emphasised in Finland, where metrics are seen as enhancing trans-
parency and thus the general development of Finnish universities. 
Therefore, performance measures are used to assist universities in making 
priorities and to aid managers in providing support to researchers. In 
Sweden, the metrics are described to aid decision-making at a higher level, 
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where the actionability is mostly related to external accountability rela-
tionships and resource allocation flows.
Regarding the incentives, the picture is more consistent across the 
countries, despite the fact that the preconditions differ among the coun-
tries and universities. Most notably, perhaps, is that publication practices 
are perceived to be heavily influenced in all four countries, at least within 
the social sciences. Researchers are considering the implications of where 
they choose to publish their research, as defined by the prevailing perfor-
mance measures. However, even when remunerative rewards are coupled 
with the achievement of measurable performances, it is mainly the sym-
bolic rewards—such as reputational gains—that researchers desire. The 
reason is that the motivation of researchers to perform is commonly found 
elsewhere: in respect of peers and more traditional academic merits. Thus, 
the introduction of remunerative incentives is seen as superfluous. Instead, 
it is the visibility of performance created by the metrics that operates as a 
motivational tool because metrics allow researchers to transparently show 
evidence of their labour. There are, however, some differences regarding 
the importance of the remunerative incentives. At the regional university 
in Denmark, it is observed that the remunerative incentives are extremely 
disciplining, and in Finland, it is noted that the PRFS increases the pres-
sure on academics to produce impactful, high-quality research.
We have seen several examples of metrics that are perceived as impor-
tant, even though they are not tied to remunerative rewards. Our interpre-
tation is that the establishment of national PRFSs contributes to the 
legitimisation of metrics as indicators of research performances, which then 
can be used to convey success. Examples of this include the findings from 
Norway, where publications in prestigious journals immediately are 
reported to the rector and are published on the university website. This 
brings us to the next concept in our analytical framework: the legitimacy 
that indicators can imbue to researchers and universities. Previous research 
has indicated that this process is contingent, in part, on the technical legiti-
macy of the performance measures (Bowker and Star 2000), as well as the 
normative legitimacy of measuring performances (Power 2004). Our 
results indicate that the technical legitimacy of the various performance 
measures of the four PRFSs is generally high because the metrics are largely 
seen as capturing research performance in an accurate manner. There are 
some differences between the countries, but primarily, we can see that the 
interviewees from the natural sciences often are sceptical towards biblio-
metric measures. Their critique is often levelled against the crudeness of 
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the measures, as with the ones used in Norway, Denmark and Finland, 
where publications are categorised on a scale that has just a few levels. This 
is also understood as a risk to high-quality research because it is seen as 
promoting the production of more publications of lesser quality. This is 
not experienced as a problem in Sweden, where citations are also included 
to define the value of publications.
Although there are some concerns about the ability of performance 
measures to capture the relevant aspects of research, as well as the neces-
sity to measure research performance as it is currently done, there is a 
general acceptance of performance measurement. This may be most 
strongly emphasised in Finland, where it is understood to be part and 
parcel of a modern university organisation and an important tool to pro-
mote transparency and a better (human resources) management of the 
university. In Finland, it is also understood as an essential tool for univer-
sity managers to identify and handle internal issues, as well as to hold 
academics accountable. In contrast, the Swedish results indicate that the 
performance measures acquire normative legitimacy because of their abil-
ity to facilitate relations with external actors. The strongest criticism 
against performance measurement is found in Norway, where it is consid-
ered to challenge the independence of the universities.
The measures of the PRFSs have also been more or less institutionalised 
(Scott 1987; Zucker 1987). As already noted, bibliometrics have been 
used for quite some time within the natural sciences, but this has been less 
so in the social sciences. Although some opposition has been noted, our 
results indicate that, within the social sciences, people are getting more 
habituated to the performance measures and come to act in accordance 
with the incentives provided by them. There are also clear signs of reifica-
tion (Espeland and Stevens 1998) because the measures of the PRFSs are 
used locally in various ways to make decisions and allocate resources. Our 
results indicate that reification occurs mainly where performance measures 
are less institutionalised. As noted in Denmark, the PRFS was thoroughly 
implemented at the regional university, but in the flagship university bib-
liometrics were already institutionalised, which made the PRFS seem 
superfluous.
Perhaps most interesting are the differences regarding the reconstitu-
tion of research (Dahler-Larsen 2014; Woolgar 1991) as a result of the 
PRFSs. There are clear examples of this in Norway, where the interviewees 
mention the importance of the publication outlet levels and how this 
affects the way they make sense of research. It also shows in the way that 
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sabbaticals are perceived as something a person deserves rather than have 
a right to. Also, in the Finnish interviews, there are indications that the 
measurement logic as embodied by the PRFS has reconstituted the per-
ception of research activities within universities. The efficiency and mea-
surability of results are now considered to be important aspects of research. 
Finally, the Danish case shows that the PRFS has led to less Danish publi-
cations, indicating a reconstitution of what quality publications are. These 
aspects are not as prevalent in the Swedish case. In Sweden, we have 
instead noted scattered voices of criticism against the implementation of 
local PRFSs, pointing mainly to the homogenising force of metrics and 
their inability to measure individual-level performance. This opposition 
seems to prevent reconstitution, while a pragmatic approach accepts the 
use of metrics for other purposes, such as external relations.
Taken together, it appears that the reactions from Sweden differ some-
what from the other three countries. In general, the Swedish interviewees 
display less concern about the use of PRFSs compared with the interview-
ees from Denmark, Finland and Norway. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the bibliometric models used in the other three countries 
are experienced as more actionable than the one used in Sweden. The 
Danish, Finnish and Norwegian systems create clear incentives for 
researchers and enable decision-making based on publication points. The 
inclusion of citations in the Swedish system does, however, make it harder 
to assess the value of individual performance before some time has passed 
and the work has been cited. It is also clear that the novelty of the metrics 
is greater in Denmark, Finland and Norway, where completely new data-
bases have been constructed. These have been large endeavours for the 
scientific communities in these countries and have also made a large impact 
on the researchers measured by the systems. The Swedish PRFS though, 
is built on an already existing database, which includes well-known metrics 
that many researchers were already relating to.
Going back to the original question of this chapter, we have sought 
to illuminate how the varying use of performance-based research fund-
ing is reflected within universities across the Nordic countries. We have 
looked at the formal resource allocation systems at the national level and 
studied the effects they have had on the perceptions of research at local 
levels. All of the studied countries have adopted PRFSs, and over the 
course of roughly two decades, they have modified their PRFSs to suit 
the national context and their role in the changing global working envi-
ronment. The increasingly competitive environment and the systems put 
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in place to monitor the research performance of Nordic universities have 
been internalised locally to varying degrees, partly based on differences 
in disciplinary practices and divergence between the traditions of flag-
ship and regional universities. 
In the current study, actionability, legitimacy and institutionalisation 
have functioned as valid factors to analyse how metrics affect univer-
sity  organisations. According to our analysis, an additional temporal 
dimension could be taken into account when looking deeper into the ways 
in which these three factors influence the use of metrics. As we look at the 
case universities, it seems that aspects of actionability, decision-making and 
incentive systems have been somewhat more straightforward to imple-
ment as managerial tools because their use is more under the control of 
formal management structures. Legitimacy and institutionalisation, how-
ever, require a longer temporal perspective because their success depends 
more on gaining trust and showing appreciation mutually between the 
academic, managerial and administrative professions.
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IntroductIon
Over the last three decades, universities have undergone massive transfor-
mations (Ferlie et al. 2009). To make universities more productive and 
attentive to society’s needs, governments have introduced new public- 
management- inspired reforms in most European countries. Although the 
aims and scope of these reforms and their actual implementation have 
varied between countries, they all share the same repertoire of reform ele-
ments: strengthened management, accountability measures, performance 
management, and increased competition (Paradeise et al. 2009). One of 
the central aims of these efforts has been to create more unified and hier-
archical organisational actors that are better able to compete in the global 
market of higher education (HE), which could especially be carried out 
by  strengthening management at universities (Brunsson and Sahlin- 
Andersson 2000; Krucken and Meier 2006; Seeber et al. 2015).
However, not all of the reform elements necessarily point in this direc-
tion. As pointed out by Richard Whitley and Jochen Gläser (2014), some 
trends in the state’s attempt at steering the research within universities 
might go against the trend of strengthening the formal hierarchy. 
Developments in the funding of research, especially the proliferation of 
external project funding for research, could have contradictory effects 
because they are likely to increase the authority of external funding agen-
cies, while decreasing the authority of managers in universities (Whitley 
2011; Whitley and Gläser 2014): ‘As universities became more concerned 
to compete for scientific reputations on the basis of their employees’ con-
tribution to knowledge, though, and researchers were more able to raise 
project money from external sources such as state research foundations, 
the ability of managers to control academics’ behaviour has declined’ 
(Whitley and Gläser 2014, 34).
Although Whitley and Gläser state this development as a fact, it should 
rather be seen as a hypothesis in need of empirical testing, since the 
authors do not base their conclusions on an empirical investigation of 
how authority relations play out in a specific empirical context. We intend 
to explore this hypothesis in a Nordic context by answering the following 
research question:
How does increasing external research project funding affect the authority 
over research for managers and researchers in Nordic universities?
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In answering this research question, we draw on the concept of author-
ity relations, which was also first developed by Whitley and Gläser. 
Authority relations are defined as the ‘legitimate power of actors’ and 
address the issue of governance, focusing on the actors involved in the 
decisions concerning research. In this chapter, we focus specifically on the 
effect of external research project funding on the authority over research 
that managers and researchers have.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, we develop the theoretical 
framework in section “Theory: Authority Relations”, presenting and fur-
ther developing the authority relations concept. Then, we present the meth-
ods and data in section “Methods and Data”. In section “Changes in 
External Funding”, we explore the policy developments concerning exter-
nal funding in the case countries. In section “Analysis”, we conduct an 
analysis of the survey results, which is followed by an analysis of the qualita-
tive data on a country basis. In section “Comparison and Discussion”, we 
comparatively discuss the similarities and differences concerning how exter-
nal funding has affected the authority over research for managers and aca-
demics. In section “Conclusion”, we conclude the findings of the chapter.
theory: AuthorIty relAtIons
Authority relations are defined as the ‘legitimate power of actors’ and 
revolve around analysing ‘the relative authority of a set of interdependent 
actors’ (Gläser 2010, 359); this concept is closely related to the concept of 
governance. Although governance has been defined in various ways in the 
literature, a central concern has been how ‘… different activities and inter-
ests are coordinated and regulated’ (Whitley 2011, 360). The governance 
perspective focuses on the systems or modes of governance and hence 
focuses more on the processes of regulating activities and less so on the 
specific actors who attempt to exercise authority. The authority relations 
perspective is both more specific and more inclusive than the governance 
perspective. As Gläser (2010) states:
It is more specific insofar as it focuses on actors (authoritative agencies) and 
uses institutional structures and processes of governance as ‘background 
information’ on how authority is produced and exercised. At the same time, 
it is more inclusive because it always includes all actors who have authority 
concerning a specific decision process regardless of their inclusion in par-
ticular governance instruments. (359)
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In the case of this chapter, and in the works of Whitley and Gläser, the 
specific decision process is about the conduct of research (which we spec-
ify further below). One of the central governance mechanisms that has 
affected authority relations in this area is the proliferation of external proj-
ect funding in universities, which will be the focus of this chapter.
As defined above, authority is about the legitimate power of actors. 
However, Whitley and Gläser (2010) do not explicitly define how one 
should approach and understand power. We will develop an understand-
ing of power that is grounded in the institutional theory as a foundation 
for the authority relations concept. In the institutional theory, power and 
authority are not commodities or something an individual can possess; 
rather, they are a relational phenomenon (Clegg 1989; Lawrence 2008). 
Therefore, we will not confine our analysis to looking at how authority is 
formally distributed, but rather, we will focus on how different actors 
experience the authority relations they find themselves in. According to 
Thomas Lawrence (2008), power comes in two forms: episodic power, 
which is ‘relatively discrete, strategic acts of mobilization initiated by self- 
interested actors’ (6), and systemic power, which is the taken-for-granted 
routines and practices rooted in cultural systems (Lawrence et al. 2012). 
Hence, episodic power covers all kinds of exercise of power where an indi-
vidual—or a collective of individuals—purposefully attempts to further his 
or her interests. This could be accomplished through controlling critical 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) or through having privileged access 
to knowledge (Clark 1979). However, it could also be engaging in strug-
gles to define what is to be seen as appropriate and true. Hence, episodic 
power can be used to change institutions and is therefore related to sys-
temic power (Lawrence 2008). Systemic power, though, is when cultural 
systems and practices become taken for granted and work in less obvious 
ways. Hence, the exercise of systemic power cannot be attributed to spe-
cific actors but still holds power over them.
However, exercising authority over research plays out quite differently 
for the studied actors in this chapter, and therefore, the concept of author-
ity relations requires some operationalisation. It is likely—and indeed what 
we partly find in this chapter—that different actors do not want to have 
authority over the same aspects of research. The researcher wants author-
ity over the actual conduct of research, while managers are interested in 
authority over the broader direction of research and, as we shall see, are 
more focused on the authority over research related to resource genera-
tion and management in their unit. Furthermore, the studied actors in this 
 J. K. LIND ET AL.
149
chapter have to exercise authority in different ways. Although managers 
(and other actors—in the case of this chapter, the external funders of 
research especially) will have to exercise their authority over research 
through others (mainly by affecting researchers’ choices or affecting who 
is allowed to do research), researchers will exercise authority over research 
by limiting the authority of other actors. This asymmetry comes from the 
professional knowledge and skills that only researchers have and the basic 
unpredictability of the scientific endeavour (Clark 1979; Whitley and 
Gläser 2014). Hence, for researchers, it becomes a question of protecting 
their research freedom. There is much discussion—yet no agreement—on 
what research freedom and the broader concept of academic freedom 
entails (Akerlind and Kayrooz 2003; Altbach 2001). Furthermore, there 
are different notions of academic freedom among different cultural spheres 
and countries (Neave 1988). Therefore, we have chosen to use an induc-
tive approach to increase our understanding of what authority over 
research means for the studied actors in this chapter. More specifically, we 
focus on the way actors exercise authority over content (research themes 
and methods used), time (actual time to, and time frames for, doing 
research), and people (who gets involved in the research). These themes are 
based mainly on how researchers define the important areas of research 
authority and will structure the current analysis. Managers also find these 
themes relevant but emphasise other aspects of them as important to have 
authority over when compared with researchers. In addition, managers 
emphasise additional themes that do not fit with the three themes of con-
tent, time, and people. Nevertheless, because these themes are more diverse 
between countries, they will not be subject to an initial categorisation that 
will structure the analysis. Instead, in the discussion section, we will sum 
up these and discuss how manager authority in these areas has changed.
Methods And dAtA
The chapter uses both the interviews and the survey conducted as part of 
the FINNUT project (see Chap. 1 of this volume for an in-depth descrip-
tion of the methods used in the FINNUT project). Regarding the inter-
views, the analysis relied on the FINNUT coding scheme. This chapter 
mainly draws on two questions in the interview guide that are relevant for 
this study. For researchers, the question was how much freedom they have 
in research. For managers, the question was how much freedom they have 
in making strategic choices regarding the research profile of the unit. 
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These questions were purposely phrased to be open, allowing the partici-
pants to define their degrees of freedom. In doing so, the interviewees 
inevitably elaborated on the authority relations they found themselves in.
In the survey, we use the part that relates to autonomy. We use quanti-
tative data to obtain a general understanding of how academics experience 
their autonomy in research. The qualitative data are used to qualify and 
make sense of the findings in the quantitative date, which, at first glance, 
seems to reveal somewhat contradicting findings.
chAnges In externAl FundIng
The overall development in external funding can be seen in Fig. 5.1. The 
country sections describe the national tendency in more detail. Although 
the largest percentage of external funding comes from national sources—
mostly research councils and foundations—in recent years, an increasing 
percentage is coming from the EU. Denmark and Finland have the high-
est percentage (Denmark had 9.6% in 1999 and 10.2% in 2013, while 
Finland had 6.7% in 1999 and 13.0% in 2013) and Norway and Sweden 
the lowest (Norway had 5.8% in 1999 and 6% in 2013, while Sweden had 
4.6% in 1999 and 7.8% in 2013).1 Hence, although their contribution to 
the increase in external funding is rising, it is still rather marginal, espe-
cially in Norway and Sweden.
Denmark
The spending on research at Danish universities has increased substantially 
over the years. Since around the year 2000, spending on research has tri-
pled. Likewise, the percentage of external funding of research has been—
more or less—steadily increasing over the past decades (see Fig. 5.1). The 
development gained speed during the 1980s, where the percentage more 
than doubled in a decade, from about 15% to 30% of the total research 
funding. After a period of stagnation during the 1990s and first part of the 
2000s, the development took off with the Globalisation Agreement in 
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), gross domestic 
expenditure on research and development (R&D) by sector of performance and source of 
funds: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_FUNDS. The most recent 
data on EU funding on all four countries are from 2013.
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2006, which significantly increased the total funding for research, espe-
cially external funding (Aagaard 2012).
Organisationally, most competitive funding up until the 2000s was 
managed by the state research councils (one for each scientific area). In 
1992, the Danish National Research Foundation was established, whose 
aim was to fund centres of excellence (CoEs). Funding was decided by 
recognised researchers and given to basic research. Hence, the external 
funding system was still very much in the hands of the academic elite. 
However, after recommendations from a research committee in 2001, a 
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Fig. 5.1 Development in external funding as a percentage of the total funding 
for research at higher education institutions. Source: Own figure, based on OECD 
data. To have comparable data, we use OECD data (gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D by sector of performance and source of funds): https://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_FUNDS. These are for all higher education 
institutions (HEIs) and are impossible to break down to only universities. However, 
they should still indicate the general trend because universities by far conduct the 
most research among higher education institutions. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data were cross-checked with 
the national available data, which revealed only minor discrepancies for Sweden, 
Finland and Norway. However, for Denmark, the numbers differ substantially in 
the years up to 2007. The national data reveal a large jump in the percentage of 
external funding in 2007. This makes sense because a large number of governmen-
tal research institutions with a high percentage of external funding merged with 
universities, and the globalisation strategy boosted the external funding of univer-
sities. However, this jump does not occur in the OECD data. However, the per-
centages in recent years match well, and therefore, we have, for reasons of 
comparability, used the OECD data for all countries
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range of reforms, introducing new, more innovation-oriented councils 
and foundations, changed the organisational landscape for public external 
funding (e.g., the Council for Technology and Innovation was established, 
along with the Foundation for High Technology). All these organisational 
innovations were established to move research more towards applied sci-
ence and business collaboration (Aagaard and Ravn 2012). In addition to 
the public funding of research, private foundations slowly developed, 
especially in recent years, as an important source of research funding. 
Funding from these sources is, however, problematic from a university 
management point of view because they do not come with overheads. All 
in all, the Danish system for external funding is very diverse, with a lot of 
funders coming in different sizes, with different purposes, and oriented 
towards different scientific disciplines.
Finland
The general level of research funding has seen a steady increase for decades, 
culminating with a doubling of funds between 2000 and 2012, when the 
levels slightly dropped. The level of external funding grew substantially in 
the beginning of the 1980s and then again after a few years of decline dur-
ing the 1990s (see Fig. 5.1). Here, external funding reached levels above 
50% of the total funding for research. In 2009, external funding increased 
again as a reaction to the new university legislation that took effect on 1 
January 2010. The total value of external funding nearly doubled between 
2000 and 2016. The general picture is one where the levels of external 
funding have been more than 50% for two decades.2
With the levels of lump-sum funding increasing only moderately com-
pared with the rising level of demands, the pressure for universities to 
increase their research funding through external funding grew. To boost the 
utilisation of research in broader society (including business) more effec-
tively, the government has founded a number of new strategically oriented 
funding instruments. Organisationally, the shift towards more strategically 
oriented, competitive funding has increased the role of the Academy of 
Finland and, to a lesser degree, Business Finland (formerly Tekes, the 
national innovation agency).
2 Because universities of applied sciences are included in the OECD data, the shift to exter-
nal funding as the dominating source appears earlier than if numbers were for universities 
only (Statistics Finland).
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Norway
Funding for research at Norwegian universities has increased substan-
tially in the past few decades, especially since around the year 2000. The 
level of external funding has also risen steadily but at a slower pace than 
the other Nordic countries (see Fig.  5.1). The development took off 
during the 1980s and then again at the end of the 1990s and beginning 
of the new millennium, after which the development stagnated. The 
level of external funding is now significantly lower than that of Finland 
and Sweden.
Among the domestic external funding organisations, the Research 
Council of Norway is the most important. It was established in 1993 as a 
merger of five discipline-based councils and has an annual budget of about 
NOK 9 billion, which is allocated based on discipline, as well as to CoEs 
and to topic-based research. In 2014, coming up with a long-term plan for 
research and higher education (Norwegian Ministry of Education 2015), 
the government announced an increase in research and development 
appropriations to 1% of the gross domestic product and to scale up appro-
priations to research and higher education within six long-term priority 
areas: seas and oceans; climate, environment, and clean energy; public sec-
tor renewal, better and more effective welfare and health, and care ser-
vices; enabling technologies; innovative and adaptable industry; and 
world’s leading academic groups. Although there is one dominating 
research council, the funding programmes are quite diverse, and there are 
regional councils supporting research that has local relevance. Therefore, 
the system seems as diverse as the other Nordic countries in terms of the 
types of funding available.
Sweden
Research funding for Swedish higher education institutions (HEIs) has 
seen a continuous increase in recent decades, doubling since the year 
2000. The percentage of external funding for research has also risen sub-
stantially since the early 1980s (see Fig. 5.1). Earlier, external funding was 
mainly provided by the national research councils and the sectorial research 
boards, which were established in the post-war era. The research councils 
operated as an inter-institutional faculty board where researchers could 
apply for funding. This was also the case for the sectorial research boards, 
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which emphasised societal utility and impact as important criteria (Askling 
2012, 57).
In 1993, the government introduced a major reform that entailed sub-
stantive deregulation and decentralisation. Simultaneously, it also estab-
lished a number of research foundations. These foundations have various 
strategic missions and support initiatives such as environmental research 
and cultural research but also internationalisation and cooperation with 
industry. In 2001, the Swedish Research Council was established as a new 
government agency, taking over the activities of the earlier research coun-
cils. The trend of an increasing share of external research funds for univer-
sity research thus continued, reaching levels over 50%, where it has 
remained since around the year 2000.
During the years that followed, the national research policy has empha-
sised quality and excellence. Regarding resource allocation, a number of 
initiatives have been taken up to effectively concentrate resources for 
research, often to areas of particular concern for decision-makers 
(Geschwind and Pinheiro 2017).
The Nordic Countries in Comparison
Although we can identify some differences in the policy development on 
external funding, there is substantial congruence in the general trends.
First, the organisation of research funding seems somewhat similar 
across countries although there are variations. In all countries, there is a 
variety of different funding opportunities, where some lean towards basic 
or blue-sky research, and others are more application or innovation ori-
ented. Even the Norwegian and Finnish systems, which both have one 
dominating research council, are, in reality, diverse systems with many 
subprogrammes that support research in a variety of ways.
Concerning the development in the level of external funding (see 
Fig. 5.1), this has at least one common general feature for all countries, 
namely, the rise of external funding. In the 1990s, a clear picture emerges, 
one where Sweden and Finland generally lie at 10% (or more) above 
Denmark and Norway. However, although Denmark and Norway follow 
a very similar development from the 1980s and onward, Denmark increases 
the percentage of external funding substantially from around 2007. 
Hence, for almost ten years, the picture has been one where Sweden and 
Finland are at the top, with Denmark following close, and Norway at a 
level substantially lower than the other Nordic countries.
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Hence, the policy development in the four countries has been very 
similar in terms of the organisational arrangement of research funding 
(great diversity) and of growing external funding. This seems to have fol-
lowed a European script for research policy, where initiatives such as the 
Lisbon Strategy have pushed for more competition (also in funding) and 
for research policy being embedded in innovation policy to support eco-
nomic development in a globalised world (Olsen 2007). The biggest dif-
ference between the countries seems to be the level of external funding, 
where there are substantial differences. The question is how these devel-
opments have been interpreted by managers and researchers in the four 
countries. We will explore this in the next section.
AnAlysIs
We will begin the analysis by looking at some of the survey data from the 
FINNUT project. We asked researchers (associate and full professors) in 
the studied Nordic universities whether they had autonomy regarding the 
research topic, methods and project partners.3 In the context of this chap-
ter, autonomy should be seen as a measure of authority over research. If 
academics experience high autonomy, we interpret this as others having a 
low authority over research. The results (see Table 5.1) show that on aver-
age, researchers report having fairly large autonomy over research (or 
authority over research). It is also interesting to note that the differences 
between countries are not large. On average, the autonomy level is slightly 
higher across countries for research methods (4.46). This could indicate 
that research funding mostly affects the topics covered (4.27) and the 
people who are involved (4.23). This would be consistent with the way 
external funding usually is managed, where there are often topic restric-
tions or demands in terms of who should be involved as partners in proj-
ects. Requirements in terms of methods are rare. However, it should be 
noted that the autonomy in research, as measured in this survey item, is of 
course also determined by factors other than external funding.
However, we also asked researchers whether they experienced any ten-
sion between managerial priorities and academic autonomy (Table 5.2). 
Somewhat contradictory to the high scores on research autonomy, they 
also score quite high on experiencing these tensions. Although there are 
variations between countries, they are quite small. It should be kept in 
3 We do not have suitable survey data on the experiences of managers in terms of their 
authority over research.
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mind that we did not ask specifically about research autonomy but rather 
about academic autonomy in general. Also, the numbers do not reflect 
whether researchers experience a tension between the priorities of external 
funders and their academic autonomy.
Looking at the survey results, a rather murky picture appears where 
academics, on the one hand, experience quite large autonomy in research 
but, on the other hand, experience tensions between manager priorities 
and their academic autonomy. In the qualitative part of the analysis, we 
will shed light on these seemingly contradictory findings.
In the following sections, using the qualitative data, we will analyse the 
authority relations regarding research for managers and researchers seen in 
Table 5.1 Autonomy in research topic, methods and project partners by country 
(the ‘mean’ is the mean score on a Likert scale from 1 ‘I strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘I 
strongly agree’)
The country in which you 
work (for your primary job):
I have autonomy 
in research 
topic.
I have autonomy 
in research 
methods.
I have autonomy in 
choosing partners for 
research projects.
Denmark Mean 4.18 4.44 4.21
N 1616 1620 1586
Std. 
deviation
0.969 0.809 0.977
Finland Mean 4.46 4.57 4.38
N 558 557 552
Std. 
deviation
0.829 0.785 0.904
Norway Mean 4,29 4.42 4.13
N 809 806 781
Std. 
deviation
0.923 0.864 1.098
Sweden Mean 4.39 4.50 4.31
N 357 357 347
Std. 
deviation
0.857 0.756 0.929
Other, please 
specify
Mean 4.55 4.55 4.64
N 11 11 11
Std. 
deviation
0.522 0.688 0.674
Total Mean 4.27 4.46 4.23
N 3351 3351 3277
Std. 
deviation
0.929 0.814 0.993
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relation to the growing share of external project funding. First, we will 
conduct an analysis for each country separately. The analysis will focus on, 
and be structured around, the authority over research regarding content, 
time, and people.
Denmark
External funding plays a huge role in researchers’ authority over research. 
In fact, although especially salient in the natural sciences, external funding 
is almost the sine qua non in contemporary research. On the other hand, 
researchers generally experience little direct steering of their research. The 
Table 5.2 Tensions between managerial priorities and academic autonomy (the 
‘mean’ is the mean score on a Likert scale from 1 ‘I strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘I 
strongly agree’)
The country in which you work (for your 
primary job):
There is a tension between managerial priorities 
and academic autonomy.
Denmark Mean 3.70
N 1739
Std. 
deviation
1.192
Finland Mean 3.70
N 773
Std. 
deviation
1.184
Norway Mean 3.56
N 847
Std. 
deviation
1.225
Sweden Mean 3.60
N 530
Std. 
deviation
1.182
Other, please specify Mean 3.55
N 11
Std. 
deviation
1.036
Total Mean 3.66
N 3900
Std. 
deviation
1.197
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following quote exemplifies this paradox well: ‘On the research side, 
I have quite big freedom. But what determines what I can do research in is 
very much controlled by what I can apply and get funding for’ (regional, 
researcher, natural sciences). Managers, on the other hand, experience 
very little authority over the research being conducted in their units. Even 
though they formally have the final authority over the applications being 
sent out, the actual authority is confined to budgetary concerns linked to 
the research. The general perception is that the competition over external 
funding has only increased in time.
Danish researchers experience a large amount of freedom in choosing 
the content of their research.4 Most researchers do not experience pressure 
from managers to change the content of their research. As one researcher 
puts it, here, commenting on a general lack of academic influence, 
‘However, it is not that I think our research freedom is suffering. There 
are no one at the rector or dean level who interferes with which research 
projects we propose or write or anything’ (regional, researcher, social sci-
ences). Managers confirm that they are not directly able to affect content 
by instructing researchers on the conduct of research, and some state that 
this is by no means desirable. They see recruiting new staff as the main way 
to exercise authority over the content and direction of research. Although 
in some cases there are procedures for the internal evaluation of applica-
tions, this is more seen as supporting the creation of good applications, 
and no one has experienced a situation where managers would reject an 
application on the grounds of the content (or even quality). However, 
funders do exercise indirect authority over the content of research. Because 
of the pressure to obtain funding, some researchers try to align their con-
tent with the wishes of funders. This is done in subtle ways, though, as one 
researcher explains that he tries to read what potential partners in minis-
tries think is interesting at the moment and then tries to make his own 
research interests fit into this agenda. This kind of influence is, however, 
the most noticeable when funding comes from private sources or public, 
non-funding agency funders (e.g., ministries, regions, municipalities, 
etc.). However, researchers are often able to target their applications to 
funders who are more suitable for their kind of research to avoid this influ-
ence. For example, one researcher mostly acquired funding from hospitals 
4 Researchers from former governmental research institutes (GRI) were not included in the 
qualitative part of the study. These researchers have research assignments more tightly con-
nected to, and often regulated by, contracts with agencies within the central administration. 
If included, we would perhaps have found other results.
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and avoided the national research councils (because it was hard to get 
funding for cross-disciplinary research), and quite oppositely, another 
researcher mostly applied to the national research councils because his 
research was more fundamental and less applied. Hence, because there is 
a range of different funding options available in the Danish system, better 
chances for funding can be obtained through some strategic thinking on 
the part of the researchers.
One of the biggest obstacles to actually doing research is time. First, 
many researchers complain about a lack of time to do research because 
they increasingly have other assignments. Writing applications for external 
funding is one of those tasks—although it differs whether researchers see 
this as a waste of time or as a part of the research process of refining their 
ideas (or recognise both). Further enhanced by these developments, it is 
generally felt that external funding is needed for actually having time to do 
research. Danish researchers do not automatically have a sabbatical semes-
ter where they are free from teaching. Hence, getting funding to be 
‘bought free’ from teaching is important. However, in one case, even 
though a researcher was ‘bought free’ from teaching, the researcher still 
had to teach anyway because of the big teaching load at the department. 
Of course, managers could, in principle, choose to give sabbaticals to their 
researchers. However, this would mean more teaching for all staff when 
they are not on sabbatical. Hence, the authority over research concerning 
time also has to do with the ministry or state authority over general fund-
ing for education.
External funding also affects who gets involved in research. Some 
funders make explicit that certain types of partners should be included in 
applications (e.g., businesses, certain public research institutions, stake-
holders, etc.). In one case, the funders themselves had so much at stake in 
the research that they wanted to have carried out that they pushed for a 
specific person to be included in the project. However, it seems that most 
researchers actually are able to set the research team and partners in their 
projects themselves. Managers typically do not have any authority over 
who gets to apply. However, in cases where a foundation intends to invest 
heavily in a university, for instance, by granting large donations or donat-
ing or cofunding new buildings, the top management is very important, 
even though the investment is in a specific faculty. Hence, the authority of 
managers seems to be somewhat related to the size and scope of the exter-
nal funding that enters the university.
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Both researchers and managers experience pressure to get funding. 
This means that on the part of the managers, most are willing to accept all 
types of funding. This includes what one manager calls ‘money from hell’ 
(regional, manager), which is funding with no overhead, high cofunding, 
and a lot of paperwork. These are problematic and diminish the authority 
of managers because they bind core funding to the (under)funded proj-
ects. Researchers, likewise, experience pressure from managers to get 
funding. Even if a researcher would accept researching only in his or her 
spare time (when not teaching), without any external funding, this can be 
very hard because there is an implicit expectation from management that 
the researcher should acquire external funding (or at least try to). One 
interviewee explained how this pressure to secure external funding was 
also linked to the merit system. In this case, it was made clear that the 
researcher needed to obtain more funding from prestigious sources, such 
as the national research councils, to advance to the full professor level.
A problem specific to the natural science faculties and departments is 
that there is less laboratory assistance available. This is a development that 
has happened because of increasing external funding. It is now expected 
that a researcher gets the laboratory assistance needed through external 
funding. Hence, researchers in the hard sciences almost cannot do research 
without external funding. However, this goes for all units and universities: 
it is hard to get internal funding for any activities, and external funding 
often is important to fund hosting conferences, going on field work, going 
to international conferences, and so forth.
Finland
The increasing importance of external funding plays a significant role in 
the ways researchers and managers perceive their authority over research. 
Acquiring competitive external funding is strongly emphasised in the 
Finnish higher education system in general, especially regarding research 
activities. There is a strong consensus across disciplines and universities 
that researchers’ authority over research has steadily decreased. This devel-
opment is linked to the rise of external funding, as well as  performance- based 
funding and result-oriented management. The enhanced focus on requir-
ing external funding, which has been pushed by internal performance 
management, is seen to be problematic when research work is valued first 
and foremost through the economic output, reflecting an attitude of ‘If 
you cannot eat it tomorrow, it is not worth doing’ (flagship, researcher, 
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natural sciences). For researchers, this represents a move from science 
being in the centre of the university to being moved into a periphery posi-
tion. Strategic thinking has become an irremovable part of academic 
work, and when planning a research project, researchers must now weigh 
the risks and consider the possibilities for publication and meeting perfor-
mance requirements more strategically than before.
For the discussion on Finland, we will begin by focusing on the author-
ity of researchers and managers over the content of the research. Academic 
staff see the acquisition of external competitive funding as a way to simul-
taneously secure and risk their freedom: freedom from the management 
decisions of the university because their work is secured by their external 
funding, yet a risk to freedom through potentially steered funding. 
Regarding the latter, the Finnish informants agree that funders have taken 
a more active role and are increasingly opening thematically focused calls 
or setting parameters for research areas through participatory processes. 
Rather than allocating fairly open funding, they now steer the funding 
more specifically to particular (often societally relevant) fields, for exam-
ple, around the so-called wicked problems, such as climate change or the 
ageing society. Through these actions, funders are seen by the academic 
staff to knowingly limit researchers’ authority over research and the space 
for scientific curiosity. A researcher explains how this is experienced: 
‘Although we, in principle, have freedom of research and you can choose 
your areas, the preconditions of today’s world define what is wise to do 
and what is not’ (regional, researcher, natural sciences). This develop-
ment, as well as the more general push from managers to be more strategic 
thinking, as described above, is drawing the attention of researchers away 
from the content of research and towards the production of knowledge 
itself. When requiring external funding becomes an important goal in and 
of itself, the content of the research is one of the parameters where one can 
choose to compromise. Yet in general, most Finnish informants agree that 
a strategic touch is a positive and built-in mechanism in research because 
it increases quality: ‘In research it is automatically so that we don’t get the 
grants to fund research projects if the research is not of high quality and 
published in good international journals. It’s a built-in mechanism in our 
type of research’ (flagship, researcher, natural sciences). Hence, although 
the increasing push to acquire external funding and the need to think 
more strategically to some extent limit the authority of researchers over 
their research, it is also seen as an important quality assurance mechanism. 
Managers have very little direct authority over the content of the research. 
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However, like in the Danish case, their authority is indirect—carried out 
through the process of hiring researchers that they think match their stra-
tegic priorities.
Second, we will now turn to the authority over time. The increasing 
role of external funding is reflected in the time span that academics have 
for their work. There is a trend towards results being wanted quicker, lead-
ing to academics having to find new ways of working, as seen in the fol-
lowing quote: ‘Applied research is emphasised strongly and research has 
become much more short-sighted. You need to get results at a faster pace. 
We should be given some time to think a little’ (regional, researcher, social 
sciences). Time has also been coupled with an increase in workloads 
because researchers are required to allocate more time to the writing of 
funding proposals. Although being frustrated by the situation, the Finnish 
informants also see the development as positive, in that it pushes academic 
professionals to be more strategic in their planning. Drafting competitive 
proposals for the much-wanted European Research Council funds, for 
example, is not only time-consuming but also highly demanding. It 
requires the goal-oriented tapping of their scientific creativity and, in prac-
tice, more cooperation with colleagues that can provide valuable input and 
support. In other words, as the role of external funding has risen, so has a 
new form of collegiality that can balance competition with support.
Third, we now turn to the authority over research concerning people. 
Managers have, as in the other cases in Nordic countries, very little author-
ity over who gets involved in the specific projects that researchers bring in 
through external funding. However, the rising role of external funding 
affects recruitment practices in another way. Instead of having authority 
over the people involved in specific research projects, managers exercise 
authority over the kinds of external funding that are being applied for by 
hiring faculty staff they believe will get external funding in areas that the 
managers prioritise. External funding is viewed as an instrument for get-
ting the necessary resources for doing societally significant and scientifi-
cally interesting research, as one manager states, ‘In many units recruiting 
is directed so that we can get certain kinds of personnel, we can’t have 
researchers all from the same field, there needs to be diversity’ (regional, 
manager, social sciences). A diverse academic staff within reasonably 
focused research fields strengthens the chances of building strong institu-
tional research profiles and research consortia that are able to acquire 
competitive funding.
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Norway
The growing governmental pressures for increasing externally funded 
research in Norway over the last decade have brought about important 
changes in the authority over research for different actors. In the 
Norwegian higher education system, acquiring external funding has 
become highly relevant, giving this issue very high legitimacy. This rein-
forces the tendencies described below, increasing the efforts by researchers 
to obtain external funding and giving successful universities an enhanced 
reputation.
First, we will focus on the authority of managers and academics over 
the content of the research. External funders have demands for the 
research they are funding: ‘You must do something that people are inter-
ested in. And you have to do a good research job’ (flagship, researcher, 
natural sciences). However, there seems to be a low degree of direct 
attempts from external actors to influence the research content: ‘… and 
the external actors with whom we cooperate, they have been very profes-
sional to understand that they can’t interfere in the research processes’ 
(regional, manager).
The relationship between university strategies and authority over 
research concerning content is a quite complicated one. The informants in 
the Norwegian study quite consistently report that the university and fac-
ulty strategies in recent years have become more specific and operation-
alised, indicating that managers might exercise authority over research 
through these strategies. Although the strategies are still characterised by 
compromises and rhetoric, to a great extent, they emphasise renewed stra-
tegic effort to: (a) give direction to the entire institutions; (b) encourage 
the faculties and departments to collaborate and facilitate more interna-
tionalisation; and (c) establish CoEs and similar units, which can be seen 
as ‘soft’ attempts at steering research. However, within these frames, there 
are substantial possibilities for initiatives and interpretations at the faculty, 
department, research group, and down to the individual researcher level: 
‘The five strategic fields are considerably wide, so you should be quite 
unfortunate if you are not included…. But strategies are always used when 
we argue for priorities’ (regional, manager). There are also examples of 
initiatives that have materialised without being mentioned in the formal 
strategies: ‘Our first project within the (mentioning the specific area of 
commitment) at the university, for example, was in (mentioning the disci-
pline) which was not according to the university’s strategy’ (flagship, 
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researcher, natural sciences). Such phenomena are, among other things, 
because of external funding opportunities that in turn may enable 
enhanced competence, for example, through the recruitment of 
new scholars.
We will now touch upon how external funding affects managers’ and 
academics’ authority over time to do research. Time is the most crucial 
resource in higher education institutions; the demands for scholars’ time 
are manifold. The pressure towards and within higher education institu-
tions to emphasise external funding both increases and changes these 
demands. For one thing, a substantial part of scholars’ and managers’ 
available time is allocated to write research project applications. When 
these applications are successful, researchers are expected to conduct this 
research in addition to their other tasks. In other cases, funding may 
enable scholars to reduce their teaching load—they are ‘bought free’. 
Because the outcome of the application processes is a crucial factor and is 
decided upon by actors external to the seeking institutions, the allocation 
of time is, to a substantial degree, beyond the managers’ control, meaning 
that successful scholars prosper while the situation of others is more chal-
lenging. This trend might reinforce a tendency found in some universities 
where a sharper divide between academics who only teach and academics 
who only do research is found (Geschwind and Broström 2015). 
Therefore, the increasing amount of external funding for research seems 
to increase the authority over research regarding time for academics who 
are successful in attracting external project funding for research. However, 
in contrast to the situation in the other Nordic countries, many Norwegian 
researchers are granted sabbaticals on a periodic basis (although this prac-
tice varies between universities and even the units within them). Although 
the granting of these sabbaticals might depend on one’s performance in 
scientific publishing, thereby indirectly being affected by the ability to 
attract external funding, sabbaticals will supply researchers with more con-
centrated time for research.
Finally, we now turn to the authority over research concerning the peo-
ple involved in the research. Because of different opportunities and tradi-
tions between the academic disciplines, a lack of competence, too 
fragmented research foci, and other factors, there are substantial variations 
in external funding between faculties, departments, research groups, and 
individual scholars. These variations generate interesting intraorganisa-
tional processes. The researcher informants in the Norwegian study who 
have succeeded in raising external funding report a high degree of congru-
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ence between the university and unit strategies and their own academic 
work. Rather than complaining about the recent developments in the uni-
versity’s managerial systems, these informants seem to take advantage of 
these processes, especially that they facilitate external funding for them. 
Thus, these processes are perceived more as possibilities for the scholars 
and less as threats to the researchers’ authority over research. Neither do 
the informants in our study who do not benefit from substantial external 
funding seem to make any serious complaints or protests about the devel-
opments in the university managerial systems. They do considerable 
research within the limits of governmental funding, and they report some 
degree of resignation and rely on universities as loosely coupled entities 
and the subsequent freedom that follows: ‘There is a low degree of leader-
ship. If one withdraws, one is to a high degree able to micromanage one’s 
own working day’ (flagship, researcher, social sciences). However, these 
differences point to external funding as a differentiating mechanism that 
privileges some groups of researchers over others.
The organisational effects of external funding concerning the people 
involved in the research thus seem to be subtler, such as when researchers 
become less dependent on the basic budget and, importantly, even more 
dependent than before on collaborating with scholars at domestic and 
international institutions. Managers may be somewhat marginalised in this 
system of increasing external funding. According to the Norwegian inter-
views, however, managers do not necessarily perceive these developments 
as challenging; managers, instead, tend to overemphasise the impact of 
their managerial roles in other areas and focus on the importance of stra-
tegic plans. Additionally, managers may be important facilitators of exter-
nal funding and may participate in external projects. Following also the 
strategies of Norwegian universities, CoEs have been established as semi-
autonomous organisational entities that rely heavily on external funding. 
Although this is often a strategic ambition that managers have decided to 
pursue themselves, CoEs paradoxically also represent a challenge for the 
established university managerial systems, which have very limited author-
ity over whom and in which areas these are established. Hence, external 
funding seems to reinforce existing patterns among and within higher 
education institutions; high-performing institutions, centres, and research-
ers become even more able to provide external funding, while others may 
fall behind, pointing to the Mathew effect commonly found in the sci-
ences (Kwiek 2016).
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Sweden
A clear result from the Swedish interviews is that funding is the most 
important factor when it comes to authority over research. Funding is 
essential in enabling any research, and because external actors are allocat-
ing a larger share of the resources for research, they are also gaining more 
authority over research.
We will begin by focusing on the authority of researchers and managers 
over the content of the research. The most salient way in which influence 
is exerted over the research process is that researchers adapt to the condi-
tions set by the funders. At times, this may not amount to more than 
changing the rhetorical framing of the proposed research, which in fact 
might be seen as a defence strategy known as ‘window dressing’ (Laudel 
2006), but in other instances, it includes major adjustments and compro-
mises to secure funding. One example is a professor at the technical faculty 
saying that ‘you have to try to adapt to whatever is popular to fund at a 
specific time’ (flagship, researcher, engineering science). More severe 
influences may, for instance, be noted in collaborative research projects, 
where the goal of companies to develop a product takes precedence over 
the researchers’ desire to produce and disseminate new knowledge. It is 
also clear how funders may influence research at an institutional level 
above the individual researcher. Examples primarily include large infra-
structural investments that may allow the university to develop their 
research substantially within particular areas. An example is provided by a 
research office manager who recalls how a large sum of money was donated 
to the university for the construction of a house dedicated to design stud-
ies. The manager says, ‘Of course, you get large effects, since you invest a 
lot in areas where someone has allocated some hundred million’ (flagship, 
administrator).
Generally, however, there is agreement that the integrity of researchers 
is quite robust and has not yet been severely challenged by the increase in 
external funding. Although academics may voice a desire for more author-
ity over research, they also express confidence in their own, as well as their 
colleagues’, ability to maintain their integrity in relation to external actors. 
A social scientist says, ‘You know where to draw the limit, how to dispose 
your time, and you very often keep in mind what really is important’ (flag-
ship, researcher, social sciences). Several informants also emphasise the 
institutional safeguards against the risk of being co-opted by external 
interests. Because a main incentive for academics is to acquire academic 
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qualifications, it is fundamental to pose scientifically interesting questions 
and publish the results. According to a top manager, it is therefore ‘some-
what suicidal’ (flagship, manager) to enter too many projects that do not 
award academic merits, and the system is thus ‘to a large extent self- 
regulating’ (flagship, manager). As a further precaution, this manager 
states that the university has established support structures to ensure that 
collaboration agreements with external actors are reviewed by lawyers to 
guarantee the freedom of the researchers to publish their findings. A trend 
among funders is also the increasing focus on societal expectations, needs, 
and impact. To some extent, this is appreciated by academics and manag-
ers alike in Swedish universities. As expressed by a sociologist, ‘If sociology 
does not matter for society, what then is the point of sociology?’ (flagship, 
manager, social sciences).
We now turn to the authority of managers and researchers over time to 
do research. Researchers point out that fewer applications are granted 
funding today and that ‘we have to write more applications now’ (flagship, 
researcher, engineering science). Low success rates and general pressure to 
obtain external funding have thus led to a situation where the process of 
applying for external funding is more time-consuming than ever before. 
These new obligations come on top of the other tasks a researcher has, 
putting pressure on the time to actually do research: ‘You feel as an indi-
vidual researcher that there is a need to have control over all this [calls for 
external funding] and at the same time do your research, that is tough’ 
(flagship, manager, engineering science). To alleviate some of this pres-
sure, and as a response to the general pressure that managers also experi-
ence when it comes to boosting external funding, a strategic priority of 
universities today is to support researchers in their attempt to acquire 
external funding. Currently, most universities have a research office that 
aids in identifying potential funders and in writing applications. At the 
subinstitutional level, initiatives are also taken to support researchers to 
acquire funding, as reported by a head of department: ‘At the faculty, we 
have calls, for instance for writing support, article support or application 
support’ (regional, manager, social sciences). These efforts also tie into 
managing the general insecurity that the increasing share of external 
 funding has created. A top manager notes, ‘If large projects end for our 
researchers, and they cannot find new funding, we have a problem’ 
(regional, manager). Fluctuations in revenues from external actors must 
be balanced by internal funding to maintain the workforce. When a uni-
versity increases its research activity and when a larger share of this activity 
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is funded by external resources, the risk also increases for the organisation 
because, to a large extent, this funding is temporary. Working actively to 
support researchers in their pursuit of external funding is an attempt to 
manage this risk.
Finally, we now turn to the authority of managers and researchers over 
the people involved in research. As the share of external funding has 
increased, managers at various levels note that they now have little influ-
ence over the people employed to do research at universities, faculties, and 
departments. Deciding on projects to fund, and thereby people to pro-
mote, is very much in the hands of funders. This also affects the ability of 
universities to promote quality in research and, in particular, to support 
up-and-coming researchers, as noted by a top manager. Although success-
ful researchers are rewarded through the acquisition of external funding, 
researchers with great but yet unrealised potential are often in need of 
financial support. With scarce resources, however, this is difficult for uni-
versities to provide. A final example of how external funding affects the 
people involved in research is tied more directly to how external funders 
make concrete demands. A research office manager notes that all external 
funders demand an impact strategy to make sure that the researchers con-
sider the societal implications of their work. However, some funders do 
also require active participation from industry and stakeholders, as exem-
plified in the following quote: ‘And of course, that is a huge opportunity 
to influence the project. And that obviously also affects our research pro-
file’ (regional, administrator).
Another trend that reinforces the managers’ lack of authority over 
research, one that cuts across the themes of content, time, and people, is the 
increasing demands from external funders for cofunding. Because cofund-
ing is required, many internal resources become tied up in research proj-
ects, which effectively diminishes the ability of departments to make their 
own prioritisations. A head of department notes that cofunding deprives 
researchers of a base resource for research, and a dean points out how this 
trend undermines the faculty’s performance-based resource allocation 
model (the more cofunding given, the less funding is available to distrib-
ute according to the chosen model). Others do, however, state that the 
less money available to the university management, the more they need to 
prioritise: ‘It forces us to take a strategic stand’ (flagship, manager).
A notable difference in the experiences of managers and academics is 
that the managers see the consequences of external funding from a broader 
perspective. Although academics may express a need to frame their research 
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proposals to fit the desires of the funders, managers also reflect on how 
this affects their authority over research in terms of the ability to prioritise, 
maintain a healthy working environment, and enhance the quality of the 
research conducted.
coMpArIson And dIscussIon
The analysis of the influence of external funding on authority over research 
reveals both many similarities and some differences across the studied 
countries. However, we should be careful when trying to explain these 
similarities and (especially) differences by the overall policy development 
concerning external funding. As the country analyses have also shown—
and which is an important point in its own right—many other factors 
interfere with how external funding affects the authority of different actors 
over research, including, for instance, how much de facto authority man-
agers generally have, how many time constraints there are that can limit 
research, how Performance-based Research Funding Systems (PRFSs) 
affect some of the same issues, how important universities strategies are, 
and so forth. Therefore, how external funding affects authority over 
research is an intricate matter to analyse. In this section, we will compara-
tively discuss the country cases and survey data analysed in the previ-
ous sections.
One of the broad conclusions we can draw when comparing the coun-
try cases is that external funding has become increasingly important for 
conducting research and has changed the authority of different actors over 
research. Applying for external funding has become an indispensable part 
of academic life. The pressure to acquire funding and the competition to 
obtain these funding sources have increased according to the experiences 
of both managers and academics. The Finnish, Danish, and Swedish data 
especially indicate that it is increasingly hard to do research without exter-
nal funding. Researchers need funding to do what is required of research 
today, where international cooperation is a necessity, where there is less 
internal funding for laboratory assistance, and where funding is often nec-
essary to go abroad—on field work or to conferences. But managers also 
need funding to ‘keep the shop running’ and experience a huge pressure 
to increase revenue through external funding. In fact, it seems that obtain-
ing external funding has become a goal in and of itself for some managers; 
thus, a budget-maximisation logic seems to have become prevalent. Hence, 
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external funding has become an important general condition for the man-
agement and conduct of research.
In the following, we focus on the authority over research for the two 
analysed groups: managers and researchers. We begin by focusing on the 
researchers. When taking a first look at the qualitative data, these seem to, 
in some ways, mirror the somewhat contradictory findings in the survey. 
When asked directly, researchers generally stress that they have quite large 
freedom when it comes to research. As the Swedish case shows, the integ-
rity of researchers has not been broken. The same goes for the Norwegian 
and Danish cases (while the Finnish case stresses the decline of academic 
freedom to some extent although this is more related to the importance of 
the strategic priorities of managers). However, when researchers elaborate 
on the way external funding affects the conditions for research, nuances 
appear. We find that both the content of the research, the time to do 
research, and the people involved in doing the research are affected by the 
increasing amount of external funding.
Regarding content, the Danish, Finnish, and Swedish cases especially 
show that, at times, researchers adjust the content of their research to 
meet the demands of funders or to improve their chances of getting 
funded. Typically, this is done when researchers try to guess what is popu-
lar to fund. The Finnish interviews stressed that researchers are learning 
‘what is wise to do and what is not’. In some cases, university strategies 
contribute to this effect by pointing out areas where there is more support 
available. This is especially salient in the Finnish case. Also, the general 
pressure from managers to obtain external funding further pushes the 
need to bend to the wishes of external funders.
Regarding time, external funding is increasingly necessary simply to 
have the time to conduct research. In addition, sometimes, as in the 
Danish case, there are still time pressures even after a researcher has been 
‘bought free’ in a project. Both the Danish and Swedish cases show how 
writing applications for external funding are sometimes viewed as a waste 
of time, preventing researchers from actually doing research. However, 
some also view this process as an integrated part of the scientific process. 
The Finnish interviewees especially stressed that time frames have short-
ened because of external funding and demands for quick results in proj-
ects with short deadlines. Management clearly contributes to this 
process. This calls for more strategic behaviour from researchers. In 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, external funding is usually necessary to 
have the concentrated time required to do research, while at least a 
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proportion of the Norwegian researchers have better opportunities 
because of regular research sabbaticals that are not directly dependent 
on external funding. Although the time to do research is probably to a 
large extent equal between the scientific disciplines, the actual possibility 
to do research might depend even more on project funding in the natu-
ral sciences because researchers in this field usually depend more on 
external funding to carry out research (with experiments requiring labo-
ratory assistance, expensive equipment, etc.).
Regarding people, the rise of external funding has generally made coop-
eration between researchers necessary. Most national funders demand 
cooperation in the project funding they offer. To obtain international 
funding, as from the EU frame programme HORIZON 2020, interna-
tional cooperation is often mandatory. However, as the Finnish and 
Norwegian cases show, this is seen as a natural development in line with 
how academic norms have developed. However, sometimes, funders are 
more specific about the partners that will be involved in research projects, 
as the Swedish and Danish cases illustrate, which limits the authority over 
research in terms of project partners.
It is important to note that the ways external funding affects the author-
ity over research for researchers are more systemic than episodic in nature. 
Instead of episodic power, for instance, which would be in the form of 
direct instruction from managers, the increasing amount of external fund-
ing sets up incentives that direct action in more subtle ways through sys-
temic power. A global script pushing for more competition, more industry 
cooperation to support innovation, demands for societal impact, and so 
forth has materialised in new funding schemes and in increased competi-
tive funding. The systemic nature of the power exercised by research 
funders might be one of the explanations for why the survey reveals rela-
tively high research autonomy and why, when asked directly, researchers 
report great freedom in research: systemic power works in ways that, to a 
lesser extent, are felt like intrusions into one’s agency. Hence, the depth of 
the qualitative interviews helps uncover the nuances in this authority 
over research.
However, researchers are not defenceless against these systemic powers. 
Across the cases, one can identify a range of ‘defence mechanisms’: first, 
the academic value of integrity is a systemic power that prevents total 
 surrender to the incentives of funding opportunities. Researchers ‘know 
where to draw the limit’, as expressed by a Swedish interviewee. It seems 
that some of the traditional academic values, as made explicit by Robert 
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Merton (1973), are still very much alive. Second, a strategy is to only 
apply to funders and funding programmes that fit the research agenda of 
the researcher. Although most clearly expressed in the Danish case, this 
strategy is likely an option in all the Nordic countries because the funding 
opportunities are diverse, as the national descriptions of the funding sys-
tems have shown. This seems to offer some support for the conclusion 
found in an article by Richard Whitley and Jochen Gläser (2014), where 
they hypothesised that high funding flexibility (i.e., diversity in funding 
opportunities) would lead to more protected space for researchers to con-
duct research. Third, the Swedish results point to the rhetorical framing of 
projects, also known as ‘window dressing’ (Laudel 2006), as a possible 
defence mechanism. Fourth, as highlighted by the Swedish results, there 
are also institutional safeguards against being co-opted by external inter-
ests in the form of legal advice on collaboration agreements. Hence, safe-
guarding against external interests is not just a matter for individual 
researchers but also is sometimes supported by managers.
Looking at the qualitative data, in Finland, the authority over research 
for researchers seems mostly restricted by the development in external 
funding, with a little less in Denmark and Sweden, and the least so in 
Norway. However, it is hard to assess the differences precisely. Although 
the survey results point only to small differences across countries, there are 
reasons to believe, as has been argued above, that the qualitative data are 
better suited for capturing the subtler effects of external funding on the 
authority over research. This adds to the likelihood that, in reality, there 
are more differences between countries than the survey results indicate.
We now turn to the authority of managers over research. The national 
cases mostly point to external funding as a factor that limits the authority 
of managers over research, at least if focusing on the three themes of con-
tent, time, and people. Managers cannot directly affect the content of 
research, which the Swedish, Danish, and Finnish cases emphasise. Even 
though they have the formal authority to do so, because managers have to 
approve applications for external project funding, no one seems to take 
advantage of this option (or find it appropriate). In this case, it seems that 
the professional authority of researchers, stemming from the knowledge 
and skills only they possess, offers researchers a degree of authority over 
research that limits managers in their use of formal authority. Although 
this is a structural factor, based on the basic asymmetry between managers 
and researchers in terms of knowledge, there is also an institutional and 
cultural factor. The fact that managers do not find direct intervention in 
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research appropriate might reflect that the values of academic freedom are 
also salient among managers. Instead, the authority over the content of 
research being conducted is exercised mainly through hiring tenured fac-
ulty staff. The same is the case regarding people. Managers have little 
authority over who gets involved in research projects based on external 
funding; instead, it is through hiring tenured faculty that they exert their 
influence. In terms of time, managers have a role in setting the basic con-
ditions for time to do research although the opportunities for doing so 
are heavily circumscribed by the general teaching loads in the specific 
university or unit. However, because external funding is increasingly nec-
essary to have time for research, the authority of managers in this regard 
is rather limited.
Instead of trying to affect the conduct of research through the themes 
of content, time, and people, managers generally seek another type of influ-
ence, namely, maximising and securing a steady stream of income. This 
points to the possibility mentioned in the theory section that managers 
and researchers might have different priorities concerning the aspects of 
research that they see as important to exercise authority over.
First, managers attempt to boost their research income by pressuring 
researchers to obtain funding. In most cases, this pressure is something 
researchers feel is more implicit than explicit, being an indirect but still 
unequivocal expectation. However, in the Finnish case, setting targets for 
units in terms of getting external funding is an example of more explicit 
measures to increase the pressure to obtain external funding. In this case, 
but also in the Danish case, linking the success of getting funding to the 
merit system increases this pressure. This finding might be one of the 
explanations for why researchers, as shown in the survey data, experience 
tensions between managerial priorities and academic autonomy. Second, 
managers also try to increase external funding by setting up offices for 
research support, offering support for writing funding applications and so 
forth. Although this can be seen as a strategic choice, it can also be seen as 
the only choice in a more competitive environment where there are pow-
erful isomorphic pressures (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) to do as other 
universities have done. Funding has become so important that managers 
will accept almost all kinds of funding, including funding with no over-
head and demands for cofunding. Paradoxically, this is pointed out as 
problematic, especially in the Danish and Swedish cases, because it ham-
pers the ability of managers to make strategic prioritisations and because 
internal funding is tied to these projects. The work of Mats Benner and 
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Gunnar Öquist (2012) partly explains the low level of breakthrough 
research in Sweden—which is defined as the percentage of articles within 
the world being in the top 10% most cited articles—with the high levels of 
external funding: ‘The universities’ own priorities are therefore overshad-
owed and emphasis is laid on how to obtain funding rather than which 
research priorities to select’ (11). Although we offer some credence to the 
hypothesis that external funding hampers strategic priorities of managers, 
it is out of the scope of this chapter to assess whether this could be an 
explanation for lower performance. However, it does seem as though get-
ting external funding has become so important that it has become a goal 
in and of itself. This finding is consistent with the well-known mechanism 
that certain activities become institutionalised and thereby infused with 
value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand (e.g., of 
improving the quality of research in universities) (Selznick 1957).
Another theme that cuts across the themes of content, time, and people 
is the effects of external funding being concentrated in specific units or 
specific researchers, also known as the Matthew effect (Kwiek 2016; 
Langfeldt et al. 2015), which, in turn, affects the authority over research 
for both managers and researchers. As found in the Norwegian and Finnish 
cases, this seems to reinforce existing patterns: the talented and well- 
funded researchers receive even more funding. An example in the 
Norwegian case is how CoEs give authority to local centre leaders at the 
expense of other units (which also diminishes the authority of the upper 
management, hence weakening the organisational hierarchy). A similar 
effect is also seen in the Swedish case, where large infrastructure invest-
ments in one area affect other areas. However, in this case, as in the Danish 
case of very large external funding donations, the authority of the upper 
management seems strengthened because top managers in universities 
need to be involved in these huge donations. These examples of the con-
centration of resources mean that external funding also creates distinctions 
within the groups of managers, on the one hand, and among researchers, 
on the other hand. Furthermore, there are examples of external funding 
empowering either low-level managers (mostly project funding) or top- 
level managers (large donations). As others also have found (Kwiek 2016; 
Langfeldt et al. 2015), a layer of very well-funded researchers and research 
leaders—who are less dependent on being in the fields of strategic priority 
for the university—also seems to have been developed, along with a layer 
of less well-funded researchers who live a more precarious existence. 
Furthermore, when success in funding acquisition is also connected to 
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career advancements, these divisions of ‘winners and losers’ become even 
more pronounced.
conclusIon
We will now return to our research question in which we asked how the 
increasing amount of external funding affects the authority over research 
for managers and researchers in Nordic universities.
When focusing on the managers, the first answer is that the external 
funding of research negatively affects their authority over research; they 
have very little authority over research within all three themes of content, 
time, and people. At least, though, their authority is indirect and confined 
to signalling through strategies and setting broad conditions for research 
that indirectly affect the research being carried out. Some managers, espe-
cially in Sweden, see this as problematic. However, there is another dimen-
sion to the authority over research, one where managers exert a stronger 
influence: the effort to maximise and secure a steady stream of income (a 
budget-maximisation logic). Although this could be seen as an ‘authority 
dimension’ that is two steps away from more substantial directing of 
research efforts, in terms of the strategic ambitions a manager might have 
for the type of research being conducted in his or her unit, it is seen by 
managers as an important avenue for authority over research. This view on 
what kind of ‘authority dimension’ to emphasise might also itself be a 
result of the increasing amount of external funding. When a substantial 
share of the funding available for research comes from external sources, 
managing this income becomes more important than the more substantial 
directing of research efforts.
To assess the consequences of more external funding on managerial 
authority, one also needs to consider how the counterfactual situation, in 
which more or all the resources were controlled by managers (external 
funding being converted to basic funding for universities), would look 
like. In this situation, managers would be better able to control the direc-
tion of research through hiring researchers who fit the local strategies for 
research. Therefore, in another funding reality, managers’ views on what 
dimensions of research it is important to control might be a different one. 
The question of whether or not the authority over research for managers 
has declined, as Whitley and Gläser (2014) have hypothesised, then 
depends on how this authority is defined. However, the findings do indi-
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cate—which was certainly expected—that the authority of funders has 
increased.
Whether the authority of researchers over research has declined or 
increased as a consequence of the rise of external project funding is also 
hard to make any firm conclusions about. Although they do, as the survey 
results indicate, experience quite high general authority over research, a 
range of mechanisms related to funders and managers reduce this author-
ity. Generally, funders are the most important source of influence over 
content, time, and people, and the role of managers seems mostly to be a 
pushing factor for the conditions set by the funders (by pushing for the 
acquisition of funding, for instance, by linking success to the merit sys-
tem). However, especially in Finland, managers’ influence is so forceful 
that researchers generally experience a decline in their authority over 
research. In all countries, the authority of researchers over research seems 
to vary between successful and less successful researchers. Those who are 
able to attract large grants generally hold much more authority over 
research and can create a type of local autonomy from managers. Those 
with less fortune live a more precarious existence. However, all researchers 
have at their disposal a range of ‘defence mechanisms’ that especially bal-
ances the authority of the funders.
Obviously, an important question arising from these findings is whether 
the appropriate balance between external funding and internal funding has 
been struck in each country. Regarding managers, the Danish, Finnish, 
and Norwegian results do not show the participants wishing for less exter-
nal funding. Although they have expressed the troubles emphasised above, 
most think that competitive external funding is a necessary, basic condi-
tion, and they instead focus on the authority dimension related to boost-
ing external funding, as mentioned above. In the case of researchers, most 
also do not wish for a smaller share of external funding (although the 
Danish case shows that the researchers in the natural sciences might think 
more internal funding is needed to have more lab assistance). Quite oppo-
sitely, in most cases, researchers think there is too little external funding in 
the sense that success rates, when applying for external project funding, 
are too low. That both managers and researchers do not wish for less exter-
nal funding indicates how institutionalised the current funding allocation 
system has become. Here, the systemic power of reforms over the last 
decades has been successful in convincing both managers and  researchers 
that competitive funding is a natural part of science. One explanation for 
this success could be that the competitive nature of the science system 
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(in  securing tenure and getting published) aligns well with increasing 
competitive funding. One can only speculate how another funding situa-
tion would affect the authority relations between managers and research-
ers. However, it is likely that less external funding would lead to less 
emphasis on the budget-maximisation logic, which is currently strong in 
the analysed countries—and probably also beyond.
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(Becker 2008). The contribution of this chapter, though, is to comple-
ment the other themes in the book by focusing on academic leaders in 
relation to these activities. Following the lines of New Public Management 
(NPM; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), there is now high pressure for there 
to be strategic action (Thoenig and Paradeise 2016), accountability, and 
performance in academia. With more formal autonomy, higher education 
institutions (HEIs) have become strategic actors competing for reputation 
and resources in a global market (Krücken and Meier 2006). This devel-
opment has also put more focus on academic management and leadership 
(Paradeise et al. 2009), and extensive earlier research has shown that the 
power, responsibilities, as well as expectations of leaders have increased in 
the last decades. This has been described as a ‘managerial revolution’ 
(Amaral et al. 2003) or a ‘managerial turn’ (Krücken et al. 2013).
But what do we actually mean when we talk about academic leadership? 
Much of the earlier research has focused on formal leaders and their per-
sonal traits, experiences, and qualifications: vice-chancellors (Goodall 
2009), deans, and middle managers such as heads of department (Meek 
et al. 2010). Traditionally, disciplinary-based departments were chaired by 
the leading professor (or one of the leading professors; (Pechar 2010). 
This model has now, in many HEIs, been replaced by professional manag-
ers who are not primarily in these positions based on their academic cre-
dentials but rather based on their management skills and experiences. 
There has also been a transition from the classic rotating system—where 
the members of the ‘community of scholars’ (Nybom 2007) took turns in 
office, elected by their colleagues—to organisations with line manage-
ment—where managers, from the unit level to deans and vice-chancellors, 
are appointed (Haake 2004). This has transformed how we think about 
academic leadership in a fundamental way (Degn 2018).
Furthermore, there are also a number of other positions without line 
management responsibilities but potentially have great influence on every-
day academics’ lives, including but not limited to directors of studies, pro-
gramme directors, and research leaders. Evermore structured education 
programmes with demands on coherence, progression, and constructive 
alignment have proliferated in the last decade, not least since the imple-
mentation of the Bologna Process (Witte 2006). Programme directors 
have become key individuals in this development with large responsibili-
ties for staff, students, and quality in the provided courses. On the research 
side, we have experienced a development towards bigger programmes, 
centres, platforms, and other initiatives that require leadership and 
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 management skills (Hansson and Mønsted 2008). In both education and 
research, external stakeholders also play important roles whilst holding 
universities accountable for their actions (Benneworth and Jongbloed 
2010). Last but not least, new professional support staff have been hired 
in order to tackle all the demands of and opportunities from the university 
management and from external stakeholders (Karlsson and Ryttberg 
2016). This complexity in terms of responsibilities, reporting, account-
ability, power relations, and line management has become part and parcel 
of academic life. These complexities seem to have been strengthened in 
many countries due to NPM, and with many other leadership roles that 
have emerged as well. In the PERFACAD project, all these leadership 
roles have been discussed and recognised.
In this chapter, we study to what extent higher education reforms over 
the last decades have changed academic leadership. The following main 
research question is asked: how can the roles of academic leaders be under-
stood in the light of recent reforms? Our analysis is based on classic aspects 
of management and leadership, all reflected in the themes of the rest of the 
volume: notions of power and responsibilities, strategy formulation and 
follow-ups, and the evaluation and assessment of performance. Before 
turning to our findings, we discuss our key concepts.
AcAdemIc LeAders Between ProfessIonALIsm 
And mAnAgerIALIsm
The dominant critique paving the way for NPM reforms stressed the idea 
that equity, freedom of choice, and the ability to prioritise in the interest 
of society instead of one’s own individual interests, to produce expected 
results and to accept external control, were not met through professional 
bureaucracies in universities (Carvalho and Santiago 2016). Following 
this criticism, the assumption was that collegial and professional bureau-
cratic structures should be replaced by new types of decision-making 
structures to make public organisations more flexible. By altering these 
sectors through reforms, universities were expected to become ‘complete’ 
organisations through decentralisation, delegated autonomy, and the uni-
fication of structures and decision-making channels (Krücken and Meier 
2006). Consequently, one core aspect of NPM is managerialism, or ‘new’ 
managerialism (Deem and Brehony 2005), emphasising the management 
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of public sector organisations through rational structures, standardised 
procedures, and clearly defined responsibility and accountability.
Earlier research has shown how practices from the private sector have 
challenged and transformed the public sector (Flynn 2002). In studies of 
the higher education sector, this development has been contrasted with 
professional, collegial ideas of leadership (Deem 1998). Lately, a growing 
discussion on ‘leaderism’ has developed, described by O’Reilly and Reed 
(2010, 960) as ‘the belief that many core aspects of social life can and 
should be co-ordinated by one or more individuals who give direction 
and/or purpose to social activity conducted by themselves and others’. 
There are indeed differences between managerialism and leadership related 
to the concepts of ‘management’ and ‘leadership’, respectively, where the 
latter is more positively connoted, but it is common for these NPM-related 
trends to place an increased emphasis on individuals in management posi-
tions. This has also fuelled critical management studies, questioning ideas 
of a ‘strong leader’ with masculine features (Alvesson and Spicer 2012). 
A recent example of this research is an article by Ekman and colleagues 
who have shown how managerialism and leaderism discourses have played 
out in Swedish state inquiries on higher education. The state committees 
have continuously questioned the current status of academic leadership, 
and there are frequent calls for stronger leadership and more managerial 
power in a deregulated higher education sector (Ekman et al. 2017).
A way to explore the different connotations of academic leadership is to 
apply the approach of institutional logics with a focus on the symbols and 
practices that guide actions in organisations (Thornton et al. 2012). Such 
practices and symbols are institutionalised and taken for granted. Different 
logics can work side by side in an organisation and bind the work of dif-
ferent professionals together, yet logics are often conflicting and competi-
tive (Greenwood et al. 2011). The traditional logic in the university sector 
has been professional logic based on collegiality. Professional logic is 
rooted in the platform of knowledge acquired from education and train-
ing in the actual profession or academia (Abbott 1988). The work of pro-
fessionals relies on discretion, trust, autonomy, and collegiality, and 
decision-making is consensus-oriented, collegial, and bottom-up. The cri-
teria of selection are based on professional skills, and the best amongst 
peers are selected (Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). Different types 
of professionals advocate distinct ideas on how to practice management 
(Abbott 1988; Freidson 1994). There is a strong focus on preserving the 
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interests of the profession that cohere with the priorities, identities, and 
values of the professional group.
As a means to change the perceived ineffectiveness of this professional 
logic, ‘managerialism’, inspired by market logic, was introduced by NPM- 
inspired reforms, and the idea was to strengthen the managerial role. 
A role is viewed as an external attribute and is linked to social positions 
within the social structure, and there is an expectation that the role will 
influence the identity of the academics. The identity is viewed as internal, 
consisting of ‘internalized meanings and expectations associated with a 
role’ (Stryker and Burke 2000, 289). The strengthening of the managerial 
role is done by altering managerial structures and by introducing new 
institutional logics with more focus on efficiency, budgetary discipline, 
and cost reduction. Following this, there is more attention on the man-
agement of resources and performance, and therefore different types of 
controlling systems as assessment, metrics, and management by objectives 
have been introduced (Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Flynn 2002).
In this new role, there is an emphasis on the division of labour and 
hierarchical relations (Rost 1993). Rational planning and the distribution 
of tasks from the leader to the follower are seen as crucial processes 
(O’Reilly and Reed 2010, 2012). The manager is loyal to the organisa-
tional objectives and has to be able to develop new strategies accordingly 
as well as adapt to changes in the environment. Managerialism is system- 
oriented in the sense that the managers try to influence the followers by 
formalised controlling systems (Ladegård and Vabo 2010). Decision- 
making is top-down with an emphasis on hierarchy and line management. 
Managers show loyalty and identify with the organisation. Increased 
accountability is one of the solutions to achieve improvements (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) along with a strengthen-
ing of the managerial role. Technologies, such as metrics and assessments, 
that discipline the behaviour of actors, are also a means to direct the 
organisational attention and focus (Cantwell and Taylor 2013). This could 
be done by translating the institutional strategy into a set of goals 
reflected in performance measures that make success (but also failure) 
more concrete for everyone (Melnyk et al. 2004). In this way of man-
aging, the aim is to shift focus from input and bureaucratic rules and 
procedures to the output through goal-setting and the use of performance 
information (Hvidman and Andersen 2013; Christensen et  al. 2007). 
Performance- based funding is believed to incentivise institutions (and 
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individuals) to improve or maintain their level of performance in exchange 
for higher revenue (Dougherty and Reddy 2011).
Based on the discussion earlier, we analyse cases in relation to how 
perceptions of the managerial logics co-exist with, complement, or 
come into conflict with the professional logic. The consequences of 
 university reforms, made with the aim to make universities in these four 
countries more ‘manageable’ or ‘well managed’, will then hopefully 
come to the fore.
method
The chapter is primarily based on qualitative data in the form of semi- 
structured interviews and quantitative survey data from Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden (a more detailed description of the methodology 
and data is found in Chap. 1). The interviews and the survey included the 
following themes:
• Goal specificity and the degree of autonomy
• Decision-making and strategy
• Control and evaluation
• Support structures
• External stakeholders
• Trust/accountability
• Incentives/recognition (career, HR, dialogue, etc.)
These broad themes were addressed in all interviews (total number 93) 
with academic staff, administrators, and managers. The themes were also 
useful concepts for analysing the data using the NVivo software. The 
interviews included at the top level, senior leaders from central university 
management; from the mid-level, deans, or their equivalent; and lastly, at 
the academic level, units, departments, groups, or programmes. The 
interviews were undertaken at two universities in the respective countries, 
one of which is referred to as the ‘flagship university’ and the other as the 
‘regional university’.
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the roLe of mAnAgers: decIsIon-mAkIng, Power, 
And PerformAnce
National Reforms and Systems
We start with a short description of the current systems and regulations in 
the four respective countries. In Denmark, the reform introduced in 2003 
led to dramatic changes. Following earlier attempts at strengthening the 
management at universities, the government finally gained support for 
radical changes that effectively abolished the collegial governance model. 
The aim was to make universities more competitive, among other things, 
by strengthening the power of managers at various levels. The reform had 
two key elements: the first was the establishment of a board of directors 
with an external majority and where the chairman also had to be from 
outside the universities. The second was replacing the former elected 
managers with appointed ones. This introduced a line management 
model, where the board hired the vice chancellor, the vice chancellor 
hired the deans, and the deans hired the head of departments (Degn and 
Sørensen 2015).
In the early 2000s, there was an increased autonomy implemented in 
Finland by the performance agreements between the universities and the 
Ministry of Education. These agreements also emphasised efficiency, 
effectiveness, and performance management. By 2006, university-steering 
reforms were implemented with defined performance-management sys-
tems using data from national university databases and financial state-
ments. These steering instruments increased the need for internal university 
performance management. The Finnish universities of the 2010s have a 
strong administrative and financial autonomy. The level of institutional 
autonomy has become more complicated with more focus on external 
funding, institutional profiling, and less collegiality in university gover-
nance. This has strengthened the role of line managers in performance- 
management issues. At the same time, lower-level leader roles maintain 
strong in setting academic priorities (Aarrevaara et al. 2011). However, 
their role in these universities is not strong in performance management, 
as academic units, such as research groups and educational programmes, 
are not performance units. This role is reserved for appointed middle 
managers at the faculty level.
A central reform regarding the governance of the Norwegian higher 
education sector was introduced in 2003 (St meld nr 27 2000–2001). The 
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aim of this reform was to increase university autonomy (Stensaker 2014) 
but also to increase the capacity to react to external changes by centralis-
ing and speeding up decision-making (Torjesen et al. 2017). As for leader-
ship, the universities were allowed full autonomy in how to organise and 
govern at the level below the rector/board, and two leadership models 
could be chosen (Stensaker 2014). The ‘standard model’, with a vice- 
chancellor elected by the staff, could continue, but now it would be sup-
plemented by an appointed director responsible for administrative matters 
in a dual leadership model (Gornitzka and Larsen 2004). In this model, 
the vice-chancellor was the chair of the board. A model referred to as the 
unitary leadership model (Berg and Pinheiro 2016) was also offered as an 
alternative model (this was preferred by the government). In this model, 
the vice-chancellor was appointed by the board for a certain period and 
had the full responsibility for both academic and administrative matters, 
and the law did not demand an administrative director in this model. The 
appointed vice-chancellor could not be the chair of the board, but an 
external member of the board would be appointed by the Ministry of 
Education for that role. The board would consist of 11 members: four 
elected by academic staff, one elected by administrative staff, two elected 
by students, and the remaining four appointed by the Ministry of 
Education. The autonomy in choice of leadership structures has resulted 
in a hybrid system within many institutions, as there might be both 
elected and appointed leaders—still most vice-chancellors are elected 
(Stensaker 2014).
An important reform in Swedish higher education is the so-called 
Freedom Reform from 1993, which increased the formal autonomy of 
HEIs in a fundamental way. A new funding system was introduced based 
on the admission of students (input) and graduation (output), and univer-
sity managers were also made more autonomous in issues regarding the 
hiring of academic staff and which programmes to provide. The increased 
freedom for HEIs was accompanied by a national evaluation system devel-
oped during the 1990s. Strong academic leadership was requested, and 
the ultimate role of the vice-chancellor as the institutional leader was 
emphasised. The government strengthened academic individual leader-
ship by explicitly pointing to the vice-chancellor as the institutional leader, 
and, without directly arguing against the traditional collegiate model, the 
government expected a more corporate management-like style of internal 
governance (Askling et al. 1999). The idea with external stakeholders in 
the university boards has a long history in Sweden, emanating from the 
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great higher education reform in 1977. In 1997, it was decided that there 
should be an external person acting as chair rather than vice-chancellor 
(Benner and Geschwind 2016).
The next reform affecting leadership and management specifically was 
the so-called Autonomy Reform introduced in 2011. One of the main 
novelties introduced was the increased freedom to create academic posi-
tions and career tracks, apart from senior lecturer and professors, whose 
positions remained centrally regulated. Also, the governance and steering 
regulations changed. Collegial bodies like the faculty board were deregu-
lated and made non-mandatory. As a consequence, many HEIs have made 
collegial bodies advisory rather than decision-making organisations. As in 
Norway, the reforms have not been compulsive and mandatory, which 
means there is significant variety in terms of, for instance, appointed or 
elected leaders and recruitment patterns. An overall pattern is that the 
older HEIs harness the collegiality and traditional primus inter pares 
model, but there is variation also within universities (Engwall 2014).
Results from the Survey
In the survey, we asked managers a general question regarding decision- 
making power in relation to four themes: budgetary matters, staff recruit-
ment, strategies, and performance indicators. The results are summarised 
in Table 6.1.
Question: Does your current position include decision-making in the 
areas stated below?
As we see from the table, strategy is the area in which managers’ 
decision- making power seems most prevalent, with Sweden on top with as 
much as 88% of managers responding positively. In some categories, there 
are significant differences across countries, most notably for budgetary 
Table 6.1 Managers’ decision-making power represented as the percentage who 
responded with a 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale
Budgetary matters Staff recruitment Strategies Performance indicators
Denmark 48 50 78 61
Finland 66 69 79 69
Norway 47 57 84 58
Sweden 76 71 88 62
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matters, where three-thirds of the Swedish managers and two-thirds of the 
Finnish managers report having decision-making power, whereas not even 
half of the managers in Denmark (48) and Norway agree or strongly agree 
that they have decision-making power. Also, regarding staff recruitment, 
the differences are remarkable: only half of the Danish respondents indi-
cated a 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale, whereas in Finland (69) and Sweden 
(71), this was more common. Generally, a comparison across the four 
countries shows that the Danish managers responded that they have little 
power in these categories. In contrast, Swedish managers’ responses 
included the options ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to a much higher degree.
Results from the Interviews
 Denmark
It was a general experience among the Danish interviewees that the hier-
archical steering from roles such as vice-chancellors and department heads 
has been strengthened significantly. Reflecting on the difference from the 
old system before the 2003 reform, one top manager said, ‘One of the 
negative aspects of the old system was that it was hard to do strategic ini-
tiatives on the university level. Actually, almost impossible’ (Flagship, 
manager, DK). This has proven to be easier after the reform, especially in 
terms of being able to attract extremely large private donations, which was 
only possible with central institutional support. The hierarchical model of 
steering is felt all the way down at the bottom level, where there is a con-
cern about the lack of employee influence on decisions. However, at this 
level, collegiality is also still alive. As one academic said:
Well, everybody in these systems [universities] has this knowledge that, if we 
[the academic staff] won’t bother, then nothing will happen […]. That is, 
we need to feel up for it. We will accept being pressured and many other 
things, but if there is something we really don’t want, then nothing is going 
to happen. (Flagship, academic, DK)
However, the degree of real hierarchical steering is quite different 
between universities. In the regional university, the hierarchical model 
seems very ingrained and (sometimes reluctantly) accepted. However, in 
the flagship university, some of the collegial culture seems to have survived 
(as the quote above indicates). It is harder to get things done if there is 
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 opposition from below (be it subordinate managers or academics) and 
decisions, once taken, are also easier to revisit and change.
Managers have quite strong authority over resources and budgetary 
matters, at least on paper. General university funds can be spent rather 
freely. However, most of these funds are invested in the salaries of steadily 
employed professors, making a change in priority somewhat difficult. In 
addition, there is the growing amount of external funding. Managers have 
very little means of influencing research based on external funding, which 
means that directing through external funding is very much delegated to 
the academics themselves, who decide what they want to apply for funding 
for, and to funding agencies and other funders, who make decisions on 
funding based on own criteria (see Chap. 5 in this volume). Finally, 
performance- based funding systems also pressure managers in budgetary 
matters since these models pressure managers into following the national 
model internally—to some degree at least (see Chap. 4 in this volume). 
These conditions could be part of the explanation for why the Danish 
managers scored low in the survey, compared to the other countries, on 
decision-making power over budgetary matters. This means that one of 
the most effective ways of steering performance is by hiring and firing.
Although there are assessment and hiring committees involved in the 
process, managers generally feel that they have substantial influence on 
who is hired. This is the way managers can most easily enact the strategy 
for research they have for the department—not by steering research 
directly. As one line manager put it:
Well, I cannot control what people want to do research on. And you should 
not. People need to be engaged in what they do. If they do not, forget it. 
But I do get some [researchers] who knock on the door and say: Could you 
hire me? I would like to go to [the regional university]. And then I will look 
at their research profile. So, we have actually gotten, I guess, 3–4 people in 
this way. Because they are strong researchers, and they have a research pro-
file that I can see fits. (Regional, manager, DK)
Hence, hiring is one of the most important instruments for managers 
who want to manage performance. It is more mixed when it comes to fir-
ing. In one department, at the regional university, management fired sev-
eral people who were not performing well on research (this was phrased as 
‘cleaning up’). Here, firing was seen as an effective performance manage-
ment tool. In the flagship university, this was more unusual. Hiring new 
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staff was most often only possible when someone resigned or if there was 
new funding—not by firing.
As the survey results suggest, managers feel they have quite substantial 
decision-making power over strategies. Managers generally feel that strate-
gies are important. They spend considerable time on planning the pro-
cesses for shaping strategies. Sometimes they are quite top-down, at other 
times they are organised to involve a range of internal and external stake-
holders. Lower-level managers generally do not feel too restricted by 
upper-level strategies. A typical quote on the question of the coupling 
between strategies was ‘They are coupled [everybody laughs]. They [the 
strategies] are not integrated, yet they are not completely free-floating in 
the sense that I have looked at the faculty strategy’ (Flagship, manager, 
DK). As a managerial tool, though, most researchers do not find that the 
strategies mattered much for work ‘on the ground’. Here, performance- 
management instruments, like performance indicators, are much more 
important.
Managing performance is practised by all managers to some degree. It 
does, however, depend on local conditions if the management is mostly 
‘soft’ (i.e., no or small incentives, hiring new personnel only when natural 
vacancies occur, managing by employer development conversations, etc.) 
or ‘hard’ (i.e., firing researchers who do not perform, using bibliometric 
research indicator [BRI] metrics as a goal-setting tool, giving bonuses for 
publications, etc.). Managers were given a new performance management 
tool when the BRI was introduced in 2010. Although it only distributed 
a small fraction of total funding for research, management at the regional 
university viewed it as a powerful tool for improving the research perfor-
mance of the university. Managers used it as a tool by demanding that 
researchers within a two-year period scored points on the BRI scale (which 
means publishing in at least one of the journals on an authorised list). 
Hence, introducing the indicator in the budget model had a very disci-
plining effect all the way down to the researcher level (although mostly in 
the social sciences faculty). However, at the flagship university, the BRI 
was not used as extensively as a performance-management tool, and when 
it was used, researchers did not see it as very disciplining. Instead, manag-
ers use mandatory employee development conversations (which are also 
mandatory in other public sector workplaces) to talk about goals, achieve-
ments, and so on. But these mostly feel like conversations to help the 
individual progress, and less like a method for controlling the performance 
of individuals. These are also used at the regional university. Monetary 
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incentives were not used in any of the departments among our cases. 
However, there are departments in Denmark that have linked BRI publi-
cation directly to bonuses. Although we do not know the full extent of 
this practice, it is not merely a curiosity (Opstrup 2014).
 Finland
In the two case universities analysed in this chapter, academic leaders are 
still most often selected internally, although some recruitment of academic 
leaders from other universities has also occurred. The expectations for aca-
demic leaders are still collegial, although practices of performance man-
agement have strengthened the status of leaders since the University 
Act of 2010:
At this moment, the power system is still the same in that our department 
head is really far from us. This is a large social institution, I do not even 
assume that the department head will know about the work of 300 staff, or 
by no means can you expect to get congratulations when you get on a ram-
page. (Flagship, academic, FI)
[The academic] leaders have to work more than before, and leadership work 
has probably tripled over the last ten years. I’ve been here almost ten years 
in this job, so I’ve seen the entire chain. (Regional, academic, FI)
We used to have about 200 academic leaders in this university, and now the 
number is less than 30—of course, this group has become smaller and each 
one has had more power than in the previous time. (Flagship, academic 
leader, FI)
The management thinking is different from what it used to be, very differ-
ent from the traditional academic leader. This is also reflected in the reform 
of university regulations, and more power is concentrated in a particular 
leader. (Flagship, academic leader, FI)
Tools for strengthening this position have also come from other 
reforms, such as the salary system reform, which has provided managers 
with performance- management tools. However, managers with 
performance- management tools only exist at the faculty level and at the 
institutional level since academic leaders lack these tools at the academic 
level of research groups or educational programmes. This means that per-
formance management and the responsibility for achieving results are to 
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be found at the top level. At the academic level, in turn, it is quite hard for 
academics to define how they are evaluated in terms of performance man-
agement and how they can influence work conditions. Managerialism in 
the 2010s seems to mean more centralised management systems, and that 
the division of labour between academics with performance-management 
tools is not successful:
Of course, we, as researchers, are hoping for different performance evalua-
tions to better know how to allocate resources, but it is a bit of a slight step 
forward with a little impact. (Flagship, academic leader, FI)
Academic leaders at the two Finnish universities have a dualistic atti-
tude towards performance management. Some interviewed leaders see the 
tools as clearly supportive of work and as valuable tools to enhance trans-
parency. Performance management was also seen in some of the interviews 
as an essential tool to combine institutional-level strategy and academic 
activities: ‘Performance is a realisation of a strategy’ (Regional, academic 
leader, FI). For the leaders of the academic units, however, there is a lack 
of performance-management incentives for the unit-level functions com-
paring to the mid- or top levels. In the academic units, incentives are often 
directed at individuals, and decisions are confirmed at institutional levels. 
This has changed the nature of academic leaders’ work:
Units are not rewarded, and our reward is that we are doing a good job, and 
we still have a prospect on the balance sheet. But individuals are rewarded. 
(Flagship, academic leader, FI)
A change seems to have taken place in the 2010s in Finnish universities 
as the institutional-level indicators have begun to direct work in academic 
units. These indicators are not chosen by academics, but leaders play a key 
role in tracking indicators. The indicators monitor the conversion of 
results, above all in terms of education and research. Tracking is focused 
on the results of the work, such as qualifications, the accumulation of 
credits, and manager discussions on these factors. Similarly, research is an 
indicator of performance, and, in particular, performance is measured by 
the number of publications according to the national publication forum. 
When there is a lack of performance-management tools, key indicators are 
of great importance. In this chapter, indicators are found first of all as 
management tools, but they can also be valuable for the academic staff to 
 L. GESCHWIND ET AL.
195
define the content of work. The indicators do not cover all dimensions of 
work, as indicated in following quotes:
In my opinion, there are clear indicators for degrees and graduates, and in 
my own work, I think first of all about the quality of the research. (Flagship, 
academic leader, FI)
For me, effectiveness is things like that, that I’m pretty moderate and wait-
ing for if all this work, and I wait to see if all this work will be done, and I 
always say yes to all interview requests and lectures. I have never refused. 
That is probably part of performance. (Flagship, academic, FI)
While there is a lot of criticism for the performance indicators, the 
interviewees also stressed the indicators’ benefits in academic work. This is 
reflected in how academics determine performance and how they describe 
their relationship with the indicators. Some of the interviewees considered 
a very positive starting point to be measuring performance by when their 
work becomes visible and can be compared to other academic units. This 
starting point is reflected in two quotations, which also describe the inter-
viewees’ estimates of the most valuable indicators:
I always found [that performance is] performing as well as possible as well as 
possible all the tasks you received, and sometimes [you] fail, and sometimes 
[you] succeed, but the goal is to produce according to your promises. 
(Flagship, academic leader, FI)
The result [of performance] is scientific publishing and competitive interna-
tional research. (Flagship, academic, FI)
 Norway
The managerial role has been strengthened over the last few years in the 
Norwegian HEIs hierarchically, not least by the use of strategies and 
action plans. Still, it seems like the role of the head of a department has 
been weakened (hence the term ‘facilitator’). This could be tied to the fact 
that this role is seldom attractive for senior professors, and attending pro-
fessors often see this as their duty for a few years. The role is thereby often 
undertaken by junior academics with a temporary contract and as a part- 
time job. The department head position works as a stepping stone into 
academia for juniors who do not have the same legitimacy as a professor.
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Findings from the Norwegian part of the survey shows that only around 
one-third of the managers have a high degree of influence over budgetary 
matters, staff recruitment, and performance indicators. It seems like they 
have the most influence over strategies, as more than half of the managers 
reported this. Many findings from the interviews also revolve around the 
development of strategies, and it seems like this is an important tool for 
the managers. One expressed:
The strategies have a four- to six-year range and are operationalised into 
yearly action plans within the hierarchical units. These strategies seem to 
have gained increased importance the last years and are a tool for the daily 
work of managers. (Flagship, administrator, NO)
There is a general trend that suggestions for overall strategies at the 
universities are developed by the vice-chancellor, who is thereafter open 
for hearings and the broad involvement of all employees. The chosen 
strategy is expected to be reflected in the strategies within the hierarchy. 
At the faculty level, the process to develop strategies seems to be the same, 
while at the levels of departments, there are more variations. Some leaders 
use the same approach—to shield the academics from administrative 
tasks—while others use a more democratic and collegial approach and col-
lect input at an early stage of strategy development.
The agenda setting in strategies relates both to signals in steering docu-
ments from the Ministry of Education and from initiatives within the 
universities:
We had strategies earlier also, but they were often put on the backburner[…] 
Now, it is expected that we use the strategy. When we make action plans for 
next year, there is an expectation from the Ministry of Education, which 
permeates the action plans within the university. But, we consider these 
according to our strategic goals, and we try to make it as adherent as possi-
ble. (Flagship, manager, NO)
The strategies seem to be used as an overall framework for academic 
work, but leaders across levels do not severely interfere with the work of 
individual academics. A department manager described the leadership role 
as minimal and more like a facilitator:
The influence from the managerial role is tiny—management is totally over-
rated. My task is more like a facilitator. That means, first of all, to protect the 
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academics from all kinds of administrative bull and nonsense and reporting 
issues, to structure teaching, research. (Regional, manager, NO)
The leaders also had low impact on the content of the teaching curricu-
lum, as this had to be aligned with a programme. Still, the individual aca-
demic has the freedom to influence curriculum and teaching methods. 
Managers and academics from the social sciences were critical towards new 
managerial tools regarding teaching quality, and they expressed their frus-
tration from dealing with such systems:
You have this definition of quality that is cut out of New Public Management 
… student satisfaction, primary applicants. Things like that, it isn’t about 
quality at all! It is all about the labour market … blah, blah, blah. (Flagship, 
manager, NO)
Managers do not interfere with the research of the individual academ-
ics, who have considerable freedom to choose whether they want to apply 
for internal or external funding in addition to the amount of research time 
they have available in their position. Still, the close ties between strategies 
and funding seem to be an organising principle that steers the focus of the 
academics too, as one manager illustrates: ‘The researchers are opportu-
nistic, so when the money and incentives are tied in one direction, the 
researchers head that way’ (Regional, manager, NO). Another leader dis-
cussed academic freedom and the risk for dilution as the professional work 
has to adjust to plans and strategies but also pointed to the advantages that 
follow: ‘At the same time, I can see that those who actually chose to fit 
into the profile are getting a boost, so it seems like there are two answers 
out there’ (Flagship, manager, NO).
A manager from the administrative hierarchy pointed to the tension of 
logics between academics and the administrators. One example was a pro-
fessor who had not filled up the classroom and had room for more stu-
dents, and the administrators who wanted to follow the procedures of 
admittance: ‘They do not quite understand why we are doing things this 
way’ (Flagship, administrator, NO). Conflicting demands not only came 
from within the institutions but also from external stakeholders regarding 
content in research, financial issues, and, particularly, ownership of the 
product: ‘There are still discussions in each project agreement regarding 
the ownership of rights and what time you are allowed to start publishing. 
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The postponement of publications is always up for discussion’ (Regional, 
manager, NO).
Strategies are also used to guide the recruitment of new employees. A 
manager told how they use their discretion to strengthen areas important 
for them: ‘As to be expected, recruitment must be done according to the 
strategies. And this means that we are trying to enhance our strengths or 
areas we find worthy to continue’ (Regional, manager, NO).
Performance indicators have become an important tool to assess per-
formance within the universities and to follow up with managers. Yet, 
performance indicators are still employed to a low degree at the individual 
level in assessing academics. Annual appraisal meetings between the leader 
and the employees were used to follow up on progress in their work and 
plans for the year to come, and most professors in managerial positions 
implement such meetings. Some of the departments were publishing pub-
lication points at an individual level, while others just kept track at the unit 
level. The metrics were not used to punish academics with low publication 
rates, and so on, but discussing this was a theme in the annual meetings. 
Such metrics were sometimes connected to an incentive system, where 
extra funding could follow from finalising master or PhD students or pop-
ular science disseminations. The extra funding could, for example, be used 
for sabbaticals or going to conferences. The Norwegian managers were 
careful not to use the data in an offending way, particularly towards aca-
demics with few publications. Instead, they use the information from the 
metrics to map what to facilitate for a higher level of publication from 
those who needed help or a push:
We can see that there are things we can facilitate, and we have been able to 
make people publish who have not done that before. But of course, people 
are different. Some of them are publishing regularly, while others are like a 
bottle of ketchup: They have a project and nothing and nothing and noth-
ing is coming, and then suddenly it is flushing out. And we have a couple 
who are at the point of not getting a sabbatical, and then they just need a 
small push. (Regional, manager, NO)
 Sweden
More than half of the managers in Sweden noted in the survey that their 
current position includes a high degree of decision-making powers about 
strategies, budgetary matters, and staff recruitment (Table  6.1). Their 
 L. GESCHWIND ET AL.
199
power to make decisions about performance indicators is a bit more lim-
ited. As in Norway, strategy is the area over which the managers seem to 
have most influence, where 88% of the managers claimed to have a degree 
of decision-making power 4 or 5 on a Likert scale.
More generally, it is noticeable from interviews that it is important who 
is in charge. Many interviewees, at both universities, discussed changes 
that occurred when a new vice-chancellor took office. It seems like the 
vice-chancellor has become increasingly important, and that employees 
notice large differences between vice-chancellors, although it is not really 
clear what the effect will be on the everyday operations of the academics:
Every time there is a new vice-chancellor, there is kind of a new agenda. […] 
And, in particular, in a smaller place, it is more obvious than at a big univer-
sity. (Regional, manager, SE)
Reflecting upon the role of the vice-chancellor, one interviewee stressed 
the power the position now is characterised by:
Well, [there are] those who think the leader is unimportant because [they 
are] pinioned and only a pencil pusher; no, a vice-chancellor has a lot of 
formal and informal power. And if the vice-chancellor wants to use that 
formal or informal power and the power over money, a lot can be influenced 
in the current system. (Flagship, manager, SE)
More emphasis on management and an increased focus on manage-
ment roles were also more generally discussed in the interviews. Ever 
higher demands require designated management skills in the higher edu-
cation sector. The pool of potential recruits needs to be as big as possible 
since the role has become so challenging and demanding, in particular, 
due to the trend towards bigger multidisciplinary departments:
But, I think we work a lot with leader development. I am curious about 
leadership. It is so important when we have big departments to get the right 
people as well. Because they affect employees, and one should engage peo-
ple, so I think there should be more focus on those issues. (Regional, 
manager, SE)
As for budgetary matters, it has become increasingly common that the 
vice-chancellor sets aside strategic funds in education and research. This 
money could be used for strategic recruitments or research programmes, 
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for instance. This is usually done in close dialogue with deans and 
faculty:
And then the vice-chancellor has strategic funds in education and research, 
and faculties know that money is not supposed to pile up but rather be used 
for strategic efforts jointly agreed. These are usually a professor programme, 
more female professors, more post docs etc. (Regional, academic, SE)
Some of the interviewed managers also thought they needed more dis-
cretion over decision-making and resources:
In regard to research, we would want discretion over money, so to say. 
When I say ‘we’, I mean the management, not necessarily university man-
agement, but also faculty or department management, someone who can 
steer funding, so to say. (Flagship, manager, SE)
The tension between line managers and research leaders also came to 
the fore in the interviews. One department head discussed how power 
over money is crucial for everyday business:
Because, if you look at research, it is rather those who are referred to as 
research leaders who have the greatest influence; i.e., the professors and 
disciplinary leaders who have the possibility to steer. What I can do is a kind 
of steering by management, steering by money. To steer what I decide to 
fund. Now, the research budget is not exactly expanding and gigantic but 
rather very scarce, and most of it is locked in fixed expenditures like doctoral 
students and supervision. Mostly that. So, the means with which I can steer 
is not particularly much. Having said that, I can also govern indirectly 
because we discuss this a lot in the Head of Department group together 
with the dean. […] So, I can’t steer by making orders, but I am around, 
that’s how I would put it. (Regional, manager, SE)
One senior manager referred to the then-recently presented Leadership 
Inquiry (SOU 2015: 92), proposing more power to managers and stron-
ger universities:
I think a lot is in line with what’s written in the Leadership Inquiry, that 
academic leadership needs to be strengthened. You need management who 
dares to make decisions, prioritise decisions and so. And it has been a bit 
problematic sometimes because of the character of these assignments. They 
are fixed term, and perhaps you have an academic position as a base, which 
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makes it difficult to make hard decisions and so on. But it feels like it increas-
ingly resembles the private sector. [It] goes in that direction, that one dares 
make tough decisions and prioritise. And you also have to—well, it is really 
important with leadership, it affects so much. It affects the work environ-
ment; it affects many issues. (Regional, manager, SE)
The same interviewee also discussed the complex character of academic 
leadership, in comparison to other kinds of organisations:
You can’t run things like that in a university. You might do that in a private 
company, what do I know. Because, I mean, you have pretty simple goals in 
a private company. They are a bit more complicated in a university. (Flagship, 
manager, SE)
In particular, at the flagship university, a collegial way of leadership was 
referred to:
And the current management is very much into [the idea] that this is a col-
legial issue, everything needs to be anchored in academic leadership, and we 
have a particular body, which is, in a way, the core in these decisions, the 
strategic decisions. And that is the vice-chancellor’s leadership council, com-
prising the vice-chancellor, the pro vice-chancellors and so on, and all the 
deans. (Flagship, manager, SE)
The more general discussion about the allocation of funding above is 
also closely related to performance when it comes to deliveries. Again, one 
of the interviewed managers thought that current managers were not 
tough enough:
OK, we have all the others making priorities for us, research councils and 
others, but we cannot escape from the fact that we ourselves set priorities. 
But then, we also need to be a bit tough, to dare to say that this type of 
activity is not good enough because nothing has been produced. And that is 
related to performance: you haven’t published anything, you haven’t done 
anything in two years, now this will be closed down. And I think we need to 
improve regarding this. We haven’t been particularly good at that histori-
cally. (Regional, manager, SE)
What roles do managers play when it comes to following up on indi-
vidual performances? Swedish universities, as state agencies, are supposed 
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to undertake annual review dialogues with all employees. One of the man-
agers reflected upon the character of those dialogues:
Well, I do have those dialogues at my department, and it is more or less [the 
case] that individual goals are followed up, if they have reached the goals. 
And that can be everything from becoming a docent or writing three articles 
or that my two doctoral students should finish or [that] I get funding for 
this exciting project. So, yes, there is absolutely a follow-up like that, but it 
never leaves those two people. (Flagship, manager, SE)
An important issue is whether performance is related to consequences. 
Are high performers rewarded and low performers punished? Interestingly, 
salary development does not seem to be related at all to performance:
So, I wouldn’t say that salaries are based on performance. Deciding salaries 
is a complicated matter as such. (Flagship, manager, SE)
Well, we don’t assess performance directly, that is, publications, if you have 
done this or that. We don’t do that at that level. (Flagship, manager, SE)
There are discussions at both universities whether, for instance, biblio-
metric measures should affect salaries. According to one interviewee, this 
is primarily advocated by those who can show good bibliometric data for 
themselves. However, it is also mentioned that too much of a focus on 
publications could have a negative effect on other parts of academic work: 
‘We cannot have a workplace where everybody sits at home and splashes 
out papers, but no one is in the office. […] From my perspective, it is very 
important to have people who can collaborate, but we don’t measure 
that’. (Flagship, manager, SE) Performance is therefore a broader concept 
than research output only. Bibliometric data are a basis for the discussion 
rather than a ‘hard’ criterion related to rewards.
The increasing focus on performance is also related to the whole idea of 
an academic career ladder. One consequence for managers is an increasing 
demand for career counselling young academics who want advice and clar-
ity when it comes to performance expectations—for example, how to 
interpret promotion criteria. The role as a manager is to mobilise support 
in order to fulfil the goals:
Yes, as department head I have felt that it is my responsibility to find support 
in order to achieve the goals, if I find them so important. [If] it is perhaps a 
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doctoral student who hasn’t completed [their] studies, then we have to 
think of why and address it. (Regional, manager, SE)
The relation between strategic plans and goals at various levels and for 
individual academics are discussed by managers. The same interviewee 
also stressed that all goals at the institutional level are not relevant at the 
department level and even less so at the individual level. All interviewees 
at the Swedish universities argued against following up on performance at 
the individual level in a ‘hard’ way:
I think it’s a dramatic difference from, say, 10 years ago. But I have a feeling 
it’s still the way to go. Then, I think we should never strive for this corporate 
model, this stone-hard…, because we need to remember that this is, like, an 
educating and researching environment, and there has to be room for 
detours and stuff like that. So, it can’t be too tough either. But I do think 
there are still things to do. (Flagship, academic, SE)
At the flagship university, there are differences between different facul-
ties. One of the faculties recently introduced the individual measurement 
of academic staff performance. This has been controversial and was met 
with deep scepticism by the other faculty members according to the 
interviewees.
concLudIng dIscussIon
The aim of this chapter has been to shed light on the role of managers in 
higher education institutions. Major reforms in the Nordic countries have 
transformed HEI systems in a profound way (see Chap. 3). They have 
increased the formal autonomy of HEIs to make decisions over their own 
activities, both academic core tasks and managerial/administrative activi-
ties. The preceding, more state-regulated system meant detailed centralised 
decision-making about, for instance, hiring of professors and the introduc-
tion of new educational programmes. The new autonomy has led to the 
introduction of new managerial practices in HEIs in line with NPM and 
inspired by private firms: strategy-making, strict budgetary  management, 
performance measurements, and so on. The issue addressed in this chapter 
is how these changes have affected the role of the academic leader.
Drawing on earlier research on managerialism and leaderism in higher 
education (O’Reilly and Reed 2010; Ekman et  al. 2017), we see clear 
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signs of change regarding academic leadership in these four Nordic coun-
tries. Overall, we see an interesting mix of institutional logics in the inter-
views: the professional, collegial traditional academic leadership, which is 
based on rotating systems, election among peers, and collegial decision- 
making has been complemented with, and in some places replaced by, a 
managerial logic with top-down order-giving, performance measurement 
and appointed managers as a new competitive academic profession 
(Thornton et al. 2012). Many interviewees mentioned the increased focus 
on these kind of management practices. Another related trend is the 
greater focus on individual managers. This is the case in all four countries 
albeit with slight differences in emphases. There are also mixed feelings 
regarding this managerialist/leaderist trend. For some of the interviewed 
academics, the development was deeply worrying and a major concern. 
This is particularly the case in Denmark. For others, particularly in the 
Finnish interviews, it seems that, for instance, increased transparency in 
reporting and communicating performance could be considered positive. 
The analysis also shows that Denmark and Finland are the countries that 
lead the way when it comes to increasing the formal authority of manag-
ers. The introduction of appointed managers rather than elected ones has 
altered the way HEIs operate in these two countries. However, as this 
chapter has shed light on, management reform has not been implemented 
in the same depth and with the same pace across and within universities. 
Hence, the ability and willingness to follow a strict, more corporate-like 
management style are unevenly distributed, although some commonalities 
can be found (Lind and Aagaard 2017).
The role of individual leaders has also increased in other countries, as 
shown in the interviews from Sweden in which the vice-chancellor’s role 
at both HEIs was considered big and increasing over time. A similar pat-
tern is appearing in Norway, where the strategising process was initiated 
from the vice-chancellor at one of the HEIs. There are also indications in 
the interviews that power has been centralised—that is, a strengthened 
steering core of HEIs. However, this increased power of managers, which 
appears clearly in the interviews, is still compromised, and the complex 
matrices of organisations that universities make up are still challenging to 
lead. Some of the interviewed Swedish managers even discussed what they 
perceived as a need for more managerial power over resources at various 
levels. They aired a frustration when it came to making priorities and to 
launching strategic initiatives. This partly reflects the national debate on 
the balance between external funding and direct state funding. A prereq-
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uisite for more managerial power is more money directly allocated to 
HEIs rather than external competitive funding, which strengthens indi-
vidual researchers and research leaders rather than managers.
Another theme is performance management—that is, identifying, rec-
ognising, and rewarding academic staff in relation to their efforts in edu-
cation and research. Across countries, it seems that there is more focus on 
performance and performance management. In Denmark, and to a certain 
level in Norway, the BRI has become a new managerial tool and is also 
used to some extent at the individual level for performance follow-ups. 
Performance is not followed up at the individual level in most places in 
Sweden and Finland. Annual staff appraisals are not based on performance 
data, but salaries are rarely affected by the level of performance. The 
increasing awareness of performance measurement among academic staff 
also affects managerial roles. In Sweden and Denmark, the role of the 
manager seems to include coaching and career counselling more than con-
trolling. Early career academics are highly aware of career demands regard-
ing performance and want guidance when it comes to making priorities. 
Also, the interviews from Norway indicate that the publication indicator 
affects individual researchers to a high degree.
The topic of management and leadership has been related to different 
kinds of HEIs in earlier research. Older, research-intensive, comprehen-
sive universities have typically held on to elected leaders, and collegial 
bodies have been maintained in national systems where this has been pos-
sible (i.e., Sweden and Norway). In contrast, younger institutions have 
introduced a stricter line management structure with more emphasis on 
professional management skills rather than academic merits for holders of 
management positions (Engwall 2014). Sweden, and particularly 
Denmark, reveal some interesting albeit expected differences between the 
older flagship university and the regional university. The line management 
is stronger, the collegial bodies are downplayed, and decision-making is 
more top-down in the younger institutions. It also seems that resistance is 
stronger at the older universities, in particular, at the Danish flagship 
university.
The final conclusion is that there has been a convergence in reform 
initiatives, and many ideas have indeed been used in all four countries with 
deep consequences for academic leadership and management. However, 
the implementation of the reforms differs significantly across and within 
countries and institutions. There is a consistent, complex interplay between 
the two co-existing logics of managerialism and collegiality (Greenwood 
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et al. 2011), a balancing act for managers whose power has increased to a 
degree that seems to frighten their co-workers but, nevertheless, for some, 
is frustratingly compromised.
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CHAPTER 7
Strategy as Dialogue and Engagement
Timo Aarrevaara, Rómulo Pinheiro, and Johan Söderlind
IntroductIon
Interest in organisational strategy spans more than half a century and is a 
central topic in the business management and organisational literature 
(Miles et  al. 1978; Chandler 2003). Within the organisational field of 
higher education, particularly in Northern Europe, strategic planning has 
only emerged in the last two decades or so, as a result of governmental 
reforms inspired by ‘new public management’ (Mouwen 2000; Rip 2004; 
Salminen 2003), leading to the rise of strategic science regimes. Strategy 
could be broadly defined as pertaining to ‘a deliberate conscious set of 
guidelines that determines decisions into the future’ (Mintzberg 1978, 
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935). Mintzberg makes an important conceptual distinction between 
‘intended’ (the aim and goals) and ‘realised’ (the means used and the 
results) strategy and refers to the strategy formulation process as ‘a pattern 
in a stream of decisions’ (Mintzberg 1978, 935).
In other words, strategies are instruments of change, and within higher 
education institutions, the responsibility of academic leaders who carry 
them out is to maintain the operation, but at the same time, to embrace 
change opportunities. Strategies are also flexible tools for dealing with a 
range of requirements and threats and are related to how universities focus 
on funds allocation, financial stability, management structure, central 
operation units, and operational monitoring (Uslu 2018). It is important 
to ensure the wide support of key stakeholders because the implementa-
tion of strategies requires dialogue and compromise (Whittington 2006). 
Academic staff, in particular, might find that the strategies adopted clash 
with their own strategic interests and motivations and that they are of low 
relevance to their performance (Elena-Pérez et  al. 2011). The highly 
dynamic and competitive environment in which universities and other 
higher education institutions operate places emphasis on the need to adopt 
strategic focus areas, increase the diversity of the funding base, identify 
and engage with a multiplicity of internal and external stakeholders, and 
prepare operational alternatives for performance management (Aarrevaara 
2015). Given the traditionally high levels of structural (and cultural) 
decoupling within universities (Birnbaum 1988), academic subunits and 
individuals tend to resist attempts to set strategic management priorities at 
the level of the central administration (Pinheiro and Stensaker 2013). 
Recent developments suggest that, as a result of managerialism, centralisa-
tion is on the rise within universities/subunits (Deem et al. 2007), and 
that the strategic management of people, resources, and values is one such 
manifestation (Fumasoli et al. 2015).
This chapter sheds light on two key aspects:
 1. Who gets involved in strategic processes in Nordic universities?
 2. To what extent do strategies affect academic and managerial 
behaviour?
To answer these questions, we have developed a conceptual framework 
that includes several theoretical perspectives on how to interpret strategy 
work within universities. The data for this chapter were drawn from 
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 interviews1 and a survey with academics, managers, and administrators 
based at public universities in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. This was 
part of a much larger project focusing on the performance effects related 
to changes in leadership and managerial structures of Nordic universities 
in recent times (consult the introduction to this volume). Their views con-
stitute their perceptions about the key starting points and identification of 
the strategy, the importance of basic tasks, changes in strategic manage-
ment, engagement in the processes around a strategy, and the importance 
of strategies for performance.
Most Nordic universities have a strategic platform, one composed of 
aims, ambitions, and key priorities in the realms of teaching, research, and 
the third mission (Pinheiro and Stensaker 2014; Pinheiro et al. 2016). Yet, 
the importance of strategies only became a key factor in universities’ activi-
ties around the late 1990s. Since then, the importance of university struc-
tures has risen alongside the academic aspects of university performance 
(Amaral et al. 2003). Strategies and structures are related in the sense that 
aims and priorities result in new forms of resource allocation and the 
redefinition of internal tasks, roles, and responsibilities. In the Nordic 
countries, this trend has been reflected in the strengthening of institu-
tional autonomy in legislation, while at the same time, the emphasis of 
strategies has been on performance management (Gornitzka et al. 2004). 
Because of these elements, strategies have a central role in defining the 
performance that is desired in Nordic universities.
PersPectIves on strategy
This chapter focuses on what a strategy is and how is it defined, paying 
particular attention to the multi-level approach of organisational design 
(Frost et al. 2016). Thus, we first look at strategy from the point of view 
of the structure, whereby the meaning of the strategy is a constructive 
organisational form. The starting point is then the shared commitment to 
the implementation of the strategy and an element of organisational devel-
opment. From the perspective of the university structure, strategy is an 
arena that aggregates diverse interests into common goals.
From a structural perspective, university strategy formulation appears 
to be a rational process, meaning a series of predetermined decisions about 
1 Interviews were held at six case institutions, two per country: one classic ‘flagship’ univer-
sity and another with a more ‘regional’ character.
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how to reach specific ends by resorting to a set of means, what March and 
Olsen term ‘the logic of consequences’ (March and Olsen 2006). 
Universities, however, also carry out a wider social agenda, and in the 
Nordic countries, their funding and mission are closely linked to wider 
public interest (Pinheiro et al. 2016). Therefore, universities’ strategies are 
not purely rational practices, but their creation and implementation also 
involve political choices and limitations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974). These 
factors of political choices and limited rational practices do not necessarily 
optimise performance. Universities have unprofitable activities and/or 
disciplines that may be unreliable from the point of view of the university’s 
internal performance. For example, costly educational programmes can be 
an effective public policy instrument for reasoning, such as analysis based 
on income, gender, or place of residence, and unprofitable performance 
can be valuable from the perspectives of regional development strategies 
and socio-economic regeneration programmes (Habibov and Cheung 
2017; Lebeau and Bennion 2014).
A second perspective of the strategy is based on processes that either 
change or maintain the activity. From this point of view, the strategies 
appear in analytical and logical constructions, whereby the consequences 
of the strategy are understandable to the intra-organisational practitioners 
and extra-organisational actors (Whittington 2006). The processes that 
form the strategy are based on a dialogue that broadly considers stake-
holders’ views and aspirations. Strategic processes reinforce the elements 
of negotiation and compromise but, at the same time, reduce institutional- 
level solutions (Aarrevaara and Dobson 2013; Pinheiro 2015). If the strat-
egy is largely based on compromise, elements such as transformation may 
remain weak in the strategy. This is why universities’ ability to undertake 
reform and organisational change, as well as significant new opportunities 
for focusing, as a part of their strategy is important.
Our third perspective is based on the outputs that the strategy seeks to 
influence. We interpret the output as an agreement between the internal 
and external actors of the university, whereby the strategy identifies the 
organisational goals and the instruments to reach them. From this point 
of view, university strategies might move universities towards complex and 
competitive knowledge marketplaces (Pucciarelli and Kaplan 2016). The 
outputs defined in the university strategies will modify the university’s 
power relations and produce engagement with organisational values. 
Further, university strategies are arenas within which to interact with 
external stakeholders and cope with societal contingencies (Aarrevaara 
et al. 2017; Fumasoli et al. 2015). Strategies can determine which disci-
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plines or cross-disciplinary research themes are at the heart of the strategy 
so that they can be focused on strategy-based resources. The key to this 
strategy is that resources (and resource redistribution) generate change 
and results in focused areas (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988).
In this chapter, we aim to analyse the data by applying the theoretical 
and conceptual framework for strategy formulation. This will be done by 
discussing the literature on strategy as practice and analysing the inter-
views and survey results as discussed in the first chapter of this volume.
engagement In the strategy Process
Our starting point for analysing strategy formulation is to draw a distinction 
between strategy engagement and strategy as dialogue. Both questions were 
asked as part of the semi-structured interviews and the survey. Engagement 
refers to who the key players in strategy formulation are. Strategy as dia-
logue, in turn, refers to the process and content of the strategy, as well as the 
ways in which actors are engaged with, and committed to, strategy formula-
tion. In previous reporting of FINNUT2 project data, attention has been 
paid to the fact that Finnish professors, as the most senior academic staff, 
have a wider opportunity to influence strategic processes than they have 
regarding resource allocations (Pekkola et al. 2017). The early engagement 
of the strategy is, therefore, much more the work of senior research and 
teaching staff and those in management and administrative positions than 
those in other academic posts. In addition, Pekkola et al. (2017) have dem-
onstrated that professors in management positions have experience in pre-
paring for strategy, which is similar to the responses of administrative 
managers. Above all, senior academics also enjoy relatively more profes-
sional autonomy regarding the strategy process (Kivistö et al. 2017).
The FINNUT data clearly indicate that participation in strategy formu-
lation is greater at the academic unit level (departments or equivalent) and 
lowest at the level of the university (see Fig. 7.1). In Sweden, nearly 60% 
of the respondents reported that they actively participated, whereas in 
Norway, only about 40% did so, with Finland in between. The data reveal 
that in practice, and unsurprisingly, engagement in strategy formulation is 
most common amongst administrative staff and academic managers and 
lowest amongst academics. Except for Norway, the countries reported 
2 FINNUT is a long-term programme for research and innovation in the educational sector 
under the auspices of the Norwegian Research Council. The programme funds research on a 
wide spectrum from early childhood education and care to higher education and adult learning.
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greater levels of participation with unit-level strategy formulation amongst 
professors when compared with other academic groups (associate profes-
sors, assistant professors, senior lecturers, etc.).
Also, from the Finnish interviews, we can verify that the engagement of 
professors who have only academic responsibilities is different from their 
engagement in strategy formation (see Pekkola et al. 2017). Early engage-
ment is typical for professors with managerial responsibilities, such as 
deans or the equivalent. However, the roles for research and teaching pro-
fessors with no managerial responsibilities are different. It is evident that 
the role of university strategies is understood in a range of ways. Some 
informants see the strategies as beacons for everyday activities at the unit 
level, while the rest of the interviewees connected the strategies with insti-
tutional views on the universities’ core functions.
For me, the strategy is that we are doing high-level international research, 
so it is not so much about the university strategy that we’re dealing with. 
(Academic, flagship, FI)
We write an annual report, so we write to the Ministry and, there, the [stra-
tegic] thematic efforts will also be reflected in what we report. The univer-
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Fig. 7.1 Participation in strategy formulation (percentage of those academics 
who agreed with values 4 and 5; scale ranged from 1 (no participation) to 5 (strong 
participation)
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sity board is very close and asking for continuous updates, and it is very clear 
that they want to see that the strategy is reflected in all the work that is 
happening in the organisation. Then, at the next university board meeting, 
there is a separate discussion about the implementation of strategies. 
(Manager, regional, NO)
I like the idea of living a strategy. So, when you make all these everyday deci-
sions, you have to ask yourself, does this contribute to an increase in the 
number of publications, increased internationalisation, and increased exter-
nal funding? (Regional, Manager, SE)
The preparatory committees for strategy processes are appointed by 
those who are attached to administrative and academic leadership profes-
sions. Membership in these committees is not merely formal but is related 
to local practices (Johnson et  al. 2007). Even if the strategy of early 
engagement is launched on the basis of the importance of academic units, 
commitment amongst other staff may be weak. Such a situation arises 
particularly when academic staff should be the ones empowered to imple-
ment a strategy that has already been decided on (Kotter 1996). This cre-
ates the need for a specific strategy to be deployed at later stages. However, 
those who do not have administrative duties in academic positions are not 
necessarily obligated to commit themselves to the management and man-
agement policies.
Participation in strategy formulation at the university level and across 
all three countries is very low (5% for all categories), and at the faculty 
level, the involvement in strategy also remains low (overall, 12%). This 
indicates that in the academic units engagement is low, especially regard-
ing university-level strategies. As expected, academic staff engage more in 
strategy making at the unit level, ranging between 25% and 50%. Professors 
score the lowest, with only 25% being involved in strategy formulation. 
Associate professors are the most involved at the university, faculty, and 
unit levels. What is more, associate professors also indicate that they have 
the greatest influence on strategy formulation at all levels when compared 
to their more senior and junior counterparts. That said, overall influence 
over strategic matters remains quite low at all levels, except for almost half 
of associate professors at the unit level and about one-third of ‘other’ at 
the unit level. Professors also scored the lowest at the unit level, with only 
about one-quarter of respondents reporting that they can influence strat-
egy formulation.
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Turning now to the qualitative data, some of those interviewed indi-
cated that strategies are primarily formulated to please external stakehold-
ers and enhance the accountability of universities to the government, as 
the main funding source. In some interviews, the universities were also 
found to be successful organisations before the introduction of institu-
tional strategies. The following responses from the interviews are con-
cerned with internationalisation and core functions such as teaching 
and research.
The performance reflects government policy, and our main funding source 
is the Ministry of Education and Culture. I have to report [to our staff] on 
the policy of the Ministry. That is how we try to anticipate the changing of 
the operational environment. In this way, we are able to adapt strategies and 
operational programmes for funding. (Academic, regional, FI)
Sometimes we have experienced that it is a little difficult to find a connec-
tion between strategy and what we see as our opportunities. For example, 
we are now very ambitious on internationalisation, but we are not aware of 
priorities and resource usage and so on. (Manager, flagship, NO)
However, other informants were doubtful of the relevance of university 
strategies for the practical work of teachers and researchers. From this 
perspective, academics as internal stakeholders are not necessarily moti-
vated by the content of university strategies per se, although their motiva-
tions may coincide with the strategies.
The staff and student bodies and also our other stakeholder groups [partici-
pated in the strategy formulation process], and it was applicable to them. 
On the other hand, a certain amount of work was done [in strategy prepara-
tion] by a rather large group [of administrators]. But in any case, they stud-
ied the earlier work of actors, and as a result, the draft was a little more 
focused. Finally, we have reached the stage that we are now at. This is an 
inclusive project, and of course, in practice, the decisions of the academic 
unit leadership, dean, and rectors of the university will close the case. 
(Academic, regional, FI)
So, if the deans and the Rector say that we should have a commitment and 
that we agree with it, so there are expectations that we put off and that we 
have strategic funds. So, I have … not very much, but I have some strategic 
funds that I use in the faculty…. So I can allocate these on the basis of qual-
ity, but also, for example, around the [strategic] thematic area … I have 
strategic space [room to manoeuvre] for it. (Manager, flagship, NO)
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The question is whether [the goals in the strategy] would have been part of 
my work anyway, because I consider them important. (Academic, regional, SE)
Returning to the survey data, assistant professors are the staff category 
with the perceived least input on decision-making processes. Academic 
staff seem to be most responsive to unit strategies: the evaluation of 
around 60% of assistant professors, associate professors, and professors was 
that they align their academic behaviour to meet the goals in the unit 
strategies. Over 30% of the assistant professors, professors, and ‘other’ also 
responded that they align their academic behaviour to meet faculty strate-
gies, while associate professors scored slightly lower, at 29%. Also slightly 
lower was the perceived alignment of academic behaviour with university 
strategies (average 30%). It seems that academics with managerial roles are 
more responsive to the strategies than the academics in general. The 
majority of the academic managers (85%) responded that they align their 
managerial behaviour to meet the goals of unit strategies, 62% to meet the 
goals of faculty strategies, and 47% to meet the goals of university strate-
gies. On average, 87% of professors with managerial responsibilities 
reported that they follow strategies.
Strategies at different levels (university, faculty, and academic unit) 
were familiar to the managers at distinct hierarchic levels in the universi-
ties. In general, members of the academic staff were not as familiar with 
these, but some recognised that strategies provide frames for academic 
work, while others thought these were just formalities that are discon-
nected or decoupled from daily work. An academic from the latter group 
remarked that he could have used the strategies more strategically to clar-
ify his research and when applying for research funding. Unsurprisingly, 
managers and administrators were found to be more dependent on the 
strategies to guide them in their daily work priorities. The dialogue 
between managers and academics is seldom based on consensus, as illus-
trated below.
My wish is to think that I can take into account different perspectives. And 
even though the administration seems to be trying to streamline our activi-
ties, in practice, sometimes it means doubling the workload. Then you need 
a person who can say that you know how this really is the [way the] process 
[should be] going. (Academic, regional, FI)
Yes, it [the strategy] is important because it provides a frame for what should 
be prioritised and what we should have as the main focus. (Manager, 
flagship, NO)
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So I guess it is good both for those who are motivated and those who think 
that the university is moving in the wrong direction because they are also 
becoming sharper in this process. (Manager, flagship, SE)
As for the process of decision-making and developing strategies, for the 
most part, it is described by interviewees as democratic and open. That said, 
it is still seen as a top-down process. Suggestions for strategies were made at 
the highest level and developed down the line in the hierarchy. In this 
regard, the data reveal significant differences between the engagement prac-
tices across Nordic universities. For example, at the department level in the 
Norwegian cases, a broad range of academics were involved, and they 
reported open discussions amongst staff. In Finland and Sweden, discussion 
and involvement at the department or equivalent academic unit level was 
greater than in other areas. Some pointed to the importance of collegial and 
informal structures. In all three countries, the stakeholders in the local com-
munity were also invited to participate in the strategy formulation process.
dIalogue as PractIce
The so-called practice turn in the approach to creating strategy has shifted 
the focus of debate from an individualist to a more broadly societist per-
spective, with task dynamics, open information, and influence (Whittington 
2006; Pacheco and Newell 2018). This also means a more integrated 
understanding of the practice of strategy within organisations. The broader 
meanings of the strategy are embedded in the work of the practitioners so 
that the perspective can be simultaneously viewed from intra- organisational 
and extra-organisational perspectives (Whittington 2006). This is of great 
importance in how practitioners of the strategy produce concepts of strat-
egies. The ‘linguistic turn’ in this approach to strategy brings the oppor-
tunity to unleash the strategy and its instruments without needing to 
follow cultural and historical practices. In this way, the strategy as practice 
perspective provides the opportunity to build and implement a strategy 
without organisational memory and, instead, focuses on what the local 
actors are actually doing (Jarzabkowski and Spee 2009).
The linguistic turn has questioned the meaning of the strategy as a form 
of rational planning by emphasising the importance of strategising the dia-
logue between practitioners. According to this perspective, the dialogue 
allows practitioners to contribute to the organisations and stakeholders to a 
greater extent than their original planning would have done (Harisalo and 
Aarrevaara 2015). Dialogue is especially necessary when actors can engage 
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in the strategy formulation at an early stage. However, the FINNUT data 
clearly show that the dialogue is inadequate. In practice, most commonly, it 
is the senior academic and administrative executives who influence the dia-
logue at the faculty and university levels, with academic engagement declin-
ing as one moves up the organisational ladder. Moreover, based on the 
interviews, it is clear that the majority of those in academic posts only very 
rarely have a stake in the strategy formulation process. Thus, in the case of 
Nordic universities, the dialogue does not seem to work, at least in the early 
stages of the strategy formulation process, as a convergence of different 
personnel groups and strategic interests and as predicted in the literature 
(Whittington 2006; Lebeau and Bennion 2014).
Figure 7.2 shows that strategy formulation can be implemented 
through dialogue at the academic unit level. On the other hand, the num-
bers of actors at the faculty and university levels are substantially reduced. 
That said, there are significant variations amongst the three countries. 
Unit-level influence is highest in Sweden and Finland and lower in Norway. 
At the faculty level, Finnish and Swedish academics reported greater levels 
of influence when compared with Norway. Finally, at the level of the uni-
versity as a whole, Finland and Sweden lead the pack, with Norway lowest 
overall. In Finland and Sweden only, over two-thirds of the respondents 
believe that they engage in the strategy process at some level.
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Fig. 7.2 Influence in strategy formulation (percentage of those who agreed with 
values of influence in strategy formulation, where 4 is some influence and 5 is strong 
influence)
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More typical for Finnish interviewees was the emphasis on funding 
mechanisms and financial influence in societal interaction and university 
governance. Most of the interviewees recognised the role of external 
stakeholders and their influence on university governance.
Of course, the fact is that there are external non-university members on the 
university board. No doubt, they are influenced by the government in their 
views. And this is also the case regarding donations, and they often deter-
mine whether to use donations or benefit from the interest on donations. 
(Manager, flagship, FI)
In the case of Norway, strategic work emerges from the interplay 
between many actors within the university as well as key external stake-
holders. Compromise seems to be reflected in the generic nature of the 
goals being adopted, in line with the traditional democratic model of uni-
versities. In open dialogue, informal structures and collegial bodies are 
thought to play a key role.
It is first and foremost the dean who has both pulled the [strategy] process 
and has had an influence in that round, I would like to say. But we have had 
the opportunity to have an input. I was involved in a working group that 
looked at one of the educational areas. So that way, you can say that I have 
had some opportunity to influence. What will come out of it, that’s another 
matter. (Manager, flagship, NO)
One Swedish manager suggests that strategies are formulated primarily 
to please external stakeholders and for enhancing the accountability of 
universities. This manager downplayed the practical use of strategies for 
university actors by noting that the university has had considerable success 
during a period when no strategy existed.
If you want to see what came out of it [the strategy work] here at the local 
level, it simply became documents. (Academic, regional, SE)
strategy as PractIce
Strategy as practice examines the evolution of strategies by studying their 
formulation, planning, and implementation. Attention is not so much on 
the consequences of the strategy, such as the economic and organisational 
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effects. Instead, strategy as a practice draws attention to practical work as 
praxis episodes in formal meetings or informal episodes. From this per-
spective, practical work is either relevant or does not fit the focus of the 
strategy. Similarly, individuals can determine their position by combining 
work practices to understand the various domains of human activity and 
their interrelation to strategies. In this chapter, and following the inter-
view and survey data from the FINNUT project, strategy as practice 
focuses on the social dimension and social interactions occurring at differ-
ent levels of the university. Thus, strategy formation and implementation 
are not key factors, but staff, management, and stakeholder relations are.
However, it has been noted that strategy work is intermittent. The ben-
efits of strategy work provide only temporary revitalisations of the discus-
sions of organisational objectives, which are quickly forgotten once the 
strategy has been decided upon. The meaning of strategy was unclear for 
many of the Finnish interviewees, but some emphasised benefits of a strat-
egy. Surprisingly, this was not necessarily dependent on the interviewees’ 
position or rank. Some interviewees were critical of the whole strategy 
process. The problem, as raised in the Finnish interviews, is the poor con-
nection between strategies and core functions. Thus, for the Finnish inter-
viewees, the top-down process of strategy management or the discussion 
at different levels has not been a key problem. The main concern is how 
the strategy links to university performance, as revealed by the follow-
ing comments.
We implement the strategy, because  excellent research is part of the 
University strategy. And really, social impact is certainly a matter, and it 
is part of my own strategy. When we publish the research outcomes, or dis-
cuss with scholarly community or patient organisations, we are implement-
ing University strategy. (Academic, flagship, FI)
The problem with strategic plans is that, at first, we worked hard on it for a 
year, then it was decided upon, and then it was kind of added to the files. 
(Manager, flagship, SE)
The accounts from Norway reveal that social relations are aligned with 
the notion of the university as a more unified, strategic actor rather than a 
collection of individual units and diverging strategic interests.
So we work on many levels. And then we try to get it together [coherent 
whole], so the strategic education committee coordinates this, and then we 
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get it a little bit, and then we get the faculties to help each other out [based 
on] what they are good at, so they borrow from each other a little. So we try 
to build a form to work inside and content such that we are as strategic and 
coordinated as possible and that we make the most of both time and money. 
(Manager, regional, NO)
changIng PurPose of the strategy
From a rational-instrumental theoretical perspective (Christensen et  al. 
2007), strategy documents are considered to be instruments to reach 
organisational goals, and actors are expected to align their behaviour to 
match them. Table 7.1 shows the extent to which academic staff and man-
agers state that they align their behaviour with the goals presented in the 
strategies. It shows that, to a large extent, managers align their behaviour 
with unit- and faculty-level strategies, but only to some extent with 
university- level strategies. This confirms the message from the interviews 
that, for actors in departments or equivalent academic units, the university- 
level strategies are mostly symbolic rather than core components of their 
daily working strategy. The survey data reveal that academic departments’ 
strategies are more strongly based on engagement and dialogue than are 
university-level strategies.
Table 7.1 also shows that academics, in general, align their behaviour to 
strategy goals to a lesser degree than do managers. Still, more than 80% of 
academics in the three countries stated that their behaviour was aligned to 
goals in unit strategies, compared to about one-third in the case of univer-
sity strategies. When it comes to academics, country differences are less 
than those seen in relation to managers. However, academics in Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden have loyalty towards hierarchically lower-level strate-
gies. In Table 7.2, it can be seen that managers reported their behaviours 
clearly meeting their goals more often than academics at all univer-
sity levels.
Respondents across the sample indicated that strategies have become 
increasingly prominent since the early 2000s, particularly in the last 
decade. Competition and the need to coordinate and orchestrate activities 
across the board, as well as assess performance, come to the fore as key 
purposes for strategic exercises, which, on the whole, have also become 
more top-down and central to university life.
For me personally, performance in teaching means that, above all, the pro-
cess to bring the message—so to say that students will learn—is the most 
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important result. In research, the most important issue is publishing. 
(Academic, regional, FI)
There is not much strategy on teaching … it’s a good idea to give good 
candidates and teaching and such things. And of course, it should be rele-
vant that the students should experience what is relevant … So, yes, you 
cannot just decide to get so and so many research projects; it’s absolutely 
impossible then. (Academic, flagship, NO)
This proves that the researchers and the departments know what to do as a 
teacher and researcher. We know what to do, and we struggle, and we are 
successful during a period, and then perhaps we may stagnate for a period. 
(Manager, flagship, SE)
InstItutIonal strategIes and actors
This section deals with a theme that focuses on strategy at the university 
level and on the university as a strategic actor. University strategies are 
essential tools for determining how institution-level goals are enforced in 
Table 7.1 Academics’ views to meeting goals of strategies (percentage of those 
who agreed with values 4 and 5)
Finland Norway Sweden
I align my academic behaviour to meet goals in university 
strategies.
31.8 29.9 28.2
I align my academic behaviour to meet goals in faculty 
strategies.
41.0 34.9 36.8
I align my academic behaviour to meet goals in unit 
strategies.
64.2 60.5 66.5
Table 7.2 Administrators’ views to meet goals of strategies (percentage of those 
who agreed with values 4 and 5)
Finland Norway Sweden
I align my management behaviour to meet goals in university 
strategies.
49.5 46.7 46.5
I align my management behaviour to meet goals in faculty 
strategies.
69.7 61.6 60.6
I align my management behaviour to meet goals in unit 
strategies.
86.9 84.1 85.6
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academic units. The alternative is traditional federalist university gover-
nance, through which the definition of essential and meaningful work is 
defined at the level of academic units (Balbachevsky and Schwartzman 
2011). The key strategy implementation of this determination is resource 
allocation. The data presented in this section provide an explanation of how 
strategy setting and allocation of resources can result in a strong institution 
at the faculty and academic unit levels. This phenomenon is apparent in the 
respondents’ perceptions of how strategic goals affect the allocation of 
resources at the university, faculty, and academic unit levels (Fig. 7.3).
The data show slight variations in the ways in which strategic goals affect 
the allocation of resources. In Finland and Norway, strategies are more 
geared towards university-level initiatives, such as strategic research areas 
and the establishment of central level units, such as for research, interna-
tionalisation, and other activities. In contrast, the data for Sweden suggest 
that strategic resource allocations are more prominent at the faculty level. 
Accounts from the interviews show that managers play a critically important 
role in implementing strategies and assessing strategic results and that there 
is an increasing tendency for the coupling of core activities and resources 
with high-level/strategic goals at the university and faculty levels.
The data suggest that in one way or another (i.e. directly or indirectly) 
university-level strategies have a tendency to dominate over academic unit 
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Fig. 7.3 Respondents’ views on how strategies affect resource allocation (per-
centage of those who agreed with values 4 and 5)
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strategies, suggesting that the relationship between strategies and organ-
isational life has become more top down (hierarchical) than was the case 
before. In some interviews, there was discussion about how well university- 
level strategies take into account academic units’ strategic priorities (spe-
cialisation areas) and assets (teaching and research excellence).
We have a new strategy developed by the faculty that will largely follow the 
university’s strategy, support it and, will participate in certain sections where 
our expertise is best targeted. In these [focus] areas, it is the implementation 
of the [university] strategy, as well as research and education strategies. And, 
of course, it also controls the research, that is, especially the strategic fund-
ing. (Academic, regional, FI)
Strategies are thought by some, mostly administrators, to be critical 
tools in processes of change and transformation (‘modernisation’), as in 
the case of mergers. There is also evidence of strategic behaviour by facul-
ties in gaining access to strategic resources, but with them acting as though 
it is business as usual (decoupling).
Now, I’ve been in this position for just 2.5 years, as long as we’ve had this 
[change process], but I’ve never … in any other roles worked so closely on 
a strategy, and I think it’s really necessary when we’re now merging. It is so 
necessary to know where we want to go and that we will all go after the 
same thing, so I think that in merger processes in particular, [a clear strat-
egy of clear leadership] becomes more important than ever. (Manager, 
regional, NO)
It should also be emphasised that discussions are thought to be benefi-
cial for people who disagree with the final strategy formulations, as it pro-
vides opportunities to develop alternative arguments about the overall 
direction of the organisation.
It may not be the strategy documents themselves, but rather the process of 
getting there and the discussions you have. (Manager, flagship, SE)
conclusIons
The remit of this chapter was to illuminate two critical aspects underpin-
ning university life in the Nordic countries: who gets involved with strate-
gic processes, and to what extent these processes affect behaviour across 
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the organisation. The results based on the FINNUT survey and our inter-
view data indicate that university-level strategies at Nordic universities lack 
legitimacy. This is because strategy formulation at these universities is 
based on the complex relationship between the academic departments and 
the university. These relationships are governed by the setting of objec-
tives, focusing on research and education, as well as on the role of the 
strategy in allocating the resources required for implementation. 
Participation in strategy work was found to be unstable, which in turn 
further weakens the legitimacy of the strategy. The comparative data show 
that some academic staff are not involved in the strategy process at all, and 
hence do not relate their daily tasks to the goals and/or values expressed 
in the strategy.
It seems that in the Nordic countries examined, universities have quite 
traditional and rational assumptions regarding strategies and strategic 
work. Academics do not often share this view, as their adherence to the 
preparation and implementation of the institutional strategies is often 
accidental. Based on the cross-country data, it can be argued that a strat-
egy has meaning for practitioners and actors in strategy formulation when 
it is useful to those practitioners. This is particularly apparent in strategy 
formulation, in which participation is significantly reduced the closer the 
strategy moves towards the university level. In the three Nordic countries, 
less than 10% of respondents reported participating in strategy formula-
tion at the university level, and about half of the academic staff reported 
participating in strategy formulation at the unit level. For administrators, 
strategy process and strategy implementation are a more natural part of 
their work. These findings are aligned with the evidence (both within and 
outside the Nordic region) that recent reform processes aimed at trans-
forming universities into more coherent, strategic actors (Pinheiro and 
Stensaker 2013; Ramirez 2006) have resulted in a growing gap regarding 
the values, practices, and priorities of university managers as compared to 
those of the academic heartland (Berg and Pinheiro 2016; Pekkola 
et al. 2017).
The factors highlighted above make it possible to rebuild universities’ 
power relationships, engagement, and organisational values in the prepa-
ration and implementation of a strategy (cf. Fumasoli et al. 2015). These 
factors, in turn, define the directions of a university’s future and also legiti-
mise the university’s position as an organisation (Deephouse et al. 2008). 
When academic staff define a strategy for the benefit of individuals or 
units, there is no common understanding of what the strategy is in any of 
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the  three Nordic countries. For example, in the Finnish responses, it is 
typical to criticise the priorities or the profile-based development of the 
strategy. Some of the respondents remain distanced from the strategy and 
do not follow the goals or meanings of the strategy in their work.
It is difficult to define the extent to which the strategies enacted in 
recent years have affected performance in the realms of teaching and 
research. That said, the so-called strategic turn seems to be associated 
(goes hand in hand) with a new culture of performativity and  accountability 
(Hansen et al. 2019). However, it is reasonable to conclude that behav-
iour changes as internal actors (at different levels) align their activities and 
strategic aspirations with key thematic (strategic) areas to secure additional 
resources, both people and funding. In this respect, recent reform pro-
cesses attest to the importance of resource dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003) in enacting change and transformation within the Nordic 
university sectors. That being said, there is also evidence of decoupling 
(Oliver 1991) once academic communities tap into strategic resources; 
hence, it is difficult to assess the extent to which strategic priorities are in 
fact guiding academic behaviour.
As regards strategic processes within universities, the FINNUT data 
sets show that assistant professors and lecturers are the least influential 
actors in decision-making processes for institutional strategies. Instead, 
they play a significant role in unit-level strategy work and especially in the 
grass-roots implementation, or ‘localization’ (Wedlin and Sahlin 2008), of 
institutional strategies. Therefore, and on the basis of survey results and 
interviews, the main observation made is that no single group is fully 
dominant in strategy formulation despite the increasing role played by 
certain local agents such as university managers. Similarly, there seems to 
be no common arena in strategy work where the dialogue takes place. 
Engagement in university strategy is formed in a dialogue where different 
groups have different roles and participate at different times according to 
their social standings within the university (Battilana 2006). If and when 
the dialogue is successful, the different actors’ roles may turn out to be 
good practices that the university can emulate or institutionalise over time. 
In those cases in which the dialogue is unsatisfactory and/or it results in 
inaction or resistance, there is evidence for the belief that academics tend 
to deny the importance attributed to strategy formulation at the univer-
sity level.
The data also indicate that without a dialogue and engagement role, 
the content of strategies is not relevant to Nordic universities. The fact is 
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that different types of staff are not involved in the strategy process. In 
providing similar access for engagement and dialogue, strategy as practice 
can take place in different contexts for personnel groups and thus produce 
a strategic process for the university in which internal and external stake-
holders become actively engaged. There is a need for scholarly research 
about the methods and practices through which strategy practitioners can 
support the engagement of university staff in the process. There is a lack 
of this knowledge, especially at the university level, where dialogue seems 
to be weakest. Based on the results outlined in this chapter, academic staff 
do not accept the university as a strategy-defining actor, and through the 
interviews and surveys, an interesting question arises as to how perfor-
mance management practices can support engagement in the strategy for-
mulation process.
Acknowledgements The data presented in the current volume and individual 
chapters emanate from a comparative study funded by the Norwegian Research 
Council under its FINNUT flagship program, a long-term program for research 
and innovation in the educational sector program. The project number was 
237782, and the project was titled ‘Does it matter? Assessing the performance 
effects of changes in leadership and management structures in Nordic Higher 
Education’.
references
Aarrevaara, Timo. 2015. The Finnish Academic Profession in Health-Related 
Sciences and Social Services. In Professionalism, Managerialism and Reform in 
Higher Education and the Health Services: The European Welfare State and the 
Rise of the Knowledge Society, ed. Teresa Carvalho and Rui Santiago, 64–78. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Aarrevaara, Timo, and Ian R. Dobson. 2013. Movers and Shakers: Do Academics 
Control Their Own Work? In The Work Situation of the Academic Profession in 
Europe: Findings of a Survey in Twelve Countries, ed. Ulrich Teichler and Ester 
Ava Höhle, 159–182. Dordrecht, Germany: Springer.
Aarrevaara, Timo, Janne Wikström, and Peter Maassen. 2017. External 
Stakeholders and Internal Practices in Departments of Teacher Education at 
European Universities. Higher Education Quarterly 71 (3): 251–262.
Amaral, Alberto, V. Lynn Meek, and Ingvild M. Larsen, eds. 2003. The Higher 
Education Managerial Revolution? Dordrecht, Germany: Springer.
Balbachevsky, Elizabeth, and Simon Schwartzman. 2011. Brazil: Diverse 
Experiences in Institutional Governance in the Public and Private Sectors. In 
Changing Governance and Management in Higher Education: The Perspectives 
 T. AARREVAARA ET AL.
231
of the Academy, ed. William Locke, William K. Cummings, and Donald Fisher, 
35–56. Dordrecht, Germany: Springer.
Battilana, Julie. 2006. Agency and Institutions: The Enabling Role of Individuals’ 
Social Position. Organization 13 (5): 653–676.
Berg, Laila Nordstrand, and Rómulo Pinheiro. 2016. Handling Different 
Institutional Logics in the Public Sector: Comparing Management in 
Norwegian Universities and Hospitals. In Towards a Comparative 
Institutionalism: Forms, Dynamics and Logics Across the Organizational Fields of 
Health Care and Higher Education, ed. Rómulo Pinheiro, Lars Geschwind, 
Francisco O. Ramirez, and Karsten Vrangbæk, 145–168. Bingley, UK: Emerald 
Group Publishing.
Birnbaum, Robert. 1988. How Colleges Work: The Cybernetics of Academic 
Organization and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.
Chandler, Alfred D. 2003. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the 
American Industrial Enterprise. Washington, DC: Beard Books.
Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, Paul G.  Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik. 2007. 
Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth. 
Milton Park, UK: Taylor & Francis.
Covaleski, Mark A., and Mark W. Dirsmith. 1988. An Institutional Perspective on 
the Rise, Social Transformation, and Fall of a University Budget Category. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 33 (4): 562–587.
Deem, Rosemary, Sam Hillyard, and Mike Reed. 2007. Knowledge, Higher 
Education, and the New Managerialism: The Changing Management of UK 
Universities. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Deephouse, David L., Jonathan Bundy, Leigh Plunkett Tost, and Mark 
C.  Suchman. 2008. Organizational Legitimacy: Six Key Questions. In The 
SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood, 
Christine Oliver, Thomas B. Lawrence, and Renate E. Meyer, 49–77. London: 
SAGE Publications.
Elena-Pérez, Susana, Ozcan Saritas, Katja Pook, and Campbell Warden. 2011. 
‘Ready for the Future? Universities’ Capabilities to Strategically Manage Their 
Intellectual Capital. Foresight 13 (2): 31–42.
Frost, Jetta, Fabian Hattke, and Markus Reihlen. 2016. Multi-Level Governance in 
Universities: Strategy, Structure, Control. Basel, Switzerland: Springer.
Fumasoli, Tatiana, Rómulo Pinheiro, and Bjørn Stensaker. 2015. Handling 
Uncertainty of Strategic Ambitions—The Use of Organizational Identity as a 
Risk-Reducing Device. International Journal of Public Administration 38 
(13–14): 1030–1040. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.988868.
Gornitzka, Åse, Bjørn Stensaker, Jens-Christian Smeby, and Harry De Boer. 2004. 
Contract Arrangements in the Nordic Countries—Solving the Efficiency/
Effectiveness Dilemma? Higher Education in Europe 29 (1): 87–101. https://
doi.org/10.1080/03797720410001673319.
 STRATEGY AS DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT 
232
Habibov, Nazim, and Alex Cheung. 2017. The Role of University Education in 
Selecting Active Strategies for Coping with the 2007 Global Crisis in 28 
Transnational Countries. International Journal of Educational Development 
57: 65–72.
Hansen, H.F., L. Geschwind, J. Kivistö, E. Pekkola, R. Pinheiro, and K. Pulkkinen. 
2019. Balancing Accountability and Trust: Higher Education Reforms in the 
Nordic Countries. Higher Education. Online First. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10734-019-0358-2.
Harisalo, Risto, and Timo Aarrevaara. 2015. Katalyyttinen puhe lautakunnissa – 
Tutkimus kuuden suurimman kaupungin lautakunnista. Tampere, Finland: 
Tampere University Press.
Jarzabkowski, Paula, and Paul Spee. 2009. Strategy-as-Practice: A Review and 
Future Directions for the Field. International Journal of Management Reviews 
11 (1): 69–95.
Johnson, Gerry, Ann Langley, Leif Melin, and Richard Whittington. 2007. Strategy 
as Practice: Research Directions and Resources. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kivistö, Jussi, Elias Pekkola, and Anu Lyytinen. 2017. The Influence of 
Performance-Based Management on Teaching and Research Performance of 
Finnish Senior Academics. Tertiary Education and Management 23 (3): 
260–275. https://doi.org/10.1080/13583883.2017.1328529.
Kotter, John P. 1996. Leading Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Lebeau, Yann, and Alice Bennion. 2014. Forms of Embeddedness and Discourses 
of Engagement: A Case Study of Universities in Their Local Environment. 
Studies in Higher Education 39 (2): 278–293. https://doi.org/10.1080/030
75079.2012.709491.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 2006. The Logic of Appropriateness. In The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert 
E. Goodin, 689–708. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miles, Raymond E., Charles C. Snow, Alan D. Meyer, and Henry J. Coleman. 
1978. Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. Academy of Management 
Review 3 (3): 546–562. https://www.jstor.org/stable/257544.
Mintzberg, Henry. 1978. Patterns in Strategy Formation. Management Science 24 
(9): 934–948.
Mouwen, Kees. 2000. Strategy, Structure and Culture of the Hybrid University: 
Towards the University of the 21st Century. Tertiary Education and 
Management 6 (1): 47–56.
Oliver, Christine. 1991. Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. Academy of 
Management Review 16 (1): 145–179.
Pacheco, Matheus M., and Karl M. Newell. 2018. Search Strategies in Practice: 
Influence of Information and Task Constraints. Acta Psychologica 182: 9–20.
 T. AARREVAARA ET AL.
233
Pekkola, Elias, Taru Siekkinen, Jussi Kivistö, and Anu Lyytinen. 2017. Management 
and Academic Profession: Comparing the Finnish Professors with and Without 
Management Positions. Studies in Higher Education. https://doi.org/10.108
0/03075079.2017.1294578.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald R. Salancik. 1974. Organizational Decision Making as 
a Political Process: The Case of a University Budget. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 19 (2): 135–151.
———. 2003. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.
Pinheiro, Rómulo. 2015. The Role of Internal and External Stakeholders. In 
Higher Education in the BRICS Countries: Investigating the Pact Between 
Higher Education and Society, ed. Simon Schwartzman, Rómulo Pinheiro, and 
Pundy Pillay, 43–58. Dordrecht, Germany: Springer.
Pinheiro, Rómulo, and Bjørn Stensaker. 2013. Designing the Entrepreneurial 
University: The Interpretation of a Global Idea. Public Organization Review 14 
(4): 1–20.
———. 2014. Strategic Actor-Hood and Internal Transformation: The Rise of the 
‘Quadruple-Helix University’? In Global Challenges, Local Responses in Higher 
Education: The Contemporary Issues in National and Comparative Perspective, 
ed. Jelena Brankovic ́, Manja Klemencǐć, Predrag Lažetić, and Pavel Zgaga, 
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evaluation Practices and Impact: Overload?
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IntroductIon
We live in an era when all policy fields and organisations are expected to 
evaluate their activities (Dahler-Larsen 2012). Not least in universities, 
multiple evaluation practices have become integrated parts of everyday 
life. Academic peer review aimed at assessing the quality of publications 
and the competencies of scholars has been supplemented by other 
forms  of evaluation practices related to accreditation systems and 
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 performance- based funding systems, as well as rankings imposed on uni-
versities from the universities’ external environments (Stensaker and 
Maassen 2015). Actors at the european level, for example, related to the 
Bologna process, and actors at national levels are both drivers in develop-
ing these practices. Other types of evaluation practices, such as student 
assessments of courses, peer-review evaluation of departments and indi-
vidual performance assessments, are initiated by the universities them-
selves (Karlsson et al. 2014).
In this chapter, we analyse the evaluation practices in and around the 
universities in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as an approach to 
better understanding the ongoing changes in the governance of the higher 
education sector in the region. As in many other regions around the world, 
the public sector in the Nordic countries has been exposed to a range of 
reforms in which the state has changed its governance approach, allowing 
for more institutional autonomy. At the same time, the reforms have intro-
duced and changed other policy instruments in the sector, exposing the 
sector to strengthened demands for accountability on aspects such as qual-
ity, relevance, impact, effectiveness and efficiency (Verhoest et al. 2004; 
Stensaker and harvey 2011).
evaluation is a procedure for assessing how public organisations per-
form on these aspects (Vedung 2010). It can have different purposes and 
roles associated with changed governance, ranging from being an instru-
ment of control to being a measure for stimulating formative improvement 
(hansen 2005). Disclosing the configuration of the evaluative design pres-
ent in a given country can accordingly inform us about underlying ratio-
nales and logic in the emergent governance of higher education in the 
Nordic countries. In this chapter, two research questions are addressed: 
(1) What are the major similarities and differences of evaluation practices 
across the Nordic countries? (2) What are the experiences of these prac-
tices from the points of view of academics and managers? The latter issue 
is of interest as input to our understanding of the meaningfulness and 
impact of the evaluative practices implemented. Our focus is on institu-
tionalised evaluation routines. Ad hoc evaluations, for example, following 
up on implementation of reforms, are not included in the analysis.
The analysis takes a comprehensive approach to evaluation practices. By 
doing so, it adds to the analyses in the other chapters in Part II of this 
book. Whereas those chapters delve thoroughly into funding dynamics, 
managerialism and strategy work, this chapter is an attempt to link these 
aspects together.
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The rest of this chapter is structured in four sections. In the section 
‘Conceptual Framework and Methodology’, a conceptual framework of 
different types of evaluation models is presented. The framework is used 
for analysing the types of evaluation practices implemented. Further, this 
section briefly presents the methodology for analysis. In the section 
‘Mapping evaluation Practices’, evaluation practices in the four countries 
are mapped and compared. In the section ‘experiences of evaluation 
Practices’, academics’ and managers’ views on evaluation are presented 
and discussed comparatively. The section ‘Discussion and Conclusion’ 
holds the conclusion as well as a discussion on further perspectives.
conceptual Framework and methodology
Within public sector management, there is an increasing interest in how 
public governance can and should be constructed in more complex and 
internationally dependent societies (Treib et  al. 2007). In general, the 
concept of governance has implied a change in public management in 
which the state may allow for private sector actors to have or take a role; a 
range of instruments, including rules and regulations, voluntary agree-
ments, standardisation and information are applied; and coordination 
rather than regulation characterises the operating mode (Levi-Faur 2014).
The changing forms of governance often include the following three 
elements: (1) increased emphasis on institutional autonomy, which is 
meant to stimulate a stronger organisational actor-hood and improved 
management (Verhoest et al. 2004; Seeber et al. 2015); (2) more empha-
sis on institutional accountability in terms of quality, relevance and overall 
performance (Stensaker and harvey 2011); and (3) the introduction of 
various evaluative measures to inform, control or stimulate both auton-
omy and accountability (Levi-Faur 2014).
As such, it is possible to argue that evaluation is a key measure in the 
new emergent governance patterns in higher education. As discussed in 
Chap. 2, the literature on evaluation is rich in discussions on how to define 
the concept. As mentioned earlier, we define evaluation as procedures for 
assessing aspects such as the effectiveness and quality of public organisa-
tions’ activities, among others (Vedung 2010). evaluation can be per-
formed by both public and private actors, and it can have both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ consequences. Consequences are hard if organisations are sanctioned 
if they do not meet evaluation criteria; consequences are soft if evaluation 
routines are implemented as support for learning and quality development 
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(Weiss 1998). Further, evaluation can be policy driven, managerial or aca-
demic in its design (hansen 2005). Performance-based national funding 
schemes are examples of policy-driven evaluation. University-driven sys-
tems assessing student satisfaction are examples of managerial-driven eval-
uation, and peer review–based appointment routines are examples of 
academically driven evaluations. As suggested, evaluations can be con-
ducted at different levels of the higher education system (Stensaker and 
harvey 2011), ranging from national systems of quality assurance to eval-
uation processes that concern universities and their performance or pro-
grammes. With programme, we refer to an ‘organized, planned, and 
usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve 
social conditions’ (Rossi et  al. 2004: 29), in our case, educational pro-
grammes. however, the levels at which evaluations are conducted are indi-
cations of where autonomy is found within the system, what this autonomy 
is used for and the accountability demands associated with it.
evaluation processes can be anchored in a number of evaluation models 
which stipulate the question in focus and specify how to set up criteria for 
assessment. Table  8.1 presents a typology of evaluation models drawn 
Table 8.1 A typology of evaluation models
Evaluation models Questions addressed Evaluation criteria
Result models
 (a) Goal-attainment have goals been realised? Derived from goals
 (b) effect Which effects can be 
uncovered?
Open. All types of effects
Process models
 (a) Implementation Are there implementation 
problems?
Assess links from the idea about an 
intervention to decisions about 
design, implementation, addressee 
responses and effects
 (b) Activity Are activity levels 
increasing/decreasing?
Improvement
Actor models
 (a) Users Are users satisfied? Formulated by users
 (b) Stakeholders Are stakeholders satisfied? Formulated by stakeholders
 (c) Peers how do peers assess 
quality?
Formulated by peers
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from the literature on organisational effectiveness (Cameron 1986), the 
literature on programme evaluation (Scriven 2003) and the literature cov-
ering both types of evaluands (Vedung 1997). The typology is a slightly 
revised and simplified version of the typology discussed in hansen (2005).
The evaluation models in the typology are ideal types falling into three 
categories. The result models are summative. In the classical goal- 
attainment model, results are assessed according to predetermined goals. 
In the effect model, the scope is broader, as all types of effects, intended/
unintended as well as anticipated/unanticipated, are assessed in principle. 
The process models are formative and explanatory, and the actor models 
are anchored in the different actors’ own evaluation criteria.
All models can be said to represent different modes of governance, 
where result models in general are associated with more traditional hierar-
chical governance, process models are often associated with more hori-
zontal and community-oriented governance modes and actor models are 
more related to market and user-type governance approaches (Treib et al. 
2007). Of course, in practice, evaluation designs may often be hybrid phe-
nomena drawing on several models. however, analytically, the models are 
fruitful tools for uncovering the regulatory logic behind the evaluation 
routines (Levi-Faur 2014). As such, they are used later for a comparative 
analysis of the country practices.
The analysis of the evaluation practices is based on several types of data. 
The mapping of the practices is based on official documentary material 
such as governmental reports, as well as on available scholarly analyses. 
The analysis of the experiences of evaluation practices are based on survey 
as well as interview data collected as part of the FINNUT-PeRFACAD 
project (see Chap. 1 for a more elaborated presentation).1 In this chapter, 
we use survey data for the comparative analysis of academics’ experiences 
with evaluation practices and then use interview data in a supplementary 
and illustrative way to shed light on the dynamics and experienced impacts 
of evaluation practices of both academics and managers.
mappIng evaluatIon practIces
In this section, evaluation practices are mapped by country in order to 
shed light on similarities and differences across countries. In the mapping 
of the practices, we use the distinctions discussed earlier: policy-driven, 
1 The survey data included in this chapter has been used also in an analysis of accountability 
relationships (hansen et al. 2019).
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managerial-driven and academic-driven practices. Further, we map evalu-
ation practices related to education activities, research activities and other 
types of evaluands. In the comparison across countries, we use the typol-
ogy of evaluation models to address the discussion on similarities and 
differences.
Denmark
There are eight universities in Denmark. Although the universities are very 
different regarding age, size, profile and structure, the policy-driven exter-
nal evaluation practices they are confronted with are very much alike. 
however, the universities have considerable leeway regarding how to 
implement external evaluation practices in organisational routines and 
how to initiate and implement internal evaluation practices. The overall 
pattern of evaluation practices at Danish universities is presented in 
Table 8.2.
Policy-driven evaluation practices in Denmark are first and foremost 
related to performance-based funding streams. Such systems evaluate per-
formance using indicators. When indicators have been decided on, such 
systems are implemented rather mechanically. In relation to education, 
nearly all resources have been linked to performance, concrete to the 
number of students passing exams, since the 1980s. Since 2009, this mea-
sure has been combined with bonuses given if students accomplish their 
studies in timely fashion (DeA 2011). Bonuses constitute nearly 10% of 
the total amount of funding for educational purposes.
Recently, the funding formula has been further developed, as the 
Parliament has decided on a new formula for 2019 which, besides student 
throughput, includes employability, goal attainment (according to con-
tracts negotiated between the government and the individual university) 
and quality aspects. The quality aspects in the formula have yet to be 
decided, with student and graduate satisfaction and maybe teacher assess-
ment of quality as dimensions being considered. The performance-based 
funding formula is, thus, becoming increasingly complex, and it seems 
more tightly politically governed.
In relation to research, approximately 20% of the total amount of ordi-
nary funding is distributed according to a performance-based formula that 
includes the number of graduates from master’s and PhD programmes, 
the ability to attract external funding and the number of published research 
publications. The future plan of the government is to distribute resources 
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on the basis of a new formula emphasising quality over quantity, but how 
to do this has not yet been decided.
According to the principle stated in the university law that universities 
are self-governing institutions, resources are distributed to the universities 
as lump sums. This implies that the university boards are responsible for 
the internal distribution and the principles for use of the resources. This 
again means that the individual university has leeway in deciding on the 
budget model and, thus, is able to strongly influence whether and how the 
Table 8.2 Overall pattern of evaluation practices at Danish universities
Evaluand Evaluation ‘owners’
Policy driven Managerial driven Academic driven
education   • Funding formula 
emphasising student 
throughput, employability, 
goal attainment according 
to contracts and quality
  • Pre-evaluation and 
approval of new 
programmes
  • Accreditation of 
quality assurance systems 
and programmes
  • National database 
including information 
about students’ assessment 
of quality and graduates’ 
assessment of relevance, 
among other things
  • Students’ 
satisfaction evaluation 
systems
  • Stakeholder 
curriculum dialogue 
with focus on relevance
  • Classroom 
evaluation dialogue 
with students
  • Examination of 
students
Research   • Partly performance- 
based funding based on 
several criteria including 
bibliometrics
  • Appointment and 
promotion decisions
  • Peer-review 
exercises (department 
level)
  • Classic peer 
review (especially 
publication and 
funding and, to some 
extent, appointments)
Other 
evaluands
  • Development 
contracts laying down 
institutional goals and 
followed up by goal- 
attainment evaluation
  • Since 2017, an annual 
report on he- and 
research performance
  • Human resource 
initiatives (systems for 
evaluation of managers, 
routine manager- 
individual staff 
dialogue)
  • Other scholarly 
qualifications such as 
third-stream activities 
in relation to 
appointments
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incentives in the funding formulae are implemented onwards in the 
organisation.
Further, in relation to education, the universities are confronted with 
evaluation practices built into accreditation requirements. In 2007, an 
accreditation scheme aiming at approving all bachelor’s and master’s pro-
grammes—new ones as well as existing ones—was established. When 
implemented, the system was criticised for being very bureaucratic. In 
2013, it was decided to turn the accreditation regime into a system for 
improving the quality assurance systems at the universities, emphasising 
both programme quality and relevance. This regime transformation is still 
ongoing. In Denmark, the evaluation of PhD programmes is not included 
in the accreditation system but is handled in a more ad hoc fashion.
Both performance-based funding formulae and the accreditation sys-
tem are laid down in political agreements, accreditation being a national 
political response to the Bologna process. however, considering both 
funding formulae and accreditation as evaluation practices, it becomes 
obvious that these represent hybrid evaluation models. Whereas the most 
recent teaching funding formulae combine different types of result models 
(e.g. goal-attainment, related to contracts, and effect, related to employ-
ability, combined with a user model—probably student satisfaction), the 
research funding formula combines a result model (graduates) more or 
less indirectly with peer review (external funding and publications). Finally, 
the accreditation scheme combines a user model, including both students 
and labour market representatives, with a peer-review model.
In recent years, a national database for comparison across educational 
programmes, UddannelsesZOOM, has been developed. The database 
holds information about study elements and dropout rates, for example, 
but also includes data on students’ assessments of quality and graduates’ 
assessments of relevance.
Development contracts have, for many years, been a political steering 
instrument. The contracts do lay down both national goals and individual 
university goals, and goal fulfilment has been monitored. Funding has not 
previously been a part of the contract regime, but as mentioned earlier, 
this will be the case in the future.
The development contracts are also used as managerial-driven evalua-
tion practices, as faculties and departments are asked to deliver into goal 
fulfilment. Besides this, managerial evaluation practices are first and fore-
most related to education. Student satisfaction evaluation is a routine 
exercise. evaluations of educational programmes by graduates and stake-
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holders in light of the labour market requirements are carried out in a 
more ad hoc fashion.
From time to time, some universities conduct research evaluations of 
departments by flying in international peers. The peers produce an assess-
ment report which may provide input on, for example, strategy processes, 
but in some situations seems to be more symbolic, legitimising ongoing 
activities. At the individual level, managers are obliged to conduct what 
are called ‘staff development conversations’ on an annual basis. Some 
managers use this occasion to evaluate staff performance related to publi-
cation activities and activities aiming at attracting external funding. In 
recent years, recruitment and promotion procedures related to academic 
staff have been changed. Traditional peer review is still part of these pro-
cesses, but, today, heads of departments and deans have much more influ-
ence on these evaluation processes, as well as on the subsequent 
decisions.
Thus, the importance of academic-driven evaluation practices in rela-
tion to recruitment and promotion has been challenged. Collegial pro-
cesses as well as collegial bodies have become advisory and not, as before, 
decision-making bodies. In the case of evaluation activities related to key 
academic activities, teaching and research, academic-driven evaluation 
practices are, however, very important. examination processes related to 
learning outcomes have become more structured. The same goes for PhD 
programmes and the monitoring and evaluation of PhD students’ activi-
ties. In research, peer review constitutes the core of evaluation related to 
publishing and funding decisions.
Finland
There are 15 universities in Finland, 14 of which are under the Ministry of 
education and Culture, and the direct government core funding they 
receive is about half of their total funding. For these 14 universities, the 
evaluation practices are generally based on legislation, but the universities 
also influence the evaluation practices themselves. The overall pattern of 
evaluation practices at the Finnish universities are presented in Table 8.3.
Common policy-driven evaluation practices have been developing since 
the 1990s in which the idea of Finnish universities accepting responsibility 
for the quality of their research and education has gained ground. A com-
mon Universities Act in 1997 replaced separate University Acts that had 
regulated each university in earlier years. This was the starting point for a 
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university system in which evaluation could be a system-guiding and eco-
nomic factor. Since 2005, the Finnish universities have been implementing 
the european principles of quality assurance at institutions and at the 
national level. The Finnish universities apply quality as a key element in 
evaluating higher education. The Universities Act (2009) obliges universi-
ties to participate in the evaluation of their operations and quality systems, 
but the universities also decide on their quality systems. The Finnish sys-
tem is based on the idea of developing quality systems (enhancement-led 
evaluations) that correspond to the european principles of quality assur-
ance (FINeeC 2016).
The role of the Finnish education evaluation Centre (FINeeC) is cru-
cial in these institutional audits. FINeeC is a semi-independent institu-
tion funded by the Ministry of education and Culture, and it produces the 
information for knowledge-based decision-making in the development of 
education. The process is based on enhancement-led principles to reach 
Table 8.3 Overall pattern of evaluation practices at Finnish universities
Evaluand Evaluation ‘owners’
Policy driven Managerial driven Academic driven
education   • Funding formula 
emphasising focus areas, 
employability and national 
duties
  • Field-specific funding and 
external funding for 
specialisation studies and 
non-degree programmes
  • Quality assurance
  • Contracting, 
performance 
agreements, demand 
for relevance, student 
credits, student 
mobility
  • Traditional 
quality assurance, 
graduates’ 
employment, student 
feedback after 
bachelor’s degree
Research   • Policy initiatives as the 
government’s key projects 
and reforms, including direct 
government funding for 
strategic development for 
national education and 
science policy aims
  • Performance 
agreements (internal 
and external), 
corporate funding
  • Scholarly 
publications (JuFo), 
international and 
domestic competitive 
research funding
Other 
evaluands
  • State of Scientific 
Research in Finland (report)
  • Human resource 
management
  • Regulation-based 
university evaluation 
of research
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universities’ strategic goals. The final results of the university audits are 
decided by the higher education evaluation Committee of FINeeC.
Further, the Ministry of education and Culture conducts performance 
negotiations with each university annually, and indicators defined in the 
funding formula since 1998 play a key role in these negotiations (hicks 
2012). even as recently as the early 2000s, these indicators were mostly 
quantitative, but the quality factor has been emphasised more in recent 
years. The significance of ‘quality’ in the Ministry’s 2017 funding formula 
has a strong correlation with key performance indicators: education is 
39%, research is 33% and other education and science policy consider-
ations are 28% of the total government core funding.
The field-specific funding emphasises art, engineering, natural sciences, 
medicine, dentistry and veterinary medicine. Ten percent of the funding 
depends on the number of students who complete 55 study points a year. 
This is to improve performance by reducing the time spent in formal study. 
Two percent of funding is based on the number of employed graduates, and 
3% is based on student feedback. All in all, the Finnish development reflects 
the international story of university quality assurance in the 2000s being 
about impact, quality and internationalisation and governments accordingly 
changing funding formulae (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn 2016).
In research, quality determines 9% of the total core funding. The model 
includes indicators for competitive research funding and corporate fund-
ing. The funding formula also includes other education and science policy 
matters covering strategy development, field-specific funding and national 
duties. These indicators in institutional negotiations are partly quality and 
partly impact and internationalisation.
Based on regulation, the Finnish Academy is responsible for the evalu-
ation of research in Finland. A report, ‘The State of Scientific Research in 
Finland’, is launched every second year, aiming to strengthen knowledge- 
based policymaking in science policy. The report contains analyses of 
research personnel, funding, scientific impact, bibliometric analysis and 
co-publications. There are also comparisons with the most important ref-
erence countries.
The policy basis described earlier applies to the internal funding alloca-
tion of universities. however, managerial-driven evaluation practices are 
varied. Some universities follow the indicator of external financing as 
closely as possible. For some other universities, however, the internal allo-
cation model is based primarily on historical allocations. The role of qual-
ity in performance management is strong for the universities that follow 
 eVALUATION PRACTICeS AND IMPACT: OVeRLOAD? 
246
external funding indicators in their internal allocations (Aarrevaara et al. 
2018). University tools for the implementation of internal allocation in 
education include performance-based negotiation or the determination of 
block grants on a historical basis through a performance contract or a 
combination of these models (Pruvot et al. 2015).
Performance management and quality assurance started to be accepted 
almost simultaneously at Finnish universities in the 2000s. These two fac-
tors have strengthened the role of universities as autonomous institutions. 
however, academic-driven evaluation practices, academic traditions and 
collegial practices are still strong factors in elements of quality manage-
ment. Some of the funding formula indicators relate to a publication 
forum, JuFo, classifying publications at three qualitative levels. The publi-
cation forum is a system maintained by scholarly communities. The impor-
tance of degree qualifications, academic evaluation and, in particular, 
peer-review practices are central to the university system. The Universities 
Act (2009) obliges universities to evaluate these practices regularly every 
year in negotiations between the universities and the Ministry of education 
and Culture.
Norway
There are currently ten universities in Norway. These universities are very 
different according to age, size, profile and structure, but the policy-driven 
external evaluation practices they are confronted with are very similar. The 
universities still have considerable autonomy concerning their own inter-
nal evaluation practices, although some types of evaluations are required 
by law (Stensaker 2014).
The overall pattern of evaluation practices at Norwegian universities is 
presented in Table 8.4.
Policy-driven evaluation practices in Norway are first and foremost 
related to performance-based funding streams. The number of credit 
points taken determines 25% of the total budget. This system was intro-
duced as part of a major reform in 2003 intended to strengthen the qual-
ity, relevance and efficiency of Norwegian higher education (Stensaker 
2014). Due to increased criticism of credit points as the key indicator for 
educational performance, recent changes include the introduction of a 
new indicator related to study programme completion. however, this 
indicator has so far only been linked to a small amount of the performance- 
based funding. A further expansion of possible indicators included in the 
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Table 8.4 Overall pattern of evaluation practices at Norwegian universities
Evaluand Evaluation ‘owners’
Policy driven Managerial driven Academic driven
education   • Partly performance- 
based funding (25% of 
total budget) 
emphasising student 
credits taken
  • Institutional 
accreditation of all 
universities
  • Accreditation of 
study programmes in 
university colleges at MSc 
and PhD level
  • National student 
satisfaction survey 
(mandatory for 
institutions to participate 
in)
  • Institutional QA 
systems, including 
routine reviews of study 
programmes
  • Stakeholder forum 
where institutions and 
representatives of 
employers discuss 
relevance of educational 
offerings (mandatory)
  • Student evaluation 
of teaching 
(mandatory to 
conduct, but 
autonomy is given 
regarding design)
  • External 
examination system 
administered 
decentrally by the 
individual institution 
(mandatory)
Research   • Partly performance- 
based funding (15% of 
the total budget)
  • A national system for 
bibliometric registration 
of research output (used 
as input to performance- 
based funding)
  • National evaluations 
of disciplines (rotating 
system)
  • The development of 
performance reports on 
research output
  • Classic peer 
review regarding 
external funding of 
projects, publications 
and academic 
appointments 
(mandatory)
Other 
evaluands
  • Development 
contracts currently 
piloted in some 
institutions
  • A national database 
containing key 
performance indicators 
on a range of dimensions 
enable the possibility for 
institutional 
benchmarking
  • An annual report on 
R&D, innovation and 
he performance, 
indicators etc.
  • Human resource 
initiatives (systems for 
evaluation of managers, 
routine manager- 
individual staff 
dialogues)
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performance-based funding system is likely, though it might be in relation 
to recent experiments with developmental contracts between the Ministry 
of education and individual institutions. In relation to research, approxi-
mately 15% of the total amount of ordinary funding is distributed accord-
ing to a performance-based formula for research output regarding the 
number of publications, external funding from the eU and so on. The 
research-output funding of research is based on input from a national 
database for academic publishing called Cristin.
A national system of institutional accreditation is also an important ele-
ment in the policy-driven education practices in Norway. This system 
accredits all public and private higher education institutions (heIs), and 
accreditations determine the degree of institutional autonomy provided. 
For example, being given the status of a university implies full autonomy 
concerning the establishment of new study programmes at all levels. In 
Norway, PhD programmes are included in the accreditation system—with 
respect to both the institutional accreditation system and when university 
colleges without the independent right to establish PhD programmes 
apply to the national quality assurance agency for specific recognition.
It should be noted that a considerable portion of these resources is 
distributed to universities in the form of lump-sum funding (60%), allow-
ing the institutions significant autonomy concerning their strategic devel-
opment. Formally, university boards are responsible for the internal 
distribution and the principles for using economic resources, and the 
boards also have full autonomy regarding how the university should be 
internally organised. This again means that the individual university has 
considerable leeway in deciding on the budget model and, thus, is able to 
influence whether and how the incentives in the funding formulae are 
implemented onwards within the organisation.
Additional policy-driven forms of evaluation play an important role in 
the Norwegian higher education system. First, the Research Council con-
ducts—on a rotating basis—their independent national assessments of spe-
cific disciplines, a practice that tends to have implications for how later 
external research funding schemes and programmes directed at these disci-
plines are designed. Partly linked to these evaluation processes, the Council 
also produces an annual report on R&D outputs, staff, performance, inno-
vation and so on for the entire Norwegian higher education system.
More recent policy-initiated evaluations include a national student sat-
isfaction  survey  conducted  by  the  national  QA  agency,  in  addition  to 
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experiments with national exams in particular disciplines aimed at estab-
lishing and upholding national academic standards.
Compared to the relatively high number of policy-driven evaluations, 
there are relatively few managerial-driven evaluation practices in Norway. 
Perhaps the most influential of these is the institutional QA system, man-
datory for every university and college to establish, in which issues such as 
management, formal responsibilities and evaluation are central (Stensaker 
2014).  These QA  systems  have  been  a  central  element  of  the  national 
accreditation system in place since 2004 and are tightly linked to the 
external checks conducted by the national QA agency at an institutional 
level  every  sixth  year.  In  some  institutions,  this  QA  system  has  been 
expanded to the area of research and has become more integrated into the 
regular steering of the institutions.
every higher education institution in Norway is also required to estab-
lish a formal forum where institutional representatives and representatives 
from employers evaluate and advise the institutions about the relevance of 
the educational offerings. Finally, several formal evaluations related to an 
expanding and more professional administration and the perceived need 
for more data and knowledge in the area of human resources management 
have been developed administratively within universities.
Academic-driven evaluation practices have become a more common 
phenomenon in Norway since World War II. however, an external exam-
iner system had already been institutionalised decades earlier. Also, stu-
dent evaluation of teaching has a relatively long history in Norway, 
although these activities were later incorporated into the institutional QA 
systems. While it is mandatory for institutions to conduct student evalua-
tions of teaching according to national regulations, there is significant 
room for individual autonomy concerning how these systems are designed 
and implemented.
As in many other Nordic countries, a considerable number of evalua-
tion activities are conducted as part of the daily running of the universities, 
including academics’ involvement in evaluating the possibility of being 
granted externally funded research projects, evaluations in relation to aca-
demic appointments and so on. While universities have started to change 
the ways in which academic staff is recruited, there is still significant focus 
put on the traditional peer-review procedure in Norwegian higher 
education.
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Sweden
There are 15 public and 2 private universities in Sweden. In addition, 
there are more than 30 university colleges providing higher education. 
There are many differences across the sector when it comes to size, scien-
tific scope and relation between teaching and research. All universities 
report to the government, and their operations are regulated by the laws 
and statutes that apply to the higher education sector. They are nationally 
evaluated by the higher education Authority (UKÄ). In addition, they 
have the responsibility of initiating and undertaking their own evaluations 
(Table 8.5).
The policy-driven evaluation practices in Sweden are partially based on 
metrics. In education, a funding system based on the input and output of 
students was introduced in 1993. Approximately half of the money is allo-
cated upon student admission, the other half when students complete 
their studies. This system does not include any evaluation component but, 
Table 8.5 Overall pattern of evaluation practices at Swedish universities
Evaluand Evaluation ‘owners’
Policy driven Managerial driven Academic driven
education   • Higher Education 
Authority (UKÄ): 
accreditation, 
institutional audits, 
reviews of subjects and 
programmes
  • HEI-initiated 
educational assessment 
exercises, institutional 
standardised systems 
for course evaluation
  • Collegial bodies’ 
decisions on new courses 
and programmes, 
teacher-driven evaluation 
of courses, assessment 
and examination of 
students
Research   • Bibliometrics: 
publications, citations 
and external funding; 
national evaluations of 
subjects and 
programmes (like 
centres of excellence)
  • HEI-initiated 
research assessment 
exercises, performance 
indicators; ad hoc 
benchmarking within 
networks
  • Classic peer review 
(funding, publication, 
appointments)
Other 
evaluands
  • Human resources 
initiatives (systems for 
evaluation of 
managers, routine 
manager-individual 
staff dialogue)
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rather, is mechanical in character. however, the assessment of students’ 
performances indirectly affects the outcome. This system has, at times, 
been criticised and is currently once again under review. The critical 
remarks are related to quality; the argument put forward has been that 
academic staff become pressured to lower standards in order to get stu-
dents through educational programmes. This has been particularly preva-
lent in areas and institutions where student admissions have been less 
competitive.
The national evaluation of higher education is under the authority of 
the UKÄ, which undertakes accreditations of new programmes, subject 
and programme reviews, thematic evaluations and institutional audits. It 
evaluates education at all three levels. The focus of the evaluation system 
has varied over time but has always comprised control, enhancement and 
information as the three main aims, currently with more emphasis on 
enhancement-driven institutional audits as compared with the previous, 
more control-oriented subject and programme reviews.
In research, a performance-based funding system was introduced in 
2009 based on indicators: external funding, citations and publications. 
This was a major shift in Swedish research policy and part and parcel of a 
larger reform agenda. Over time, 10–20% of the total funding has been 
allocated on the basis of these indicators. Until then, the direct state fund-
ing was allocated entirely based on the size and number of academic staff, 
sometimes referred to as ‘historical principles’.
Managerial-driven evaluation practices are also in place. In addition to 
the national systems, there have been a number of initiatives at the institu-
tional level, both in education and research. The national policy-driven 
systems described earlier have, to varying degrees, ‘trickled down’ to the 
universities (hammarfelt et al. 2016). The first research assessment exer-
cise at the institutional level was launched at Uppsala University in 2007 
(called Quality and Renewal), which was subsequently followed by a num-
ber of similar exercises at other institutions. They have all used peer-review 
panels and bibliometrics as standard procedure. Some of the Swedish uni-
versities have repeated the exercises more than once, usually with a slightly 
altered methodology (Bomark 2016). They have, for instance, put more 
focus on research environments (Quality and Renewal, Uppsala University 
2017) or societal impact (RAe, KTh Royal Institute of Technology). The 
outcomes of the evaluations have been used in various ways: for funding 
allocations (e.g. in the case of bonuses), for further support (for less-than- 
excellent environments) or simply for recognition (Karlsson 2017).
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Similar initiatives from the heI management have been taken on the 
educational side. This was particularly the case during a period when some 
leading universities, in light of more formal autonomy and a criticised 
national evaluation system, decided to instigate their own subject and pro-
gramme reviews (Karlsson et al. 2014). The variation in aims and method-
ology was even larger than in the case of research. These reviews were also 
affected by the research assessments, contributing to a general feeling of 
evaluation fatigue in Swedish higher education. The current national sys-
tem puts much emphasis on the universities’ own responsibility for assur-
ing and enhancing quality. This might indicate more management-led 
evaluations in the near future, both in the form of large-scale,  comprehensive 
exercises like the ones mentioned earlier and by introducing more for-
malised quality assurance cycles and processes on an annual basis.
Although both policy- and managerial-driven evaluation practices have 
been intensified, academic-driven evaluation practices do not seem to have 
decreased, either in number or in importance. Many of them are inter-
twined with managerial practices, such as the hiring of academic staff and 
promotion decisions. The relation between the collegial bodies at Swedish 
universities and the line management has been discussed quite frequently 
in the last decade. As a consequence of the autonomy reform in 2011, col-
legial bodies have, like in Denmark, become more advisory than decision- 
making. however, all major decisions regarding academic core activities 
shall still be made by academically qualified staff, according to the higher 
education ordinance.
evaluation practices regarding academic activities start with the assess-
ment of students. This is an area in which academic judgement is key, and 
traditionally, this has been under the discretion of academic staff themselves 
with few guidelines. Increasingly, the assessment of students has become 
more structured and more related to intended learning outcomes, a devel-
opment fuelled by the Bologna process. This development is intended to 
increase the transparency of the assessment process. Furthermore, doctoral 
education has also become rationalised and structured, moving away from 
the traditional master-apprentice model to becoming an education based 
on a curriculum, structured supervision, occasional mentoring and indi-
vidual study plans to be followed up at least once annually.
In the research realm, peer-review activities seem to grow continuously 
due to an increasing number of publications, journals, book publishers 
and conferences. Official reports from the Swedish Research Council show 
that Swedish researchers are indeed very productive in terms of publica-
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tions but also that their papers are not as cited as the other top nations 
(Vetenskapsrådet 2017).
Closely related to both policy-driven and managerial practices are the 
evaluations performed in research councils and private foundations that 
inform decisions on funding. Typically, leading professors form peer- 
review panels who grade research applications. Since a large portion (55%) 
of Swedish public research funding is external and competitive, these 
activities are important (Geschwind 2017).
Comparison
The mapping of evaluation practices in the Nordic countries has revealed 
both similarities and differences across countries. In this respect, our find-
ings are in line with former studies focussing more narrowly on national 
evaluation systems related to education (hansen 2014; Schmidt 2017). In 
all four countries, policy- and managerial-driven evaluation practices are 
widespread. And these types of evaluations have become more important 
compared to academic-driven practices. Further, policy-driven evaluation 
practices seem to include more performance elements across time as still 
more indicators and measures are developed and included in evaluation 
practices.
The process can be observed in relation to both education and research 
evaluation. In evaluation practices related to education, student activity 
measures have become supplemented with measures focussing on timely 
student throughput, student satisfaction and employability. And in evalu-
ation practices related to research, classical academic peer-review routines 
have been supplemented with bibliometric measures in the form of publi-
cation and citation counting, as well as with an attention to impact. This 
development has raised discussions on whether the performance-based 
funding systems have promoted quantity more than quality. In recent 
years, there seems to have been a turn towards giving more weight to 
quality.
There are, however, differences across countries regarding which new 
measures to adopt and when to adopt them. The Nordic countries seem 
to monitor each other’s evaluation practices as well as those of other 
northern european countries, thereby seeking inspiration for further 
developing their own practices. Differences across countries are also seen 
in how they have responded to the evaluation demands implemented 
according to the Bologna process. In Denmark, the accreditation system, 
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although now in transformation, has constituted a hard regulation system 
stating that every educational programme has to be accredited. In Norway 
and Sweden, universities have more authority to establish new pro-
grammes. In Finland, a softer, enhancement-led quality assurance 
approach, rather than an accreditation approach, has been adopted, and in 
Sweden, institutional audits have now become the main feature of the 
national system, evaluating the quality assurance systems rather than the 
quality itself.
Further, performance-based research funding schemes are anchored in 
different approaches. Denmark, Finland and Norway have schemes focus-
sing on counting publications, while Sweden’s scheme centres on assess-
ing the number of citations. Although the publication counting schemes 
look similar at first sight, emphasising scholarly publications and competi-
tive funding, there are important differences. For example, the transpar-
ency in the Norwegian system is much stronger than in the Danish system. 
This fact probably makes it much easier to use the performance informa-
tion in the system for other purposes than the official purpose related to 
the redistribution of resources at the national level.
In Norway and Finland, national research evaluation systems driven by 
the Norwegian Research Council and the Finnish Academy have been 
developed, whereas the approaches in Sweden and Denmark have been 
university led or faculty anchored.
Table 8.6 summarises our findings on evaluation models; result models, 
process models and actor models are in use.
Overall, similar evaluation models have been implemented across the 
Nordic countries. We find result, process and actor models in use in all 
four countries. At the same time, however, there are many differences in 
the details. For example, activity-based educational funding formulae are 
used in one way or another in all four Nordic countries. In Denmark and 
Norway, the number of credit points taken are important; in Sweden, the 
number of completed degrees is prioritised. In Denmark and Norway, the 
emphasis on timely student throughputs is more intense than in Finland 
and Sweden.
Activity- and effect-based funding formulae are also in use in the alloca-
tion of resources to research. Research funding formulae, however, also 
differ across countries. For example, Sweden is the only country that 
includes effect indicators in the form of citation counts.
In all the countries, we also find examples of policy-driven indicators 
reflected in managerial practices at both the organisational and individual 
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employers’ level, as some universities implement national indicators in 
internal resource allocation, hiring and firing procedures and decisions 
concerning individuals’ reward-based salaries. however, universities apply 
these practices in very different ways.
experIences oF evaluatIon practIces
The previous section mapped and compared evaluation practices across 
the Nordic countries. In this section, the focus is on how academics expe-
rience these practices. Key questions on this aspect include: Do they find 
it legitimate and meaningful? how do they experience its impacts?
Table 8.6 evaluation models in use
Evaluation models Used in evaluation 
procedures
Country
Result models
  • Goal attainment   • Contract steering   • DK, FI, NO
  • Effect   • Employability focus   • DK, FI
  • Ability to attract 
external funding, 
influence funding for 
research
  • DK, FI, NO, SWE
  • Citation patterns 
influence funding for 
research
  • SWE
Process models
  • Activity   • Funding formula 
education
  • DK, FI, NO, SWE
  • Formula including 
student throughput
  • DK, NO
  • Funding formula 
research (publications)
  • DK, FI, NO, SWE
Actor models
  • Users   • Student surveys   • DK, FI, NO. Gaining importance 
at the national level
  • Stakeholders   • Relevance in 
education
  • DK, NO
  • Peers   • Research evaluation   • All countries. Classic use in 
relation to publishing and funding 
decisions. Challenged in relation to 
appointment and promotion decisions
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Academics’ Views on Evaluation: Meaningful?
The survey data (Table 8.7) show that Nordic academics perceive evalua-
tion as a fairly legitimate task. however, there seems to be some misalign-
ment between the personal opinions regarding academic performance and 
measured academic performance. evaluation is experienced most nega-
tively in Denmark. In particular, there is a striking difference between 
Denmark and the other Nordic countries in perceiving measurement as a 
sign of mistrust.
Many interviewees reflected upon the meaning of the growing number 
of evaluations. An interviewee from Sweden described how policy-driven 
evaluations fuel managerial-driven evaluations, as some universities under-
take their own evaluations to prepare for the national reviews carried out 
by the UKÄ:
There are, like, so many evaluations. Before UKÄ, there are also a couple of 
internal evaluations, etc. (Flagship, Social science)
A department head from Denmark (flagship, natural science) gave voice 
to an experience of evaluation overload. This person felt that too much 
evaluation is conducted, with some evaluation procedures being principles 
without specific purposes. Further, the same individual had experienced 
evaluation procedures taking a lot of time but seldom producing new 
knowledge.
Various evaluations on research, teaching, university activities and the 
innovation system in Finland have also caused a lot of work for the inter-
viewees. Although various evaluations produce legitimacy according to 
Table 8.7 Respondents’ views on the legitimacy of evaluation and measurement 
(percentage of those who answered 4 (agree) and 5 (strongly agree))
Denmark 
(%)
Finland 
(%)
Norway 
(%)
Sweden 
(%)
Control and evaluation of my work is a 
legitimate task
42 46 49 51
Internal procedures for measuring academic 
performance are in accordance with my 
understanding of academic performance
18 25 22 23
In my opinion, performance measurements 
are signs of mistrust
47 23 36 28
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the survey results, the knowledge base of these evaluations is subject to 
much criticism. The main argument of the criticism is that the information 
used does not sufficiently support the academic tasks. One of the leaders 
of an academic unit stated:
I feel that our own observations, development work, monitoring and stu-
dent feedback, locally, and our general evaluation are more useful compared 
to the management system, even at the faculty level. (Regional, academic 
leader, sciences)
One of the Swedish interviewees belonging to the social sciences 
reflected upon the implications of changes in evaluation practices and 
experienced them as mistrust:
I think it used to be part of the profession to be able to … just like teachers, 
and there has been a deprofessionalisation, that’s for sure. […] Well, they 
(academic assessments) have been replaced by these quantitative evaluation 
systems rather than showing confidence in those who are educated to the 
assessments themselves. (Flagship, social sciences)
When asked about the degree of changes regarding evaluation and 
accountability issues in the last decade, all the groups reported an increased 
focus on this. In Norway, an administrator stated:
[…] as management, we are required to have a little more accountability by 
our owner, KD [Ministry of education], than we were 10 years ago […] But 
we are working hard to fulfil what we think are the orders we have received. 
Also, in other areas as well, I feel that we must be more responsible for the 
good management of human resources […] We have had financial prob-
lems. There is more focus [now] on having proper management and control 
processes. It must be quality assured … We got a quality assurance system 
from Bologna. So, yes, I really feel that it has become more [focus on evalu-
ation]. (Flagship, administrator)
Still, there were large variations in how meaningful this development 
was. Some found evaluation meaningful:
I am stimulated by the demand for higher performance. I want to do more. 
I get motivated to do more when people around me appreciate what I am 
doing and give feedback. (Regional, manager, sciences)
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Others were more detached and did not pay attention to this regime, 
while some were more critical, questioning the role of universities as inde-
pendent institutions if they were met by such indicators and questioning 
the impact from New Public Management.
Academics’ Views on Impacts of Evaluation
Table 8.8 shows that academics from all the countries are quite pessimistic 
about the positive impacts of measurement and evaluation, with respect to 
both performance and the atmosphere at work, regardless of the fact that 
they consider evaluation a rather legitimate activity. This observation holds 
true for both research and teaching tasks. Denmark differs most from the 
other three countries, particularly concerning research rather than teach-
ing. In the perceptions of impacts of research performance measurement 
on work atmosphere specifically, the Danish figures are considerably lower 
than the figures for Sweden, especially, but also for Norway.
The interview data illustrate a range of different impacts of educational 
evaluation, from non-positive to positive. A Danish academic (flagship, 
natural science) characterised the teaching team to which he belonged as 
anarchistic. They routinely conduct student evaluations using surveys. 
Table 8.8 Respondents’ views on the impact of evaluation and measurement 
(percentage of those who answered 4 (agree) and 5 (strongly agree))
Denmark 
(%)
Finland 
(%)
Norway 
(%)
Sweden 
(%)
Measurements increase my performance in 
teaching
13 16 18 18
Measurements increase my performance in 
research
16 26 26 28
Teaching performance measurements have a 
positive impact on the atmosphere 
surrounding academic work
11 12 16 19
Research performance measurements have a 
positive impact on the atmosphere 
surrounding academic work
11 15 19 26
Control and evaluation of my work has a 
positive impact on my teaching performance
16 20 23 29
Control and evaluation of my work has a 
positive impact on my research performance
14 23 22 26
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These results are read, and sometimes colleagues have fun doing that, but 
in his experience, the evaluations do not influence practice.
Others, however, characterised the routine student evaluations as a 
kind of fire alarm. If an evaluation uncovered problems, action was neces-
sary. Sometimes, not-so-good evaluations also had the consequence of the 
responsible programme leader having to explain upwards in the hierarchy: 
‘Up to father and over the knee’, as one (flagship, academic, social science) 
phrased it. In this way, evaluation routines can be seen as enhancing 
accountability.
Some of the Swedish interviewees also reflected upon the positive 
impacts of the external educational evaluations carried out by the UKÄ. 
They saw the evaluations as opportunities to work with quality develop-
ment at the organisational level:
And actually then, there has been good quality work as a consequence. 
Although nobody thinks this last evaluation system has been particularly 
good, the result has been good … You got an opportunity to reflect and go 
through the education holistically and scrutinise this with successive pro-
gression and coherence, etc. (Flagship, Social Sciences)
If a programme faces a negative outcome in an external evaluation, this 
seems to lead to extensive internal activity, as reputation could be 
threatened:
Well, of course, that we made it the first round was considered kind of good. 
I know my colleague at the XX programme, the programme director, when 
they failed the first round, they had a huge amount of work inwards in the 
organization. (Flagship, Social Sciences)
Also, if national evaluations are linked to funding, and good perfor-
mance is rewarded with extra money, impact was thought to increase:
Well, when there was talk about linking funding to evaluation, then people 
really got busy. (Regional, Social Sciences)
Further, some interviewees also reflected upon the impact of educa-
tional evaluations at the system level. here, the experience was that evalu-
ations have led to a greater awareness of who is good and who is less good. 
This is particularly the case in evaluations where grading is used:
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One can only see that we had this [name of evaluation]; it led to an increased 
awareness of: they are good, they are less good. even if it’s not exactly a 
competition, I think it leads in that direction. (Flagship, Regional)
As for the Norwegian academics, they are also performing student eval-
uations of the different subjects, but the impact of the evaluations varies:
What comes out of the evaluations depends—here, I am very arrogant—it 
depends on which students are showing up during the evaluation. (Regional, 
Academic, Sciences)
Most of them emphasised that the feedback from students was of high 
importance for them; however, the informal system through the daily con-
tact with students was of higher importance than the institutionalised 
evaluation systems, as illustrated here:
Well, I have a strong focus on the student feedback. But not through the 
formal system. I organise it myself. Informal and self-organised. (Flagship, 
Academic, Social Sciences)
In relation to research evaluation, the Danish interview data show that 
managers who ‘own’ evaluations are positive regarding the impact on per-
formance. For example, a former and a present dean at different universi-
ties (both social sciences) who had introduced performance-based research 
funding had both experienced a positive impact on research performance. 
however, they were also aware that undesirable side effects could occur, 
and, when such effects were recognised, the evaluation practices had been 
changed.
The interviews clearly indicate that evaluations also have an impact on 
the atmosphere of the academic units. The evaluations’ consequences for 
the atmosphere of academic life are not necessarily constant, because the 
competitive situations are temporary in character. These situations, espe-
cially before an evaluation, highlight the contradiction between unit-based 
interests and collegiality. A leader of a Finnish academic unit stated:
every time, a little depends on our situation, and if we are evaluated, we 
cannot truly be collegial. Frankly, the academic leaders of the large units 
somehow have their own interest. (Regional, academic leader, sciences)
From the Norwegian data, we can read that the impact of evaluations 
is more closely connected to research than teaching. This is seen through 
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the employment process but also through the allocation of funds. The 
metric system for publications is of particular importance for allocations at 
both the individual level (e.g. allocation of funds for daily operating activi-
ties, conferences and sabbaticals) and the institutional level (e.g. getting 
PhD students). There are critical voices that question whether this focus 
in the evaluations is of importance, but they also question this emphasis on 
research over teaching. A statement from a manager regarding the hiring 
procedures illustrates this:
Research is what comes first in the review of the competences of applicants 
… The evaluation from the review committee contains 14 pages related to 
research, and then there might be a couple of sentences at the end, summing 
up: “The applicant has been teaching for ten years, so he must be compe-
tent.” So, we are also focussed on highlighting development projects on the 
teaching side. (Regional, Manager, Social sciences)
Although the overall survey data indicate that academics are quite pes-
simistic about the direct impacts of evaluation and measurement, the 
interview data show that there may be, indirectly, more positive dynamics 
following these activities.
dIscussIon and conclusIon
The analysis in this chapter has drawn on a broad conceptualisation of the 
concept of evaluation. Evaluation has been defined as ‘procedures for 
assessing the effectiveness and quality of public organisations’. This broad 
conceptualisation has made it possible to bridge the analyses in the other 
chapters in Part II of this book. While those chapters have gone thor-
oughly into the dynamics and influence of evaluation-based funding sys-
tems, managerialism and strategy work, this chapter has given the broader 
picture of how these themes are interrelated.
The analysis has shown that there are different evaluation practices 
within the Nordic region, though the ideas behind developing evaluation 
practices are similar; they aim at improving performance on a wide range 
of aspects, such as quality, effectiveness and, in some contexts, especially in 
recent years, internationalisation, impact and employability. But looking 
into the specific practices, evaluation systems are varied. In relation to 
education, the Nordic countries adopt slightly different compared to the 
evaluation requirements in the Bologna process, and they include slightly 
different indicators in their performance-based funding systems. In rela-
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tion to research, Finland and Norway have developed national evaluation 
systems: in Finland, driven by the Finnish Academy, and in Norway by the 
research council. In Denmark and Sweden, there are no national systems 
as such. here, the universities have more autonomy to organise evalua-
tions  themselves. Also, performance-based funding systems related to 
research include different indicators and are organised differently. 
Internationally popular governance and evaluation ideas are, thus, trans-
lated into national policy agendas and administrative cultures. We find 
convergence in policy talk but less convergence in practices (Pollitt 2002).
even though quality enhancement has been an important topic on the 
national agendas, a discussion is ongoing on whether evaluation practices 
and indicators related to both research and education have caused the 
focus to move from quality to quantity. This has raised an agenda about 
how to develop systems and practices focussing more on ‘real’ quality. 
Future studies should look into how this agenda develops and how the 
initiatives implemented influence university performance.
A general pattern across the four countries is that policy-driven evalua-
tion schemes have been institutionalised and expanded, and management- 
oriented schemes—sometimes mirroring the national systems—have 
gained importance. Last but not least, the academic-driven evaluations 
have proliferated in systems with fierce competition for recognition and 
rewards. Given the public nature and the long tradition of public sector 
steering in the Nordic region, the national policy-driven initiatives are still 
seen as quite legitimate by the academic staff. As seen in these case studies, 
the growth of policy- and managerial-driven schemes have not meant a 
reduction in academic forms of evaluations, resulting in an overall growth 
of evaluations in the system. There are, however, signs that academic 
forms of evaluation are changing, as indicators used in the policy-driven 
evaluation systems are finding their way into academic evaluation prac-
tices, just as academic evaluation is becoming a stepping stone for 
managerialism.
Although the policy-driven evaluation schemes in all the countries seem 
to carry some legitimacy, academic staff throughout the Nordic region do 
not consider these very effective as tools for improving performance, 
either in research or in education. It seems that evaluation criteria in pol-
icy- and managerial-driven evaluation schemes often do not match aca-
demic definitions of what constitutes and supports good performance. 
Danish academics, in particular, were found to be quite negative towards 
the potential performative impact of evaluations. Why Denmark stands 
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out is not easy to identify through our data, but one possible explanation 
is that evaluations have perhaps been perceived as more ‘intrusive’ when 
compared to those implemented in the other Nordic countries. A related 
explanation is that Denmark also seems to have more expansion in 
managerial- driven evaluations than the other countries, which may have 
contributed to the negative atmosphere. It is also possible that the nega-
tive perceptions identified among the Danish academics are an indicator of 
‘evaluation fatigue’. Maybe evaluation has been overdone, and a proper 
balance between higher education policy initiatives, managerial initiatives 
and academic duties has not yet been found.
Returning to some of the concepts introduced in our analytical frame-
work, it could be argued that evaluations have taken up a central role in 
the changed governance of higher education in all four countries. Given 
the historical forms of governance of higher education found in the Nordic 
region, it is striking that the growth of evaluation schemes, to a large 
extent, is policy driven and, as such, under the supervision of the national 
authorities. While the state has delegated a substantial number of evalua-
tions to intermediate bodies and agencies, the governance of the sector is 
still very much a public affair in all the countries. This pattern reflects the 
intensified accountability demands due to the growth of the higher educa-
tion sectors and the corresponding increases in tax-financed resources 
spent. It also shows that decentralisation in the form of increased institu-
tional autonomy occurs in tandem with centralisation initiatives, a pattern 
also known from the hospital sectors in some of the countries (Torjesen 
et al. 2017).
One can, however, also argue that the new element found in the region 
is not so much the dominant position taken by the state but, rather, that 
many of the evaluation schemes introduced are summative and result- 
oriented with elements of user and stakeholder orientation. What we see, 
therefore, is that the nation states are strengthening competition in the 
sectors and developing more market-like governance structures while still 
holding on to the Nordic universal welfare model.
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IntroductIon
In this last chapter, we will summarize the main findings from this exten-
sive comparative study, draw some conclusions, and discuss possible impli-
cations for research, policy, and practice. The starting point for the project 
FINNUT-PERFACAD (consult Chap. 1 of the current volume for details) 
was that the conditions of the environment under which Nordic higher 
education institutions (HEI) operate have changed dramatically during 
the last decade. Policy efforts aimed at modernizing the sector have paid 
considerable attention to the way in which public universities operate. A 
privileged focus has been attributed to aspects such as efficiency, effective-
ness, and accountability (Fägerlind and Strömqvist 2004; Gornitzka and 
Larsen 2004). In addition to managing their internal operations in a more 
cost-efficient manner, public universities in the Nordic countries and else-
where are increasingly expected to respond adequately to the needs of 
various external stakeholder groups (Jongbloed et al. 2008; Neave 2002). 
One of the mechanisms being used to achieve these goals lies in enhancing 
the rationalization of internal structures and activities (Ramirez 2006, 
2010) by, inter alia, promoting professional management (Amaral et al. 
2003; Paradeise et al. 2009). As a result, most Nordic universities have 
developed extended administrative structures (at central and unit levels) 
capable of strategically supporting their primary activities (cf. Aarrevaara 
et al. 2014), and some have introduced recent changes in the nomination 
of formal leaders, such as filling the positions by appointment rather than 
election (Hansen 2017).
Yet, in spite of these trends, few studies have investigated, in a system-
atic fashion and comparative manner, the effects such types of strategic 
measures are having on the actual performance of individual institutions. 
This study has addressed this knowledge gap by investigating the impact 
of the rationalization processes—with a focus on the rise of professional 
management (managerialism) and the strengthening of leadership struc-
tures—on the teaching and research performance of public universities in 
Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden in the period 2003–2013. The 
research problem driving the project is the following:
• To what extent are changes in leadership and management structures 
related to shifts in teaching and research performance in public univer-
sities across the Nordic countries in the last decade?
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In order to address this query, we focused on three key dimensions: 
drivers, actors, and effects. The study adopted a mixed-methods design 
based on desktop research (comparative database) and a survey question-
naire along with interviews with staff of selected public universities (for 
details consult Chap. 1 of the current volume).
Before moving on to discussing the main findings of the project, a 
selection of previously undertaken studies of the Nordic higher education 
systems, as well as the conceptual backdrop, will be revisited.
the PerFAcAd Project In context: eArlIer StudIeS 
on nordIc hIgher educAtIon
In many contexts, in particular from the outside, the Nordic countries are 
discussed as one system. This volume also contributes to that discussion 
with its explicit comparative approach. Over the years, the Nordic higher 
education system has been in focus in a number of studies. A decade and 
a half ago, Fägerlind and Strömqvist (2004) published an edited volume 
with contributions from all Nordic countries: Reforming higher education 
in the Nordic countries. Studies of change in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden. They write in their concluding chapter that the 
global economy has had a substantial influence on higher education in the 
Nordic countries, where the social function of education has changed 
from welfare state social engineering to globalized market features. 
Further, they conclude that the academic oligarchy has lost power and 
that the role of the state is not as straightforward as it used to be before 
these reforms. During the 1990s, all Nordic countries increased their stu-
dent participation rates, in particular, Finland. All countries have had tra-
ditions of strict centralization of higher education systems. However, 
recent decentralization reforms have changed systems from normative leg-
islation to funding and evaluation systems and by appointing external 
members to university boards. Performance-based funding systems were 
in place in all systems based on the number of students and their achieve-
ments in the form of degrees or credits. By the early 2000s, all five Nordic 
countries had introduced a management by results governance model. 
HEIs have been given more autonomy with respect to programmes, inter-
nal organization, and economy. In all countries, designated organizations 
were created for the evaluation of higher education, and in all cases except 
Sweden, the organizations are somewhat autonomous from the Ministry.
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At the beginning of the volume, Fägerlind and Strömqvist also ask the 
question whether the Nordic countries are similar or different. The answer 
they give is that it is “complex.” On the one hand, all countries share the 
fact that they have become increasingly similar due to, for instance, the 
Bologna system, globalization, and governance trends. They were also 
distinct regarding the organization of the tertiary education landscape, 
where Finland, in particular, had chosen the most explicit binary sector, 
Norway was a front runner in the implementation of the Bologna degree 
structure, and Sweden’s higher education system was considered by the 
authors as too uniform and based on an ideology of “sameness.”
In a comparative project between the United Kingdom, Norway, and 
Sweden from the 1990s, a number of similar conclusions are made. The 
final volume (Kogan et al. 2000) summarizes, “We noted how all three 
governments urged universities to adopt explicit quality assurance prac-
tices, market behaviour, stronger vocational missions and public account-
ability, but the policies came out differently” (200). The United Kingdom 
and Sweden were basically the opposite, where Sweden’s tradition of 
state planning gave way to self-regulation at the university level. Norway 
was hesitant to “insinuate nationally devised practices.” The researchers 
also identified different national policy styles, where the English were 
described as “heroic,” the Norwegian as “incremental,” and the Swedish 
as “adversarial.”
A more recent study of the Nordic countries was undertaken by Ahola 
et al. (2014). Regarding governance, they concluded that all national sys-
tems have strengthened institutional autonomy, and a new governance 
regime had been introduced, based on delegation of state authority to 
HEIs by the use of performance-based funding and evaluations. Managerial 
forms of governance have largely replaced collegial modes. This is particu-
larly the case in Denmark and Finland, where there are the most “extreme” 
versions of reforms and where universities have become more autonomous 
institutions. Other organizational aspects mentioned include the intro-
duction of tuition fees, centres of excellence, doctoral schools, and merg-
ers within and between universities. The authors interpret this as a 
transformation of the Nordic model of higher education as part of the 
larger transition from welfare state to welfare society, where “the state no 
longer solely takes the role as a protector, while to a greater extent expect-
ing the higher education institutions to operate as entrepreneurs in a 
global market” (Ahola et al. 2014, 8).
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Recently, based on research evidence from 12 European flagship uni-
versities, including the Nordic countries, Maassen (2017) discussed why 
the outcomes of reforms in general are not in line with reform intentions. 
One explanation for this “governance paradox” would be the neglect of 
institutional trajectories of universities, what is commonly known as “path 
dependencies” (cf. Krücken 2003), as one of modern society’s oldest but 
still existing organizations.
The comparative analyses mentioned above not only tell us something 
about the individual country, but they also shed light on historical devel-
opment in relation to other, neighbouring countries. Our results build 
upon these empirical and theoretical insights about the Nordic higher 
education systems. Before we discuss the findings, we will briefly revisit 
the theoretical backdrop and the methodology used in the project.
revISItIng the concePtuAl BAckdroP
The theoretical approach taken in this project, discussed at some length in 
Chap. 1, was inspired by a typology developed by Norwegian scholar 
Johan P. Olsen (2007). This typology focused on various aspects of gov-
ernance of universities and also stressed the ability of universities—as insti-
tutions—to resist, adapt, and respond to change initiatives from external 
and internal actors. It emphasizes the resilience of universities and their 
capacity to fight back against unwanted and perceived intrusive policy and 
management initiatives. Olsen suggested four visions, or typologies (along 
two dimensions, autonomy vs. conflict), for the modern university based 
on different assumptions about what the university is for as well as the 
circumstances under which it will operate appropriately. At the heart of 
Olsen’s inquiry is the question, what type of university and for what type 
of society?
Olsen’s neo-institutional model (Table  9.1) captures various dimen-
sions of modern universities: external–internal, change–stability, market–
collegiality–bureaucracy. Universities are highly institutionalized 
organizations laden with rules, norms, and regulations. Traditionally, they 
have been described as loosely coupled and bottom-heavy (Clark 1983), 
with an impressive capacity to resist, delay, and simply not do what is 
expected of them by external stakeholders. This picture has changed in the 
last decades, and present-day universities are increasingly described as 
“strategic actors” (Krücken and Meier 2006), more tightly coupled, ratio-
nal, and even “complete” organizations (Seeber et  al. 2015), yet still 
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Table 9.1 Visions of the European university
Source: Olsen (2007, 30) [Official permissions secured from Springer]
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 heavily dependent on the external environment for resources, legitimacy, 
and power (Bleiklie et  al. 2015). Bleiklie and colleagues have recently 
introduced the concept of “penetrated hierarchies” for understanding 
universities as organizations. The authors stress the introduction of more 
hierarchical bureaucratic governance of universities, the conflict between 
leadership and academic staff, and the relationship between members of 
the organization and key external audiences who penetrate their organiza-
tion by influencing the legitimacy of control models and resource 
decisions.
As outlined in Chap. 1 of this volume, the theoretical framework being 
adopted resulted in an operationalization comprising six 
organizational/management mechanisms, listed below and related to 
organizational performance:
• Strategy
• Decision-making structures
• Organizational structures
• Accountability measures
• Funding arrangements
• Cultural climate
These mechanisms were further operationalized in a number of themes 
in the interviews and survey discussed in Chap. 1. We also formulated a 
few basic assumptions in light of the research problem and following on 
Olsen’s work:
Strategy
• H0: An overarching and penetrating institutional strategy boosts 
performance.
• H1: An overarching and penetrating institutional strategy alienates 
staff and negatively affects performance.
• H2: Strategies that are developed through participation boost 
performance.
Decision-Making Structures
• H0: More hierarchical decision-making structures stimulate increased 
performance.
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• H1: More hierarchical decision-making structures negatively affect 
performance.
• H2: Participatory decision-making structures stimulate increased 
performance.
Organizational Structure
• H0: Larger, more interdisciplinary structures boost performance.
• H1: Larger, more interdisciplinary structures negatively affect 
performance.
• H2: Diverse structures are best fitted to the diversity found in uni-
versities, and diversity boosts performance.
Accountability Measures
• H0: More systematic and regular (intense) reporting boosts 
performance.
• H1: More systematic and regular (intense) reporting negatively 
affects performance.
• H2: It is the way and form of reporting that affects performance.
Funding Arrangements
• H0: More incentives and results-oriented funding boost 
performance.
• H1: More incentives and results-oriented funding negatively affect 
performance.
• H2: A mixed funding arrangement is the best way to boost 
performance.
Cultural Climate
• H0: Systematic training and competence building in the organiza-
tion boost performance.
• H1: Systematic training and competence building (which takes time 
away from primary activities) negatively affect performance.
• H2: Cultural change through participatory and trust-based processes 
drives performance.
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As mentioned in Chap. 1, these hypotheses have not been tested in 
each chapter, but they have been instrumental in the operationalization of 
the study. We will now return to these mechanisms, themes, and assump-
tions and discuss them in relation to results presented in the empirical 
chapters composing Part II of the current volume.
comPArAtIve themAtIc FIndIngS
Strategy
Starting out with the thematic strategies, earlier research has shown how 
they have become part and parcel of modern universities for planning and 
steering and also for organizational identity formation (Fumasoli et  al. 
2015). Chapter 7, in particular, sheds light on two critical aspects of strat-
egies: who gets involved with strategic processes and to what extent these 
processes affect behaviour across the organization. The results show that 
participation in strategy work varies across cases, and many times, partici-
pation is low, which in turn affects the legitimacy of the strategic process, 
per se. The data show that some academic staff are not involved in strate-
gic processes at all, which alienates them from their own institutional goals 
and values. Furthermore, the authors show that strategies at lower levels 
are considered more relevant to academic staff, and whereas less than 10% 
of survey respondents were involved at the university level, around half of 
the academic staff reported participation at the unit level.
These findings suggest that there is a growing gap between values, 
practices, and priorities, as expressed in strategies, held by university man-
agers and administrators as compared with those of floor-level academics 
(Pinheiro and Stensaker 2014; Ramirez 2010). Thus, when we talk about 
universities as strategic actors, not all employees are necessarily included, 
but rather, only a small portion of the total staff (Pekkola et al. 2017). 
Strategies have the capacity to rebuild the university’s power relationships, 
engagement, legitimacy, and organizational values. However, where aca-
demic staff define a strategy for the benefit of individuals or units, there is 
no common understanding of what the strategy is within or among any of 
the four Nordic countries.
It is difficult to assess how strategies have affected performance in 
teaching and research. That said, the so-called strategic turn seems to be 
associated with a new culture of performativity and accountability (Hansen 
et al. 2019). Our data show that assistant professors and lecturers are 
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least influential in decision-making processes for institutional strategies. 
Instead, they play a significant role in unit-level strategy work and espe-
cially in the grass-roots implementation, or localization or translation 
(Sahlin and Wedlin 2008), of institutional strategies. On the basis of sur-
vey results and interviews, the main observation made is that no single 
group is fully dominant in strategy formulation, and there seems to be no 
common arena where the strategy dialogue takes place (Battilana 2006). 
The findings regarding strategy also indicate that the process is as impor-
tant as the outcome. Without dialogue and buy-in from internal stake-
holders, the content of the strategies will remain irrelevant and the 
effects minimal.
Decision-Making and Organizational Structures
Regarding decision-making and organizational structures, some impor-
tant changes have taken place in the Nordic countries. External stakehold-
ers have become members of advisory councils and university boards. A 
corporate-like governance structure, including boards with a majority of 
external members and a chairman who is politically approved, has been 
introduced (Benner and Geschwind 2016). In Denmark, this corporate- 
like governance structure has been mandatory for all universities since 
2003, while political approval of board chairs has only recently been intro-
duced. Here, the former autonomy of universities has been restricted. In 
Denmark and Finland, the formerly elected leaders have been replaced by 
appointed leaders. The new Universities Act that went into effect in 
2010 in Finland changed the legal status of universities from being part of 
the state administration to independent legal entities. Legislative regula-
tion on central aspects such as staffing policies (in particular, regulation on 
qualifications of the staff, recruitment, and remuneration) and internal 
governance of universities were significantly changed; currently, Finnish 
universities enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy compared to many 
other European countries (see Pruvot and Estermann 2017).
In Norway, the managerial structures have been changed through the 
“Quality reform” of 2003–2004, with an effort made to enhance political 
and social accountability by including politically appointed stakeholders 
on the boards of the universities. The Ministry of Education introduced a 
model where the board appointed their chair and also appointed the rec-
tor. This model replaced the traditional one where the rector was elected 
by the university and also chaired the board (Gornitzka and Larsen 2004). 
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Still, despite the Ministerial preference for the appointment model, 
 institutions can voluntarily choose which model to follow (or they can fol-
low a combination of the two). This has resulted in a hybrid version in 
many universities, with both appointed and elected leaders in key roles of 
the institutions. The aim in giving universities the possibility of choosing 
their own governing model was twofold: to increase autonomy (Stensaker 
2014), on the one hand, and to respect the traditions of universities as 
collegial entities, on the other hand (Olsen 2007).
The decision-making structures in Sweden have changed during the 
last two decades. The country has a long tradition of central state gover-
nance based on planning. However, this changed during the 1980s and 
1990s across many sectors, higher education included. During the 1990s, 
following a groundbreaking reform in 1993, the higher education sector 
was fundamentally deregulated through a reduction in central laws and 
ordinances and an increased formal autonomy for HEIs. Although most 
universities remained state agencies, the autonomy (or freedom) reformed 
two HEIs, Jönköping University and Chalmers University of Technology, 
which became private foundations upon applications to the government. 
The main differences were regarding the internal organization and the 
regulations around the hiring of academic staff. Academic positions had to 
that point been centrally regulated, but from that point on, professorships 
could be initiated by each HEI. In 2011, another autonomy reform was 
implemented deregulating the internal organization of HEIs and aca-
demic positions. However, an even more far-reaching autonomy bill sug-
gesting Swedish HEIs become private foundations was rejected by the 
sector a couple of years later (Geschwind 2017).
In Chap. 6, academic leadership is in focus. The pre–New Public 
Management (NPM) state-regulated system meant detailed centralized 
decision-making about, for instance, hiring of professors and the intro-
duction of new educational programmes. The findings from the survey 
and interviews reveal that the roles of academic leaders are changing, most 
dramatically in Denmark and Finland, but also in Norway and Sweden, 
which have been the target of more evolutionary reforms. The perceived 
decision-making power of leaders differs significantly between countries, 
with Danish managers reporting the lowest degree of power. This finding 
is, in itself, rather interesting since the rationale for implementing NPM- 
inspired unitary management models (with centralization of decision- 
making) is to empower specific (formal managers) individuals (Berg and 
Pinheiro 2016). Thus, it should be reflected in the views of academic staff 
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in interviews, stressing what they perceived as increasing manage-
rial power.
The traditional professional, collegial academic leadership that is based 
on rotating systems, election among peers, and collegial decision-making 
has been complemented with, and in some places replaced by, a “managerial 
logic” (cf. Deem and Brehony 2005) substantiated on order-giving, perfor-
mance measurement, and appointed managers as a new academic profession 
(managerialism). A related identified trend is the greater focus on individ-
ual leaders and managers (leaderism) (Ekman et al. 2017). This develop-
ment is met with different opinions by HEI employees, ranging from deep 
concern in Denmark to moderate appreciation in Finland and Norway and 
occasional frustration expressed by Swedish managers with regard to the 
power of external stakeholder influence. Hence, as in the other themes, 
reforms have not been implemented to the same depth and at the same pace 
across and within universities. The ability and willingness to follow a strict, 
more corporate-like management style are unevenly distributed.
Accountability Measures
As public organizations dependent on the support of several stakeholders 
(Benneworth and Jongbloed 2010), universities in the Nordic countries 
meet with a number of accountability requests. In recent decades, a num-
ber of reforms have been implemented in order to increase the account-
ability of universities (Hazelkorn et  al. 2018; Hansen et  al. 2019). 
Professional accountability is important in relation to the quality of educa-
tional programmes and particularly the quality of research. However, pro-
fessional accountability has, in all countries to some extent, been challenged 
or at least complemented by political and social accountability. Political 
accountability has been enhanced through the introduction of New Public 
Management instruments such as performance-based funding, contract 
governing, and evaluation “machines” (Dahler-Larsen 2012).
This has kept political expectations, and thus, also political accountabil-
ity, at a high level. Higher education in general and universities in particu-
lar continue to be at the core of educational policies, and therefore, 
political interests. At the concrete level, this has been evident in the gov-
ernment programmes and action plans of past ruling cabinets, but also in 
the prominent role of the European Commission (“modernization 
agenda”) and the importance of skills and research to the Europe of 
Knowledge, more generally (Maassen and Stensaker 2011; Pinheiro 
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2015). At the same time, important stakeholders such as several trade 
unions, student unions, employer organizations (such as the Confederation 
of Finnish Industries) have continued to keep universities and higher edu-
cation at the forefront of their political agendas (Klemencǐc ̌2018).
Professional accountability in Finland has remained strong alongside 
the other forms of accountability. For instance, various scientific associa-
tions operating under the Federation of the Finnish Learned Societies are 
actively exercising their gatekeeping role, especially in publishing. Scientific 
associations are often responsible for publishing scientific journals and 
other publications and appoint the editorial boards and editors for these 
journals. Also, the various trade unions, such as the Finnish Union of 
University Professors and the Finnish Union of University Researchers 
and Teachers, continue to play a critical role in upholding and safeguard-
ing professional norms and values of the Finnish academic profession.
The majority of Norwegian HEIs are state owned, but private institu-
tions are granted the same state funding as the public ones. As for profes-
sional autonomy, there has been an increased focus on the quality of 
teaching and alignment in educational programmes, but also on research 
quality as well as quantity. This increased focus on quality and quantity 
associated with a bureaucratic and political form of accountability is chal-
lenging the professional autonomy of academics. That being said, profes-
sional accountability remains strong, both as a stand-alone aspect of 
academic work and as intertwined in political accountability. As in Finland, 
university teachers and researchers’ unions are strong voices for the 
Norwegian academic profession. Peer review is an ever-growing activity, 
for example, in conferences, research proposals, academic publications, 
and hiring and promotion of academic staff, and senior academics spend a 
significant amount of time assessing colleagues.
One specific aspect of accountability measures is evaluation, highlighted 
in some detail in Chap. 8. Evaluative procedures have become widespread 
in Nordic higher education since the 1990s.
As shown in Table 9.2, there are different evaluation practices within 
the Nordic region, although the ideas behind developing evaluation prac-
tices are similar. In relation to educational tasks, the Nordic countries 
adopt slightly different approaches than those of the Bologna process, 
including different indicators for their performance-based funding sys-
tems. In relation to research, Finland and Norway have developed 
national evaluation systems that are driven by the Finnish Academy and 
the research council, respectively. In Denmark and Sweden, there are no 
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national systems, and the universities have more autonomy to organize 
evaluations themselves. Hence, with regards to evaluations, we find evi-
dence of yet another case of policy convergence combined with diversity 
when it comes to implementation (Pollitt 2002; Maassen 2017).
A general pattern across the Nordic countries is that policy-driven eval-
uations have been institutionalized and expanded, and management- 
oriented schemes—sometimes mirroring the national systems—have 
gained importance. Last but not least, the academically driven evaluations 
have proliferated as well. Our findings indicate that evaluations with simi-
lar evaluands lack coordination. This has created a feeling of evaluation 
overload among academics, although, generally speaking, many academics 
still regard national evaluations as legitimate tasks.
Table 9.2 Evaluation models and procedures
Evaluation 
models
Used in evaluation 
procedures
Country
Result models
 • Goal 
attainment
Contract steering DK, FI, NO
 • Effect Employability focus DK, FI
Ability to attract external 
funding influences funding 
for research
DK, FI, NO, SWE
Citation patterns influence 
funding for research
SWE
Process models
 • Activity Funding-formula 
education
DK, FI, NO, SWE
Formula including student 
throughput
DK, NO
Funding-formula research 
(publications)
DK, FI, NO, SWE
Actor models
 • Users Student surveys DK, FI, NO. Gaining importance at the 
national level
 • 
Stakeholders
Relevance in education DK, NO.
 • Peers Research evaluation All countries. Classic use in relation to 
publishing and funding decisions. 
Challenged in relation to appointment and 
promotion decisions.
Source: Chap. 8 of this volume
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Another important finding concerns the usefulness of evaluations. 
Although the policy-driven evaluation schemes in all the Nordic countries 
seem to be largely accepted, academic staff do not consider these effective as 
tools for improving performance, either in research or in education. There 
seems to be a mismatch between academic and managerial conceptions of 
what constitutes and supports quality and performance. This is particularly 
the case in Denmark, where domestic academics stand out as the most nega-
tive. Explanations that are discussed in Chap. 8 include the fact that the 
evaluations have been perceived as intrusive managerial instruments adding 
extra workloads without tangible returns or rewards for academic staff.
Evaluations have taken up a central role in the changed governance of 
higher education in all four countries, which in itself reflects intensified 
accountability demands due to the growth of the higher education sectors 
and the corresponding increases in the public resources being allocated to 
the sector (see Chap. 3). It also shows that decentralization, in the form of 
increased institutional autonomy, occurs in tandem with centralization ini-
tiatives (managerialism and leaderism), as detected in earlier studies in the 
Nordics (Torjesen et al. 2017).
Performance Measurement and Management
The empirical evidence provided throughout this volume shows that per-
formance measurement and management have become important, and 
growing in importance, principles in higher education governance in the 
Nordic countries. There are many common features in the actions taken 
by the respective governments, but also important differences. Performance 
management has been criticized for encouraging quantity on behalf of 
quality, and the criticism has recently been followed by a political request 
to incorporate quality criteria in the performance management approaches. 
Already, in the 1980s and 1990s, performance management was intro-
duced in educational funding in Denmark and Sweden, and in today’s 
system, educational programmes are funded solely according to a perfor-
mance principle, where funding is based on the number of students pass-
ing exams as well as on bonuses given if students accomplish their studies 
in due time. In Denmark, it has been decided to further develop the fund-
ing system to include employability criteria as well as quality aspects pos-
sibly linked to student assessments. Since 2009, an increasing part of the 
funding for basic research, in recent years amounting to 20%, has been 
performance based. The formula includes the number of graduates from 
master’s and PhD programmes, the ability to attract external funding, and 
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the counting of publications. A quality aspect is included in counting pub-
lications as publication channels are divided into two groups, one releasing 
more points and resources than the other. Universities also negotiate per-
formance contracts with the Ministry. Hitherto, contracts have not been 
related to funding, but the institutions have to document goal attainment, 
and recently, it has been decided to link goal attainment to funding, start-
ing in 2019. In Denmark, salaries are rather marginally linked to perfor-
mance, although this is increasingly gaining importance.
In Finland, after the reform of 2010 making universities legally inde-
pendent from the state hierarchy, the university sector can be considered 
one of the administrative sectors governed/financed by the state, where 
the ideals of NPM are most comprehensively applied (Kauko and Diogo 
2012). Some of the recent empirical studies have also proven the effective-
ness of using performance-based funding in increasing the performance of 
Finnish universities (see Seuri and Vartiainen 2018). Although the execu-
tion of performance management on behalf of the Finnish Ministry of 
Education and Culture has been highly structured, its further application 
in individual universities within their own internal management and strat-
egies is not controlled by the Ministry. As a matter of fact, individual uni-
versities, and in many cases also their subunits, like faculties, have developed 
their own internal variations of performance management (Kallio and 
Kallio 2014). The extensiveness of performance-based funding in provid-
ing resources to universities, professionalization of academic and adminis-
trative management positions, the use of contractual arrangements 
(performance agreements), outsourcing and centralization of support and 
administrative services in universities, and the use of various types of com-
petitive funding are examples where the influence of performance man-
agement is most visible. One important aspect of performance measurement 
is the salary system for university personnel. Since 2008, the salary system 
at universities encompassing both academic and administrative staff has 
been based on performance measurements, where a maximum of one- 
third of the salary is performance based. Even though the salary or other 
performance-based financial incentives have not proven to be the main 
motivation of Finnish academics to work harder (see Kivistö et al. 2017), 
they are applied as a means to impose system and institutional level incen-
tives on the individual level, and thereby draw attention to what is consid-
ered valuable.
The funding system in Norway provides a more stable budget than the 
Danish and Finnish systems, as 70% of the funding is in the form of a block 
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grant. Still, the 30% of performance-based indicators increasingly function 
as a policy tool used to stimulate improvement in both teaching and 
research, but also as a managerial tool at the institutions. Teaching indica-
tors constitute the largest share (24%), focusing on throughput of stu-
dents and internalization. As for research indicators (the remaining 6%), 
these are related to throughput of PhD students, external funding of 
research (e.g. from the EU and the Norwegian Research Council), and 
lastly, from the metrics related to publications. The Norwegian Publication 
Indicator was introduced in 2004 as a system to measure publication 
activities. As a policy and performance management tool, such indicators 
from research are meant to stimulate excellence and productivity, but also 
to increase the accountability of public research. Another important aspect 
is to align research with societal and economic needs (Aagaard et  al. 
2015). Despite the broad objectives, the financial role of the Indicator is 
marginal as it only distributes 2% of the funding to the sector (ibid.). This 
funding system based on metrics and a market model has, on the one 
hand, increased autonomy within the universities as the boards are respon-
sible for prioritizing within the allocated financial frames and for aligning 
their activities to meet the goals for the sector. On the other hand, ex-post 
control has increased, and the contractual relationships between universi-
ties and the state based on performance metrics are replacing the trust-
based foundational pact (Stensaker 2014). The increased autonomy is 
counteracted by controlling instruments, reporting systems, and the 
financial incentive systems following students and research activities 
(Christensen 2011).
In Sweden, as well, performance measurement has become more 
important over time (Geschwind 2017). As mentioned above, one of the 
most dramatic changes in Swedish higher education was the introduction 
of performance-based funding in education, based on the inflow of stu-
dents and throughput. The previous system was criticized for being too 
rigid, based on central planning, and not driving quality enough. The lat-
ter argument has also been used against the current system. Since fund-
ing is so closely related to student success, there have been discussions 
about decreased demands for passing students. The system is based on 
the idea that different educational areas bear different costs. A student in 
the humanities is supposed to cost far less than an engineering student, 
for instance. Another effect of this system has been increased marketing 
activity by HEIs. An important aspect of the system is the use of a “ceil-
ing” for the number of students recruited. Allocation of funds has a limit, 
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linked to a maximum number of students. Throughput of students has 
been a controversial quality indicator, and whereas there have been occa-
sional discussions on the risks of lowering demands on students, there are 
also examples where student throughput has been linked to incentives. 
Generally speaking, though, this has not affected the individual academic 
but rather organizational units and HEIs.
In research, the traditional model was block-funding based on histori-
cal principles rather than performance. Direct state funding was the bulk 
of the total funding of research. Lately, there has been a development 
towards more competitive external funding rather than direct state fund-
ing, and as of 2018, the external funding makes up slightly more than half 
of the total funding. A milestone in Swedish research policy was the intro-
duction, in 2009, of performance-based funding as part of the direct state 
funding. Since its introduction, 10–20% of the total funding has been 
allocated to HEIs based on performance, as shown in publications and 
external funding.
The national systems of performance measurement and management 
are described in Table 9.3. So what can be said about the actual effects of 
these systems, both for universities and for individual academics? The 
 in- depth empirical studies in this volume (Chaps. 4 and 5) focus on 
research rather than education, which is no coincidence. The performance 
management systems are primarily used for research, albeit other academic 
activities are also discussed to varying degrees in terms of performance. 
Following Dahler-Larsen (2014), it can be concluded that research per-
formance measurement has had the greatest constitutive effects on aca-
demic staff.
The results discussed in these two chapters show that performance- 
based research funding systems have had notable effects on Nordic univer-
sities. Performance indicators are implemented for resource allocation and 
decision-making in a way that impacts how university actors understand 
and perceive research activities. Not only do they contribute to a rational-
ization of formal university structures (Ramirez and Christensen 2013), 
but they also subtly contribute to an institutionalization and consolidation 
of research metrics as organizing principles of research (Geschwind and 
Pinheiro 2017). Even though there are concerns within universities, met-
rics are generally accepted and even appreciated as a means of enhancing 
transparency and for assisting university leaders in their efforts to set pri-
orities and improve performance. From the perspective of incentives, pub-
lication practices are heavily influential in all countries. Researchers are 
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considering the implications of where to publish as defined by perfor-
mance measures. Most important are “reputational factors” (Kwiek 2016) 
rather than the introduction of remunerative incentives such as bonuses 
and direct salary consequences. However, at some universities in Finland 
and Denmark, the remunerative incentives have become very important 
tools, putting pressure on academics to publish high-quality research. The 
use of metrics is important nevertheless, and the establishment of national 
metrics in research also influences how success is communicated internally 
in universities. The technical legitimacy of the measures is generally high, 
meaning that metrics are perceived as accurately assessing research perfor-
mance. There are some interesting differences between the countries, 
however, with more criticism aimed at the crudeness of measures in 
Norway, Denmark, and Finland, where publications are categorized on a 
scale with few levels. This is even seen as a threat to high-quality research 
as it might prompt the production of more publications of lesser quality. 
The institutionalization of performance measures was also found to vary 
across scientific fields and institutions. The results from this study show 
that in the social sciences as well, which have been later to adopt biblio-
metrics, researchers now act in accordance with measures. An interesting 
Table 9.3 Main components of the performance-related research funding sys-
tems in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway
Sweden Norway Denmark Finland
Introduced 2009 2005 2010 2010
Size 20% of institutional 
research funding 
and annual 
additions
6% of total 
institutional 
funding
19% of institutional 
research funding 
and increasing 
every year
33% of total 
institutional 
funding
Indicators  • Publications
 • Citations
 • External 
research funding
 • Publications
 • External 
research 
funding
 • EU 
research 
funding
 • PhD 
production
 • Publications
 • External 
research funding
 • PhD 
production
 • Student 
throughput
 • Publications
 • External 
research 
funding
 • PhD 
production
Source: Chap. 4 of this volume
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aspect is also the reconstitution of research as a result of performance 
measurement; the importance of the publication outlet affects how 
researchers make sense of research. Again, in the three countries of 
Denmark, Finland, and Norway, with their respective systems of publica-
tion levels, this is clearly evident, whereas in Sweden, this was not 
discussed.
Funding Arrangements
Among all OECD countries, the Nordic countries are, year after year, in 
the group of countries with the highest levels of public expenditures 
(compared to GDP) on HEIs. Compared with other countries in the 
Western world, the four countries’ respective higher education and 
research sectors studied here have remained largely unaffected by the lat-
est financial crisis. An issue affecting the role of higher education in Nordic 
societies has been the introduction of fees for non-EU students in 
Denmark in 2006, and in 2011, Sweden followed suit. However, that is 
an issue beyond the scope of the empirical studies of this volume. Another 
topic being recently discussed in the Nordic countries is the relationship 
between external and internal funding for research and, in turn, its conse-
quences for performance. In an often-cited report, Swedish scholars 
Öquist and Benner (2012) argued that systems with more direct state 
funding perform better in research. One of the benchmarks in this study 
was Denmark (the others were the Netherlands and Switzerland). This has 
led to a political debate in Sweden on the balance between direct state 
funding and competitive external funding (Öquist and Benner 2012). As 
shown in Fig. 9.1, there are significant differences between the Nordic 
countries regarding this issue. In Norway, only about 30% of total research 
funding is external, whereas the same number in Sweden and Finland 
is over 50%.
The relationship between internal and external funding also has influ-
ence over power relations within HEIs. Chapter 5 includes a discussion 
about how the increasing proportion of external funding affects authority 
relations surrounding research activities (Whitley 2011; Whitley and 
Gläser 2014). It is concluded that authority over research has decreased 
for managers and increased for funders as a result of these developments. 
In addition, successful researchers (i.e. those who win grants) receive 
more freedom in relation to their managers. This is also discussed 
in Chap. 6.
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concludIng dIScuSSIon
Having exposed here the main findings across the core categories and 
themes being investigated in the study, a critical question remains—how 
does this volume contribute to our knowledge about performance, leader-
ship reforms, and universities as organizations? The richness of data and 
our comparative approach have made a number of conclusions possible. 
This was thematically discussed above, although admittedly, the initial 
project question on the relationship between leadership reforms and actual 
performance in all its crudeness turned out to be more complicated to 
assess than initially anticipated, not least of all due to challenges we faced 
in finding appropriate indicators for comparison, not to mention the dif-
ferent definitions (e.g. what counts as student or staff categories) across 
the Nordic countries. In fact, one of the major conclusions made by the 
research team is that there are, indeed, four distinct Nordic higher educa-
tion systems, each with its own dynamics and peculiarities as well as sets of 
interrelated (nested) variables, which makes any comparative or causality 
assessment a challenging task. That being said, and guided by Olsen’s 
visions of the European university, we can unequivocally conclude that the 
conditions of the environments under which Nordic HEIs operate have 
changed dramatically during the last decade. With reference to our initial 
hypotheses, it can be concluded that the H0s, based on a generally ratio-
nalist view of universities, have guided the policies and reforms in the 
Nordic countries. However, our survey and interview data reveal more 
Fig. 9.1 Development in external funding as a percentage of total funding for 
research at Nordic HEIs. Source: Chap. 5 in this volume
 GOVERNING PERFORMANCE IN THE NORDIC UNIVERSITIES: WHERE ARE… 
290
nuanced and multifaceted experiences, more closely related to the H1s 
and H2s, emanating from an institutionalist view of universities.
Policy efforts aimed at modernizing the sector have paid considerable 
attention to the way in which public universities operate. A privileged 
focus has been given to aspects such as efficiency, effectiveness, and 
accountability. Most Nordic universities have developed extended admin-
istrative structures (central and unit levels) capable of strategically sup-
porting their primary activities, and some have introduced recent changes 
in the nomination of formal leaders, moving to appointed positions rather 
than elected ones. Here is a clear distinction between Denmark and 
Finland, on the one hand, and Norway and Sweden, on the other. The 
more radical reforms in the former two countries have brought with them 
a development towards managerialism and leaderism that can be traced in 
the other two countries as well, albeit not to the same degree. As expected, 
it is, indeed, apparent that aspects of all four Olsen visions appear in the 
findings. As a general conclusion, though, we find signs of movement 
towards universities becoming more hierarchical, bureaucratic organiza-
tions where the modus operandi associated with the “community of schol-
ars” has gradually been replaced by a market-driven logic substantiated on 
entities that are, formally speaking, more “autonomous” but also highly 
dependent on the external environment (Sahlin 2012). There are also 
signs of change in what Olsen calls a “representative democracy,” where 
the role of elective collegial bodies has gradually changed. We therefore 
find the concept of “penetrated hierarchies” introduced by Bleiklie et al. 
(2015) to be useful for unpacking and explaining the complex structures 
of Nordic universities. The authors identify a new institutional template 
for organizational control, stressing the virtues of a hierarchical bureau-
cratic model that creates pressures within universities. These pressures are 
mediated by actors at different levels of the organizational field. This con-
clusion is, indeed, also valid in our analysis. Furthermore, we found empir-
ical support for the second main conclusion of Bleiklie et  al. (2015); 
namely, that control models are associated with ongoing power struggles 
between leadership and professionals, which in turn, are partly contingent 
on their respective control of external resources. Stated differently, our 
findings reveal that social standing (Battilana 2006), legitimacy (Deephouse 
and Suchman 2008), and resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003) do matter within the context of change dynamics in universities as 
modern organizations. What is more, these dimensions reinforce (and are 
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tightly nested in) one another, thus making any causal claims with respect 
to the link between structural change and performance a daunting task.
Following ongoing evidence of the transformation of universities as 
strategic actors (Whitley 2008), another important conclusion arising 
from this research project is that universities are active entities, not only 
through the collective efforts of their employees but also as organizations. 
Contrary to what was the case in the past, it has become rather important 
for university actors (at multiple levels) to initiate and show activity 
(Karlsson 2016; Geschwind 2018). One explanation for this is found in 
the need for legitimacy in the view of external stakeholders and, further 
on, with taxpayers (Suchman 1995). The formulation of strategies (Chap. 
7) is one such example. The launch of evaluations (Chap. 8) is another 
example, and the introduction of management and measurement systems 
(Chap. 6) is a third one. Yet, another is the pressure from governmental 
agencies to respond to demands for accountability, efficiency, and effec-
tiveness (cf. Hazelkorn et al. 2018). In combination with more ambitious 
professional leaders and managers, this has created a sector packed with 
initiatives, some of which are aligned, some overlapping, some co-existing, 
and some conflicting (Geschwind 2018). Evaluation provides an interest-
ing example in this regard, where there is now a combination of policy- 
initiated, managerial, and professional evaluations that make up a wide 
array of initiatives.
It is also clear that reforms have similar aims and primary rationales 
across the Nordic countries. The close collaboration between the coun-
tries and the “travelling of ideas” (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008) between the 
countries has created conversion at the policy level, similar to trends found 
elsewhere in Europe (Witte 2008). That said, it is worth pointing to the 
fact that the operationalization of these ideas—such as stronger, profes-
sionalized management; the use of metrics and strategies; and the roles of 
external stakeholders like funding bodies and others—differs significantly, 
and there is plenty of manoeuvre room for governments and university 
leaders to navigate in. One distinctive difference between the four coun-
tries is the introduction of increased formal autonomy for universities in 
Denmark and Finland and the changes in recruitment and appointment of 
academic managers. Another distinct difference is the use of publication 
points in all countries except Sweden. The discussion about “level 1” or 
“level 2” publication seems to have become institutionalized in all three 
countries and has been found to have effects on researchers’ behaviour, 
although the effects are deeper in some scientific fields than others.
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Performance measurement and management have proliferated as well, 
albeit with important differences. First, it should be noted that  performance 
is discussed more in relation to research than education. The metrics used 
deeply affect researchers in all countries, but particularly so in Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway, where each publication is marked with a number 
and thus made easily measurable. This has also complemented other avail-
able metrics, such as the h-index, impact factor, and discipline- specific lists 
of prestigious journals that are still the most common ways to measure 
excellence in some scientific areas. Although performance-based funding 
has been used in education in all countries, with slight variations, the per-
formance measures—basically input/output—are less directly related (or 
even questionably so) to quality and performance. This, in turn, might 
have consequences for the quality of education, which is an issue that 
needs further research.
Publication statistics show that performance has been high in the 
Nordic countries and also that performance is, today, more transparent, 
measurable, and comparable. However, there is also a growing critical dis-
cussion on the concept of performance and its relationship to quality and 
impact of research. Some of the findings in this project indicate that per-
formance management systems encourage researchers to publish too 
much and that researchers are more eager to apply various strategies in 
order to add “points” to their résumé than they are to pose challenging 
and meaningful research questions (Seeber et al. 2019). Not least in the 
social sciences, this has been increasingly debated (Alvesson et al. 2017). 
Future studies should look into how this agenda develops and how initia-
tives implemented influence university performance in relation to 
researcher behaviour. A similar effect is found in applications for competi-
tive grants, in particular in systems such as in the Nordic countries, where 
external funding is an important part of the incentives, becoming a goal in 
itself rather than a means. Both HEIs and individual academics apply for 
ever more research grants, not only to sustain a perceived optimal level 
but also for merit, leading to growth at all levels and casualization of 
academic staff.
As mentioned earlier, national differences and similarities have appeared 
in our project. Our case universities included both flagship universities and 
so-called regional universities. Not least of all, the latter term is controver-
sial, and our impression is that it is considered pejorative and not necessar-
ily used (at least in Denmark and Sweden). Being linked to the region is 
important, but “being regional” is less attractive, as identified in earlier 
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inquiries (Pinheiro 2012). We have found few differences between these 
two types of universities. Some trends worth exploring in future studies 
include the relatively greater importance of education (and thus its stake-
holders) and the more managerial type of steering, with appointed manag-
ers even in Norway and Sweden. We also selected soft and hard scientific 
fields in order to control for differences across the sciences. Also there, we 
found few significant differences. Worth mentioning, however, is the 
greater dependence on external funding and more acceptance of the use 
of metrics for measuring quality in the hard sciences.
Performance measurement and management have, indeed, created dif-
ferent universities than those before the implementation of NPM. For 
many senior academics who experienced academic life prior to NPM 
reforms, the changes have been rather dramatic. Some of these voices have 
been heard in this project. In contrast, for younger academics, this world 
of performance indicators is part and parcel of being an academic in the 
twenty-first century. The development over time and generational shifts 
are important. Further (longitudinal) studies of early career researchers’ 
perceptions of current developments within universities are necessary. 
Finally, we need to continuously discuss how evaluation, measurement, 
and management systems affect academic life and its core activities of 
research and education. We surely hope this volume has encouraged our 
fellow colleagues across the social sciences to pursue these and other 
related inquiries in the near future.
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ou
ps
)
Ar
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
pr
e-
se
t o
r n
eg
ot
ia
te
d?
D
o 
yo
u 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
co
nf
lic
tin
g 
de
m
an
ds
 fo
r 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
w
or
k?
 (e
g.
 
Fr
om
 m
an
ag
er
s,
 a
ca
de
m
ic
 
st
af
f)
Ar
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
pr
e-
se
t o
r n
eg
ot
ia
te
d?
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H
ow
 fa
m
ili
ar
 a
re
 y
ou
 
w
ith
 th
e 
co
nt
en
t o
f 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
t d
iff
er
en
t 
le
ve
ls
 in
 y
ou
r u
ni
ve
rs
ity
? 
Ar
e 
th
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
lig
ne
d?
H
ow
 fa
m
ili
ar
 a
re
 y
ou
 w
ith
 
th
e 
co
nt
en
t o
f s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
at
 d
iff
er
en
t l
ev
el
s 
in
 y
ou
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
? 
Ar
e 
th
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
al
ig
ne
d?
H
ow
 fa
m
ili
ar
 a
re
 y
ou
 w
ith
 
th
e 
co
nt
en
t o
f s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
at
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 le
ve
ls
 o
f y
ou
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
Ar
e 
th
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
lig
ne
d?
St
ra
te
gy
 re
fe
rs
 to
 a
 
fo
rm
al
, w
ri
tt
en
 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
H
ow
 im
po
rt
an
t i
s 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
r y
ou
r 
be
ha
vi
ou
r i
n 
te
ac
hi
ng
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 re
se
ar
ch
? 
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s 
qu
al
ity
 p
la
y 
a 
ro
le
?
H
ow
 im
po
rt
an
t i
s 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
r d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t (
eg
. 
th
e 
w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
 
w
or
k 
w
ith
 te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
 re
la
te
d 
is
su
es
)?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s 
qu
al
ity
 p
la
y 
a 
ro
le
?
H
ow
 im
po
rt
an
t i
s 
st
ra
te
gy
 
fo
r y
ou
r w
or
k?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e
in
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
r c
on
te
nt
 o
f 
st
ra
te
gy
 in
 th
e 
pa
st
 
de
ca
de
?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
r c
on
te
nt
 o
f 
st
ra
te
gy
 in
 th
e 
pa
st
 
de
ca
de
?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
r c
on
te
nt
 o
f 
st
ra
te
gy
 in
 th
e 
pa
st
 
de
ca
de
?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
?
De
ci
sio
n-
m
ak
in
g 
re
fe
rs
 to
 fo
rm
al
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 b
ut
 a
lso
 
to
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 o
ne
s 
th
at
 a
re
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
re
al
 e
ffe
ct
.
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
d 
ar
e 
yo
u 
fr
ee
 to
 m
ak
e 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ch
oi
ce
s 
on
 th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
/e
du
ca
tio
n 
pr
of
ile
 o
f t
he
 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t/
un
it?
W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
m
os
t 
im
po
rt
an
t f
ac
to
rs
 th
at
 
ha
m
pe
r/
bo
os
t y
ou
r 
fr
ee
do
m
? 
(e
g.
 U
pp
er
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
in
te
rn
al
 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n,
 e
xt
er
na
l 
fu
nd
in
g,
 n
at
io
na
l s
te
er
in
g,
 
ac
ad
em
ic
s)
W
ho
 g
et
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
rm
ul
at
io
n?
 
W
ho
 h
as
 in
flu
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s?
H
ow
 d
oe
s 
th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
w
or
k 
(fo
rm
al
, i
nf
or
m
al
, 
w
rit
te
n,
 d
ia
lo
gu
e)
?
W
ho
 g
et
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
rm
ul
at
io
n?
 
W
ho
 h
as
 in
flu
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s?
H
ow
 d
oe
s 
th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
w
or
k 
(fo
rm
al
, i
nf
or
m
al
, w
rit
te
n,
 
di
al
og
ue
)?
W
ho
 g
et
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
rm
ul
at
io
n?
 W
ho
 
ha
s 
in
flu
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s?
H
ow
 d
oe
s 
th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
w
or
k 
(fo
rm
al
, i
nf
or
m
al
, 
w
rit
te
n,
 d
ia
lo
gu
e)
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
re
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
go
al
s 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
on
 
te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 re
se
ar
ch
?
Ar
e 
th
er
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 
be
tw
ee
n 
te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
re
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
go
al
s 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
on
 
te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 re
se
ar
ch
?
Ar
e 
th
er
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 
be
tw
ee
n 
te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
re
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
go
al
s 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
on
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ta
sk
s?
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
?
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Ar
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 fo
r y
ou
r 
te
ac
hi
ng
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 
re
se
ar
ch
?
Is
 a
 q
ua
lit
y 
di
m
en
si
on
 
in
cl
ud
ed
?
Ar
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s 
fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 fo
r t
ea
ch
in
g?
 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 re
se
ar
ch
?
Is
 a
 q
ua
lit
y 
di
m
en
si
on
 
in
cl
ud
ed
?
Ar
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
ta
rg
et
s 
fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 fo
r y
ou
r 
w
or
k?
 A
re
 th
ey
 s
om
eh
ow
 
lin
ke
d 
to
 te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
?
Is
 a
 q
ua
lit
y 
di
m
en
si
on
 
in
cl
ud
ed
?
W
ho
 a
sc
er
ta
in
s 
w
he
th
er
 
th
es
e 
ta
rg
et
s 
ar
e 
m
et
? 
W
ho
 h
as
 th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 
de
ci
de
?
W
ho
 a
sc
er
ta
in
s 
w
he
th
er
 
th
es
e 
ta
rg
et
s 
ar
e 
m
et
?
W
ho
 h
as
 th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 
de
ci
de
?
W
ho
 a
sc
er
ta
in
s 
w
he
th
er
 
th
es
e 
ta
rg
et
s 
ar
e 
m
et
?
W
ho
 h
as
 th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 
de
ci
de
?
H
ow
 is
 y
ou
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 te
ac
hi
ng
? 
An
d 
re
se
ar
ch
?
W
ho
 h
as
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
n 
ho
w
 
th
e 
m
ea
su
rin
g 
is
 d
on
e?
 
(F
or
m
al
 a
nd
/o
r i
nf
or
m
al
 
ch
an
ne
ls
?)
H
ow
 is
 y
ou
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
as
pe
ct
s?
 W
ha
t r
ol
e 
to
 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
re
su
lts
 p
la
y 
in
 
th
is
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
th
e 
em
ph
as
is
 o
f 
ev
al
ua
tio
ns
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pa
st
 d
ec
ad
e?
H
ow
 is
 y
ou
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
d?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
at
a 
us
ef
ul
 
fo
r i
m
pr
ov
in
g 
yo
ur
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 w
or
k?
 
If 
it 
is
, h
ow
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
at
a 
us
ef
ul
 
fo
r i
m
pr
ov
in
g 
ac
ad
em
ic
 
w
or
k?
If 
it 
is
, h
ow
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
us
ed
 fo
r i
m
pr
ov
in
g 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
w
or
k?
Eg
. H
ow
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
w
or
k 
is
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
d 
or
 
of
fe
re
d.
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 re
w
ar
ds
 a
re
 
hi
gh
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
un
its
 a
nd
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
w
ith
? 
Ar
e 
sa
nc
tio
ns
 
po
se
d 
on
 lo
w
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
on
es
?
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 re
w
ar
ds
 a
re
 
hi
gh
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
un
its
 a
nd
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 w
ith
? 
Ar
e 
sa
nc
tio
ns
 p
os
ed
 o
n 
lo
w
 
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
on
es
?
Fo
rm
al
 v
s i
nf
or
m
al
-
Th
is 
re
fe
rs
 to
 
un
iv
er
sit
ie
s' 
in
te
rn
al
 sy
st
em
s, 
no
t e
xt
er
na
l o
ne
s 
fr
om
 e
g.
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
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H
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
su
pp
or
t y
ou
 re
ce
iv
e,
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 y
ou
r t
ea
ch
in
g?
 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 re
se
ar
ch
?
H
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
su
pp
or
t y
ou
 re
ce
iv
e?
H
ow
 w
el
l d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
su
pp
or
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
?
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
fi
ce
, 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
qu
al
ity
 a
ss
ur
an
ce
 
et
c.
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
yo
u 
ge
t t
he
 h
el
p 
yo
u 
ne
ed
? 
Ca
n 
yo
u 
gi
ve
n 
an
 
ex
am
pl
e 
on
 h
ow
 su
pp
or
t 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 h
av
e 
he
lp
ed
 
yo
u 
re
ac
h 
yo
ur
 a
ca
de
m
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 ta
rg
et
s?
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 h
el
p 
is
 
m
is
si
ng
 o
r p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 
us
ef
ul
?
W
ha
t t
yp
es
 o
f s
up
po
rt
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 a
nd
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
do
 y
ou
 fi
nd
 im
po
rt
an
t 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 te
ac
hi
ng
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
? 
W
ha
t 
ab
ou
t r
es
ea
rc
h 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
?
In
 y
ou
r e
xp
er
ie
nc
e,
 w
ha
t 
ty
pe
s 
of
 s
up
po
rt
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
do
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 
st
af
f n
ee
d?
 N
ot
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 st
ru
ct
ur
e, 
se
pa
ra
te
 b
ut
 th
er
e 
to
 su
pp
or
t t
he
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 w
or
k
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t h
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 a
n 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 s
up
po
rt
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
?
H
av
e 
th
ey
 b
ec
om
e 
m
or
e 
so
ph
is
tic
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 
de
ca
de
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t h
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 a
n 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 s
up
po
rt
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
?
H
av
e 
th
ey
 b
ec
om
e 
m
or
e 
so
ph
is
tic
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 
de
ca
de
?
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To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
yo
u 
co
op
er
at
e 
w
ith
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 (o
ut
si
de
 
ac
ad
em
ia
)?
H
ow
, a
nd
 w
hy
, i
s 
co
nt
ac
t 
w
ith
 e
xt
er
na
l s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
yo
u 
co
op
er
at
e 
w
ith
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
?
H
ow
, a
nd
 w
hy
, i
s 
co
nt
ac
t 
w
ith
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 h
av
e 
on
 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 ru
le
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
nd
 re
so
ur
ce
 
al
lo
ca
tio
n?
D
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
ha
ve
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
yo
ur
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 w
or
k 
(r
es
ea
rc
h/
te
ac
hi
ng
)?
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 im
pa
ct
 d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
ha
ve
 o
n 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 
w
or
k 
of
 y
ou
r u
ni
t?
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 im
pa
ct
 d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
ha
ve
 
on
 a
ca
de
m
ic
 s
ta
ff?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
s 
do
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 re
la
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
s 
do
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 re
la
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
In
 w
ha
t w
ay
s 
do
 e
xt
er
na
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
r a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 re
la
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
in
flu
en
ce
 y
ou
r t
im
e 
sc
he
du
le
s 
or
 p
rio
rit
ie
s?
D
o 
th
es
e 
ch
oi
ce
s 
ha
ve
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
in
flu
en
ce
 y
ou
r t
im
e 
sc
he
du
le
s 
or
 p
rio
rit
ie
s?
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 in
flu
en
ce
 y
ou
r 
tim
e 
sc
he
du
le
s 
or
 
pr
io
rit
ie
s?
H
ow
 w
el
l d
o 
th
e 
de
m
an
ds
 fr
om
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
nd
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s 
al
ig
n?
 
Ca
n 
yo
u 
pr
ov
id
e 
ex
am
pl
es
?
H
ow
 w
el
l d
o 
th
e 
de
m
an
ds
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
al
ig
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
ne
ed
s 
of
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 s
ta
ff?
Ca
n 
yo
u 
pr
ov
id
e 
ex
am
pl
es
?
Se
en
 fr
om
 y
ou
r p
oi
nt
 o
f 
vi
ew
, h
ow
 w
el
l d
o 
th
e 
de
m
an
ds
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
al
ig
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
ne
ed
s 
of
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
st
af
f?
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 a
ct
or
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 th
e 
un
iv
er
sit
y 
an
d 
sc
ie
nt
ii
c 
co
m
m
un
ity
 (p
ol
ic
y-
m
ak
er
s, 
fu
nd
er
s, 
in
du
st
ry
 e
tc
.)
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W
ho
 d
o 
yo
u 
fe
el
 y
ou
 a
re
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
Pl
ea
se
 e
la
bo
ra
te
 o
n 
ho
w
 
an
d 
w
hy
?
W
ho
 d
o 
yo
u 
fe
el
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
Pl
ea
se
 e
la
bo
ra
te
 o
n 
ho
w
 
an
d 
w
hy
?
W
ho
 d
o 
yo
u 
fe
el
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
Pl
ea
se
 e
la
bo
ra
te
 o
n 
ho
w
 
an
d 
w
hy
?
W
ho
 a
re
 y
ou
 fo
rm
al
ly
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
(If
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
iff
er
en
ce
), 
w
hy
 d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
es
e 
di
ffe
r?
W
ho
 a
re
 y
ou
 fo
rm
al
ly
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
(If
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
iff
er
en
ce
), 
w
hy
 d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
es
e 
di
ffe
r?
W
ho
 a
re
 y
ou
 fo
rm
al
ly
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
?
(If
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
iff
er
en
ce
), 
w
hy
 d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
th
es
e 
di
ffe
r?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e,
 
in
 th
e 
la
st
 d
ec
ad
e,
 in
 th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 a
tt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
by
 th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
nd
 
ho
w
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 a
 c
ha
ng
e 
(la
st
 d
ec
ad
e)
 in
 th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 a
tt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
by
 th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
? 
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
nd
 
ho
w
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e,
 in
 
th
e 
la
st
 d
ec
ad
e,
 in
 th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 a
tt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
by
 th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
?
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t a
nd
 
ho
w
?
Ca
n,
 a
nd
 d
o,
 y
ou
 fr
ee
ly
 
ex
pr
es
s 
yo
ur
 v
ie
w
s 
on
 
th
e 
w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 is
 ru
n 
or
 w
ith
 
re
ga
rd
 to
 te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
, i
n 
yo
ur
 w
or
ki
ng
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t?
 
Ar
e 
th
er
e 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 w
he
re
 
yo
u 
fe
el
 y
ou
r f
re
ed
om
 is
 
co
ns
tr
ai
ne
d 
or
 e
nh
an
ce
d?
Ca
n,
 a
nd
 d
o,
 y
ou
 fr
ee
ly
 
ex
pr
es
s 
yo
ur
 v
ie
w
s o
n 
th
e 
w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 is
 ru
n 
or
 w
ith
 
re
ga
rd
 to
 te
ac
hi
ng
 a
nd
 
re
se
ar
ch
, i
n 
yo
ur
 w
or
ki
ng
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t?
 
Ar
e 
th
er
e 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 fe
el
 y
ou
r 
fr
ee
do
m
 is
 c
on
st
ra
in
ed
 o
r 
en
ha
nc
ed
?
Ca
n,
 a
nd
 d
o,
 y
ou
 fr
ee
ly
 
ex
pr
es
s 
yo
ur
 v
ie
w
s 
on
 th
e 
w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
r 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 is
 ru
n 
in
 y
ou
r 
w
or
ki
ng
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t?
Ar
e 
th
er
e 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 w
he
re
 
yo
u 
fe
el
 y
ou
r f
re
ed
om
 is
 
co
ns
tr
ai
ne
d 
or
 e
nh
an
ce
d?
Tr
us
t /
 co
nt
ro
l i
s a
 
m
ed
ia
tin
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 le
ad
in
g 
to
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r 
hi
gh
er
/l
ow
er
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
yo
ur
 
be
ha
vi
or
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
em
an
ds
?
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 e
g.
 P
la
ns
, 
ev
al
ua
tio
ns
, b
ib
lio
m
et
ric
s
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
yo
ur
 
be
ha
vi
or
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
em
an
ds
?
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 e
g.
 P
la
ns
, 
ev
al
ua
tio
ns
, b
ib
lio
m
et
ric
s
To
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t i
s 
yo
ur
 
be
ha
vi
or
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
em
an
ds
?
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 
st
af
f?
Is
 th
e 
cu
ltu
re
 in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t 
be
tt
er
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 b
y 
co
lle
gi
al
is
m
 o
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
is
m
?
Is
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
an
d 
ha
m
pe
rin
g 
in
te
rn
al
 
co
op
er
at
io
n,
 o
r g
en
er
ou
s 
an
d 
su
pp
or
tiv
e 
of
 
co
op
er
at
io
n?
Is
 th
e 
cu
ltu
re
 in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t 
be
tt
er
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 b
y 
co
lle
gi
al
is
m
 o
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
is
m
?
Is
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
an
d 
ha
m
pe
rin
g 
in
te
rn
al
 
co
op
er
at
io
n,
 o
r g
en
er
ou
s 
an
d 
su
pp
or
tiv
e 
of
 
co
op
er
at
io
n?
Is
 th
e 
cu
ltu
re
 in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t 
be
tt
er
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 b
y 
co
lle
gi
al
is
m
 o
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
is
m
?
H
ow
 im
po
rt
an
t a
re
 
m
er
ito
cr
at
ic
 c
rit
er
ia
 fo
r 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t?
H
ow
 im
po
rt
an
t a
re
 
m
er
ito
cr
at
ic
 c
rit
er
ia
 fo
r 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
in
 y
ou
r u
ni
t?
W
ha
t i
ss
ue
s 
or
 m
er
its
 d
o 
yo
u 
fe
el
 p
la
y 
an
 im
po
rt
an
t 
ro
le
 in
 th
e 
at
m
os
ph
er
e 
of
 
yo
ur
 w
or
ki
ng
 u
ni
t?
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 b
ei
ng
 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 o
th
er
s; 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
nd
 
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
ac
tio
n
 
308 APPendix A: FinnUT inTeRview GUide enGlish
o
pe
er
 re
co
gn
iti
on
o
pe
er
 re
co
gn
iti
on
o
pe
er
 re
co
gn
iti
on
o
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
po
in
ts
o
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
po
in
ts
o
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
po
in
ts
o
st
ud
en
t f
ee
db
ac
k
o
st
ud
en
t f
ee
db
ac
k
o
st
ud
en
t f
ee
db
ac
k
o
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
o
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
o
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
o
fin
an
ci
al
o
fin
an
ci
al
o
fin
an
ci
al
o
m
ed
ia
 a
tt
en
tio
n 
o
m
ed
ia
 a
tt
en
tio
n
o
m
ed
ia
 a
tt
en
tio
n
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 s
al
ar
y 
ha
ve
 a
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
-d
im
en
si
on
 
(e
g.
 %
 o
f s
al
ar
y)
? 
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s 
th
at
 a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
r d
ai
ly
 ta
sk
s 
an
d 
pr
io
rit
ie
s?
 C
an
 y
ou
 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 e
xa
m
pl
e?
D
oe
s 
yo
ur
 s
al
ar
y 
ha
ve
 a
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
-d
im
en
si
on
 
(e
g.
 %
 o
f s
al
ar
y)
? 
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s 
th
at
 a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
r d
ai
ly
 
ta
sk
s 
an
d 
pr
io
rit
ie
s?
 C
an
 
yo
u 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 e
xa
m
pl
e?
D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
di
m
en
si
on
 in
 y
ou
r s
al
ar
y 
(e
g.
 %
)?
If 
so
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s
it 
af
fe
ct
 y
ou
r d
ai
ly
 ta
sk
s 
an
d 
pr
io
rit
ie
s?
D
oe
s 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 h
av
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
 in
 
pl
ac
e 
(e
g.
 te
nu
re
 tr
ac
k)
?
If 
so
, i
s 
it 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
? 
H
ow
?
D
oe
s 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 h
av
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
 in
 
pl
ac
e 
(e
g.
 te
nu
re
 tr
ac
k)
?
If 
so
, i
s 
it 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
? 
H
ow
?
D
o 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 h
av
e 
an
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
yo
ur
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
?
D
o 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 h
av
e 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f y
ou
r 
un
it?
In
 y
ou
r o
pi
ni
on
, d
oe
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 h
av
e 
an
 e
ffe
ct
 
on
 y
ou
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
yo
ur
 te
ac
hi
ng
 lo
ad
s 
in
 
th
e 
pa
st
 1
0 
ye
ar
s?
 W
ha
t 
ab
ou
t p
ub
lis
hi
ng
?
If 
so
, h
as
 th
is
 h
ad
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 (p
os
iti
ve
/n
eg
at
iv
e)
 
on
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 q
ua
lit
y?
H
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
yo
ur
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l w
or
k 
lo
ad
s 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
 1
0 
ye
ar
s?
 
If 
so
, h
as
 th
is
 h
ad
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 (p
os
iti
ve
/n
eg
at
iv
e)
 
on
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 q
ua
lit
y?
If 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
as
t 
de
ca
de
, h
as
 th
er
e 
be
en
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
w
or
k 
lo
ad
s?
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
ar
e 
th
e 
ke
y 
ac
co
m
pl
is
hm
en
ts
th
at
 w
ill
 s
ec
ur
e 
yo
ur
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 c
ar
ee
r?
Fo
rm
al
ly
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 
in
fo
rm
al
ly
?
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
ar
e 
th
e 
ke
y 
ac
co
m
pl
is
hm
en
ts
 
th
at
 w
ill
 s
ec
ur
e 
an
 
ac
ad
em
ic
 c
ar
ee
r?
Fo
rm
al
ly
? 
W
ha
t a
bo
ut
 
in
fo
rm
al
ly
?
W
ho
 tr
ea
ts
 y
ou
 w
ith
 
co
ur
te
sy
?
Eg
. A
ca
de
m
ic
 s
ta
ff,
 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
st
af
f, 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
?
W
ho
 tr
ea
ts
 y
ou
 w
ith
 
co
ur
te
sy
?
Eg
. A
ca
de
m
ic
 s
ta
ff,
 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
st
af
f, 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
?
W
ho
 tr
ea
ts
 y
ou
 w
ith
 
co
ur
te
sy
?
Eg
. A
ca
de
m
ic
 s
ta
ff,
 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
st
af
f, 
ex
te
rn
al
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
?
W
hi
ch
 ty
pe
s 
of
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 d
o 
yo
u 
fin
d 
im
po
rt
an
t?
   
   
   
   
[N
ot
e:
 
af
te
r t
he
 g
en
er
al
 
qu
es
tio
n,
 g
o 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
lis
t o
n 
th
e 
rig
ht
 fo
r t
he
 
pa
rt
s 
no
t m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 
th
e 
op
en
 a
ns
w
er
.]
W
hi
ch
 ty
pe
s 
of
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 d
o 
yo
u 
fin
d 
im
po
rt
an
t f
or
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f y
ou
r 
un
it?
W
hi
ch
 ty
pe
s 
of
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 
do
 y
ou
 fi
nd
 im
po
rt
an
t f
ro
m
 
a 
(a
ca
de
m
ic
) p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e?
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Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e:
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e:
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e:
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
au
to
no
m
y?
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
au
to
no
m
y?
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
au
to
no
m
y?
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n?
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n?
-
M
or
e/
le
ss
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n?
Is
 th
er
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 y
ou
 
w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 a
dd
 w
hi
ch
 
ha
sn
't 
be
en
 c
ov
er
ed
 in
 
th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 b
ef
or
e?
Is
 th
er
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 y
ou
 
w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 a
dd
 w
hi
ch
 
ha
sn
't 
be
en
 c
ov
er
ed
 in
 
th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 b
ef
or
e?
 Is
 th
er
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 y
ou
 
w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 a
dd
 w
hi
ch
 
ha
sn
't 
be
en
 c
ov
er
ed
 in
 th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 b
ef
or
e?
Ca
n 
w
e 
us
e 
th
e 
an
sw
er
s 
fr
om
 th
is
 in
te
rv
ie
w
 in
 
ot
he
r r
el
at
ed
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
an
d 
fo
r e
du
ca
tio
na
l 
pu
rp
os
es
, i
f w
e 
fin
d 
it 
us
ef
ul
? 
Ca
n 
w
e 
us
e 
th
e 
an
sw
er
s 
fr
om
 th
is
 in
te
rv
ie
w
 in
 
ot
he
r r
el
at
ed
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
an
d 
fo
r e
du
ca
tio
na
l 
pu
rp
os
es
, i
f w
e 
fin
d 
it 
us
ef
ul
? 
Ca
n 
w
e 
us
e 
th
e 
an
sw
er
s 
fr
om
 th
is
 in
te
rv
ie
w
 in
 o
th
er
 
re
la
te
d 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 a
nd
 fo
r 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l p
ur
po
se
s,
 if
 w
e 
fin
d 
it 
us
ef
ul
? 
A 
co
ns
en
t f
or
m
 w
ill
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r t
he
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s 
to
 s
ig
n.
A 
co
ns
en
t f
or
m
 w
ill
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r t
he
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s 
to
 s
ig
n.
A 
co
ns
en
t f
or
m
 w
ill
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r t
he
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s 
to
 s
ig
n.
H
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l t
en
de
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
la
st
 d
ec
ad
e?
H
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l t
en
de
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
la
st
 d
ec
ad
e?
H
ow
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l t
en
de
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
po
lic
y 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
st
 d
ec
ad
e?
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